İrlanda Veri Koruma Otoritesi (DPC) — ie/dpc/inquiry-permanent-TSB-april-2026

In the matter of the General Data Protection Regulation

DPC Case Reference: IN-22-7-3

In the matter of Permanent TSB plc trading as PTSB and PTSB Asset Finance

Decision of the Data Protection Commission made pursuant to Section 111 of the Data
Protection Act, 2018

Further to an own-volition inquiry commenced pursuant to Section 110 of the Data
Protection Act 2018

DECISION
Decision-Makers for the Data Protection Commission:

________________________________
Dr Des Hogan, Commissioner for Data Protection
&
Mr Dale Sunderland, Commissioner for Data Protection

30 April 2026

Data Protection Commission
6 Pembroke Row
Dublin, D02 X963
Ireland

Contents
A. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1
B. Preliminary Matters .............................................................................................................................. 2
a) Data Controller...................................................................................................................................... 2
b) Factual Scope of the Inquiry ................................................................................................................. 2
C. Legal Framework for the Inquiry and the Decision............................................................................... 4
a) Legal Basis for the Inquiry ..................................................................................................................... 4
b) Legal Basis for the Decision................................................................................................................... 4
D. Factual Background ............................................................................................................................... 5
E. Scope of the Inquiry and the Application of the GDPR ....................................................................... 13
F. Issues for Determination..................................................................................................................... 14
G. Analysis of the Issues for Determination ............................................................................................ 14
a) Issue 1: Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR .............................................................................................. 14
i. Assessment of the Risks ...................................................................................................................... 16
ii. Measures Implemented by PTSB and Appropriateness of those Measures ...................................... 22
(i) Technical measures........................................................................................................................ 23
(ii) Organisational Measures ............................................................................................................... 25
Data Protection Governance ......................................................................................................... 25
Training and Awareness ................................................................................................................. 27
Additional organisational measures .............................................................................................. 29
Security Journeys ........................................................................................................................... 29
Monitoring of Calls/Adherence to Security Procedures ................................................................ 32
b) Issue 2: Article 33 GDPR ...................................................................................................................... 35
i. The Obligation to Notify Without Delay ........................................................................................ 35
ii. The Breach Notifications ................................................................................................................ 38
H. Findings ............................................................................................................................................... 44
I. Decision on Corrective Powers ........................................................................................................... 45
J. Decision on Reprimand ....................................................................................................................... 45
K. Order to Bring Processing into Compliance ........................................................................................ 46
L. Decision on Administrative Fines ........................................................................................................ 46
a) Whether to impose an administrative fine ......................................................................................... 48
i. Article 83(2)(a) GDPR: the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking into account
the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number of data subjects
affected and the level of damage suffered by them .............................................................................. 48
Taking into account the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the
number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them .................................. 49
The nature of the infringements ......................................................................................................... 54

The Gravity of the Infringements ........................................................................................................ 57
The duration of the infringements...................................................................................................... 59
Assessment of Article 83(2)(a) GDPR .................................................................................................. 63
ii. Article 83(2)(b) GDPR: the intentional or negligent character of the infringement ...................... 63
iii. Article 83(2)(c) GDPR: any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage
suffered by data subjects ........................................................................................................................ 69
iv. Article 83(2)(d) GDPR: the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor taking into
account technical and organisational measures implemented by them pursuant to Articles 25 and 32; .
....................................................................................................................................................... 70
v. Article 83(2)(e) GDPR: any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor; ...... 72
vi. Article 83(2)(f) GDPR: the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority, in order to
remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the infringement; ................... 73
vii. Article 83(2)(g) GDPR: the categories of personal data affected by the infringement; ................ 73
viii. Article 83(2)(h) GDPR: the manner in which the infringement became known to the
supervisory authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the controller or processor
notified the infringement; ...................................................................................................................... 75
ix. Article 83(2)(i) GDPR: where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been ordered
against the controller or processor concerned with regard to the same subject-matter, compliance
with those measures;.............................................................................................................................. 75
x. Article 83(2)(j) GDPR: adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or
approved certification mechanisms pursuant to Article 42 ................................................................... 76
xi. Article 83(2)(k) GDPR: any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the circumstances
of the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the
infringement. .......................................................................................................................................... 76
Decisions on whether to impose administrative fines ........................................................................... 77
b) Decision on the amount of the administrative fines .......................................................................... 79
i Article 83(3) GDPR ......................................................................................................................... 80
ii Categorisation of the infringements .............................................................................................. 81
iii Seriousness of the infringements pursuant to Articles 83(2)(a), (b) and (g) GDPR ....................... 81
iv Turnover of the undertaking with a view to imposing an effective, dissuasive and proportionate
fine ....................................................................................................................................................... 82
v Aggravating and mitigating circumstances .................................................................................... 84
vi The relevant legal maximums for the different processing operations ........................................ 86
The relevant undertaking for the purposes of the fine calculation ........................................................ 86
vii Article 83(1) GDPR: Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness .................................... 91
Effectiveness .................................................................................................................................. 91
Dissuasiveness ............................................................................................................................... 91
Proportionality ............................................................................................................................... 92
M. Summary of Envisaged Action ............................................................................................................ 93
N. Right of Appeal.................................................................................................................................... 93

A. Introduction
1. The General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) is a regulation in European Union law on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data. The date
of application of the GDPR is 25 May 2018.1
2. The Data Protection Commission (‘the DPC’) was established on 25 May 2018, pursuant to
the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘the 2018 Act’), as Ireland’s supervisory authority within the
meaning of, and for the purposes specified in, the GDPR.2
3. The GDPR elaborates on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom,
equality and solidarity as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘the
Charter’) and Article 8 in particular, which safeguards the protection of personal data
provides:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent
authority.
4. This document (‘the Decision’) is a decision made by the DPC in accordance with section
111 of the 2018 Act. The DPC makes this Decision having considered the information
obtained in an own-volition inquiry (‘the Inquiry’) pursuant to section 110 of the 2018 Act.
5. This Decision considers particular aspects of the fundamental right to the protection of
personal data in relation to the security of processing and compliance with responsibilities
arising when a personal data breach has occurred.

1
Reference to ‘the GDPR’ in this Decision is to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (‘General Data Protection Regulation’).
2
SI 175/2018 Data Protection Act 2018 (Establishment Day) Order 2018.

6. This Decision is being provided to Permanent TSB plc trading as PTSB and PTSB Asset
Finance (‘PTSB’) pursuant to section 116(1)(a) of the 2018 Act, in order to give notice of the
Decision, the reasons for it, and the decision in relation to the powers exercised pursuant
to Article 58 of the GDPR.
7. This Decision contains corrective powers under section 115 of the 2018 Act and Article
58(2) GDPR arising from the infringements that have been identified herein. It should be
noted in this regard that PTSB is required to comply with the corrective powers that are
contained in this Decision, and it is open to the DPC to serve an enforcement notice on
PTSB in accordance with section 133 of the 2018 Act.
B. Preliminary Matters
a) Data Controller
8. In commencing the Inquiry, the DPC considered that PTSB was the controller, within the
meaning of Article 4(7) GDPR, in respect of the processing of personal data that was the
subject of the personal data breach notifications relevant to Inquiry (and detailed below).
In this regard, PTSB had confirmed that it was the controller in its breach notifications of
26 and 27 May 2022.
b) Factual Scope of the Inquiry
9. This Inquiry was commenced following a series of three data breach notifications made by
PTSB to the DPC on 26 and 27 May 2022. These notifications were logged on the DPC system
as BN-22-5-459, BN-22-5-469, and BN-22-5-497 (‘the Breaches’) and concerned PTSB’s
processing of personal data – including financial data – through its ‘Open24 Contact
Centre’.
10. PTSB is a leading provider of personal and business banking services in the Irish market.
The Open24 Contact Centre functions as PTSB’s primary point of customer contact. The
Open24 Contact Centre receives a large volume of calls from customers seeking to take
action in relation to their accounts, such as checking their account balance, transactions,
standing orders or to make fund transfers and payments to other designated accounts. In
this respect, PTSB has advised that the Open24 Contact Centre received circa
calls during 2022 and that PTSB recruited and trained Open24 Contact Centre staff
in the same period.3 The quantity of personal data potentially stored on customer accounts

3
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p1-2.

is also broad in scope and sensitive in nature, including data subject identity, contact
details, and economic and/or financial data.
11. The Breaches each concerned circumstances where malicious actors, in possession of
certain customer information, called PTSB’s Open24 Contact Centre posing as those
customers and sought to access their accounts or obtain or amend account details. PTSB
stated in its submissions of 12 September 2022 that the same source phone number was
used in BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497. It is therefore highly likely that the same malicious
actor was behind both attacks.4 The source number differed in BN-22-5-459 and PTSB
stated that this attack “appears to have involved a different bad actor”.5 In all three
instances, PTSB agents repeatedly failed to follow security procedures and the malicious
actor was able to change the mobile phone number on the accounts. Other information

were also disclosed by PTSB due to security failings. This meant that data
subjects were put at increased risk of additional fraud, were forced to close their accounts
and in BN-22-5-497 and BN-22-5-469, data subjects suffered financial loss. In the context
of BN-22-5-497, the correct security procedures were not followed on at least five calls with
five separate agents.6 Similarly, in the context of BN-22-5-469, appropriate procedures
were not followed on at least three separate occasions leading to the occurrence of
repeated personal data breaches.
12. Article 4(12) GDPR defines a data breach as “a breach of security leading to the accidental
or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal
data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed”. As the Breaches involved the
unauthorised alteration, disclosure of and access to personal data processed by PTSB
related to data subject accounts, the DPC is satisfied that personal data breaches occurred
under the meaning provided by Article 4(12) GDPR.
13. Three data subjects were affected by the Breaches, however, as the Breaches concerned
the technical and organisational measures implemented by PTSB in the Open24 Contact

4
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p40.
5
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p40.
6
In its submissions PTSB referred to agents and staff in relation to persons working on the behalf of PTSB. PTSB
also confirmed that agents are “bound by the same rules for securely identifying customers as full-time employees”
as noted at paragraph 28. Throughout this decision the DPC interchangeably uses agent and staff to refer to those
persons working on behalf of PTSB.

Centre, and the organised use of social engineering by bad actors seeking to circumvent
those measures, a potentially much higher number of data subjects were put at risk and
could have been affected.
C. Legal Framework for the Inquiry and the Decision
a) Legal Basis for the Inquiry
14. The GDPR is the legal regime covering the processing of personal data in the European
Union. As a regulation, the GDPR is directly applicable in EU member states. The GDPR is
given further effect in Irish law by the 2018 Act. As stated above, the Inquiry was
commenced pursuant to section 110 of the 2018 Act. By way of background in this regard,
under Part 6 of the 2018 Act the DPC has the power to commence an inquiry either on foot
of a complaint, or of its own volition.
15. Section 110(1) of the 2018 Act provides that the DPC may, for the purpose of section
109(5)(e) or section 113(2) of the 2018 Act, or of its own volition, cause such inquiry as it
thinks fit to be conducted, in order to ascertain whether an infringement has occurred, or
is occurring, of the GDPR or a provision of the 2018 Act, or regulation under the Act that
gives further effect to the GDPR. Section 110(2) of the 2018 Act provides that the DPC may,
for the purposes of section 110(1), where it considers it appropriate to do so, cause any of
its powers under Chapter 4 of Part 6 of the 2018 Act (excluding section 135 of the 2018 Act)
to be exercised and / or cause an investigation under Chapter 5 of Part 6 of the 2018 Act to
be carried out.
b) Legal Basis for the Decision
16. The decision-making process for the Inquiry which applies to this case is provided for under
section 111 of the 2018 Act. This requires that the DPC must consider the information
obtained during the Inquiry to decide whether an infringement is occurring or has occurred
and, if so, to decide on the corrective powers, if any, to be exercised. In so doing, the DPC
is required to assess all of the materials and submissions gathered during the Inquiry and
any other materials which the DPC considers to be relevant, in the course of the decision-
making process.
17. Having considered the information obtained in the Inquiry, the DPC is satisfied that the
Inquiry has been correctly conducted and that fair procedures have been followed
throughout. The DPC has had regard to submissions made by PTSB in respect of the draft
version of this Decision sent to PTSB on 29 August 2025 (‘the Draft Decision’) before
proceeding to make this final Decision under section 111 of the 2018 Act.

D. Factual Background
18. PTSB is a provider of banking services in Ireland, having its registered office at 56-59 St.
Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2. PTSB provides banking services via inter alia the Open24 service.
The Open24 service is defined as “the system provided by [PTSB] from time to time to enable
Customers and their Users to access, transact, and utilise services provided by us using
telephone, Internet or other technology-based communication.”7 The Open24 Contact
Centre is PTSB’s primary point of customer contact and sits within PTSB’s Digital and Direct
Team. It provides PTSB customers with access to a range of banking services via telephone.
19. As noted above, the data breach notifications each concerned circumstances where a
malicious actor, in possession of certain customer information, called PTSB’s Open24
Contact Centre posing as those customers and seeking to access their accounts or obtain
or amend account details. Based on the analysis undertaken of the breach notifications and
subsequent documentation provided during the breach handling process, the DPC
considered that the matters concerned breaches of security leading to the accidental or
unlawful destruction, loss, alteration or unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal
data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed by PTSB and thus constituted personal
data breaches within the meaning provided by Article 4(12) GDPR.
20. Following its own review, the DPC was of the opinion that one or more provisions of the
2018 Act and/or the GDPR may have been contravened in this case. The DPC subsequently
commenced an Inquiry of its own volition under, and in accordance with, section 110(1) of
the Act on 24 August 2022.
21. The circumstances of each of the Breaches are outlined below.
BN-22-5-459
22. In the breach notification form for BN 22-5-459, dated 26 May 2022, PTSB advised that the
data breach concerned a confidentiality breach (i.e. unauthorised disclosure of or access to
personal data) and an integrity breach (i.e. alteration of data) concerning an incident which
occurred on 8 April 2022.
23. A bad actor contacted the Open24 Contact Centre by phone on 8 April 2022 and
successfully changed the mobile phone number associated with the customer’s account.
PTSB stated that the customer’s online banking access and Visa debit card for his sole-
owner current account were cancelled on 8 April 2022 after he advised PTSB via telephone

7
Open24 Online Banking Terms and Conditions, p3.

that he had fallen victim to a vishing fraud incident on the same day.8 In a response
provided to the DPC of 22 June 2022, PTSB noted that this was an error and the customer
had in fact fallen victim to a smishing fraud incident.9
24. On 16 April 2022, the customer called PTSB again and advised that he was having difficulty
completing transactions from a different, joint-owner current account also held with PTSB.
PTSB concluded that the incorrect phone number was held on file and that the customer
had not received the secure customer authentication text messages. Upon further
investigation, PTSB determined that the phone number on file had been updated by a
malicious actor on 8 April 2022 and this incorrect number remained on the account until
16 April 2022. PTSB stated that the update occurred due to the bank’s agent’s failure to
follow security procedures properly. In a subsequent phone call received by a separate
service agent on 8 April 2022, the customer’s email address was verbally disclosed to the
fraudulent caller. This was despite the caller’s failure to satisfactorily answer the
designated security questions.
25. PTSB noted that it was protocol for an SMS message to issue
as a means of verifying that the number was not updated fraudulently or in error. In
this instance PTSB noted that the customer did not have a record of receiving this
notification; however, PTSB stated that it held a record confirming that the SMS had issued.
26. PTSB indicated that remedial mitigating measures were put in place after the breach,
including:
“1. Feedback has been provided to the relevant department.
2. The customer's phone number has been reverted on the Bank's systems.
3. The customer's online access number and Visa debit cards have been cancelled.
4. The Bank has recommended the customer close his accounts with the Bank as
the Bank would no longer be in a position to continue to guarantee the safety of
the account in the future. In the meantime, transaction holds have been placed on
the customer's accounts in an effort to prevent any fraudulent activity on the
accounts.

8
Vishing is the use of fraudulent phone calls to make the recipient provide his or her personal data to the bad
actor.
9
Smishing is the use of fraudulent text messages, including SMS or instant messages, to make the recipient
provide his or her personal data to the bad actor.

5. The staff members responsible for this security breach were removed from
customer calls and provided with emergency training, outlining the Bank's security
procedures.
6. An email reminding all staff in the Bank's contact centre of the correct security
procedures has been issued.”
27. Subsequent to the breach notification BN 22-5-459, the DPC wrote to PTSB on 1 June 2022
seeking further information in relation to the breaches.
28. PTSB responded on 8 June 2022 and confirmed that the call by the malicious actor on 8
April 2022 was handled by an agent contracted to work for PTSB and based in the PTSB call
centre. PTSB confirmed that such agents were “bound by the same rules for securely
identifying customers as full-time employees”.
29. PTSB additionally provided the following details in relation to the protocols and procedures
for verification of callers’ ID and changing customers’ contact phone numbers.

30. PTSB confirmed that there was no written protocol in place to notify a manager or to place
an alert after unsuccessful attempts to change the contact telephone number of a
customer. However, for agent assisted calls, it was procedure

31. PTSB provided the following response in relation to the DPC’s query regarding the
protocols, procedures or rules governing the internal reporting of personal data breaches
to PTSB’s Data Protection Unit:
“As per PTSB data breach protocol all incidents of loss of control of personal data
must be reported to the DP team as soon as staff become aware of the incident.
Staff members must promptly report any breach to their Line Manager and/or
Head of Function and the Data Protection team within 24 hours of detection. If
there are other circumstances where a data breach or suspected data breach
occurred, staff members are asked to contact the Data Protection Team. If, on
review, the Data Protection team determines that a breach has occurred, the Data
Protection team will then advise whether: -
the breach needs to be reported to the DPC; and
the affected data subject/individual needs to be informed of the breach”
32. The DPC team handling the breach notification wrote to PTSB on 15 June 2022 seeking
further information in relation to the breaches. On 22 June 2022, PTSB responded to the
DPC and indicated that there was an error in its submission on 26 May 2022, whereby it
had indicated that the customer had fallen victim to a vishing fraud incident and that it was
in fact a smishing fraud incident. PTSB confirmed that this occurred on 8 April 2022, when
the customer received a text message purporting to be from his mobile service provider
and clicked on a link. The customer then contacted PTSB’s fraud department on the same
date to advise them of the matter and provided his name, address, BIC, IBAN & card details
in relation to the account held in his sole name. PTSB confirmed that customer’s personal

10
The response provided by PTSB on 8 June 2022 was subsequently corrected by PTSB in its submissions of 16
February 2024 due to a number of factual inaccuracies. The updated information appears in the quote.

online access and debit card for his sole account were both cancelled by PTSB on 8 April
2022, following the above referenced telephone call.
33. PTSB additionally provided the below response in relation to the DPC’s query as to whether
the protocols or procedures in effect at the time of those cancellations require or advise
placing restrictions or security flags on other accounts of the customer:
“[O]nce the Bank became aware of the smishing incident where the customer
provided details of the account held in his sole name, his personal online access
and debit card for his sole account were cancelled. At the time of the smishing
incident, the details provided by the customer to the fraudulent actor were not
deemed severe enough to warrant additional action across all accounts.
It was regrettable that as a result of the agent disclosures, that the customer’s
mobile phone number was provided to the unauthorised party which led to an
amendment of this number on our customer’s records. It was this reason why the
customer experienced difficulty in completing transactions on his joint account as
the secure customer authentication text messages were not being received by him,
which is how this matter came to light. The Bank then took additional action by
placing transaction holds [restricts transactions] on both the sole account and the
account held in joint names.”
34. In its submissions of 16 February 2024 on the DPC’s Issues Paper, provided as part of the
Inquiry,11 PTSB stated that while the agent did not follow security protocols, and while the
customer’s number was amended on its records as a result, the agent did not in fact
disclose the customer’s phone number.
BN-22-5-469
35. In the breach notification form for BN-22-5-469, dated 27 May 2022, PTSB advised the DPC
that the data breach concerned a confidentiality breach (i.e. unauthorised disclosure of or
access to personal data), an integrity breach (i.e. alteration of data), and an availability
breach (i.e. loss or destruction of data).
36. PTSB stated that on 3 May 2022 a customer contacted PTSB to query fraudulent
transactions on her current account. On reviewing the customer’s account, PTSB noted that
a malicious actor had called the Open24 Contact Centre on three consecutive days from 20

11
DPC Inquiry Issues Paper was issued to PTSB on 18 January 2024. It was intended to document the relevant facts
established by the DPC and the issues which might fall for consideration in the decision of the DPC.

April 2022. PTSB stated that the malicious actor provided
for the customer account. However, PTSB call agents repeatedly failed to
follow proper security protocol and disclosed customer details on these calls
These details allowed
the bad actor to access the
customer’s account and make a number of fraudulent transactions totalling
approximatively €35,000.12
37. PTSB further stated that during a call on 22 April 2022, the bad actor was successful in
updating the mobile phone number registered to the Open24 account despite failing to
satisfactorily complete the relevant security protocol. This phone number is required for
secure customer authentication for online transactions. PTSB issued an SMS
to ensure that the change had not been carried out
fraudulently or in error. The customer subsequently confirmed receipt of the SMS but did
not contact PTSB at the time as they were resident in
38. PTSB said that its fraud monitoring system was triggered on 22 April 2022 in relation to one
of the fraudulent transactions. However, the phone number on the account had been
updated at this point, which resulted in the bad actor being contacted in relation to the
transaction. The bad actor falsely confirmed that the queried transaction was genuine. On
3 May 2022 the customer called the fraud department and the extent of the fraudulent
activity was established.
39. Subsequent to the breach notification BN 22-5-469, the DPC team handling the breach
notification wrote to PTSB seeking further information in relation to the breaches. In
particular, the DPC requested clarification as to how the contact number for the customer’s
account was changed by the bad actor without confirmation being received in response to
the SMS notification sent to the customer in
40. PTSB responded on 8 June 2022 and clarified, inter alia, as below:

“In circumstances where a phone number is updated on an account, it is protocol
for an SMS notification message to issue as a
means of verifying that the number was not updated fraudulently or in error. This
SMS message, which is intended as a security measure and requests that the

12
A full refund was later made available to the customer on 27 June 2022.

customer ‘contact us if this update was not made by you’, does not require
confirmation by return. This change is made at the point of time at which the
amendment to the account is made. In this instance, as the customer did not
contact the bank as a result of this SMS notification, the amendment to the
account remained in place until the customer called the bank directly on 3 May
2022.”

41. In its submissions of 16 February 2024 on the Issues Paper, PTSB clarified that there is a
delay in the new mobile phone number becoming effective to allow time for the
customer to respond to the SMS, e.g. a new beneficiary cannot be set up until after the
have elapsed.13
BN-22-5-497

42. In the breach notification form for BN-22-5-497, dated 27 May 2022, PTSB advised that the
data breach concerned a confidentiality breach (i.e. unauthorised disclosure of or access to
personal data), an integrity breach (i.e. alteration of data), and an availability breach (i.e.
loss or destruction of data).
43. PTSB stated that its fraud department noted suspicious transactions on the customer
account on 7 May 2022. PTSB attempted to contact the customer to query these
transactions but was initially unsuccessful. The customer subsequently contacted PTSB on
9 May 2022 and confirmed that the transactions were fraudulent. On review of the
customer’s account activity, PTSB noted that a malicious actor had contacted PTSB on four
occasions between 6 and 7 May 2022. The unauthorised third party was able to provide
the customer's The unauthorised
third party was provided with the
due to security failings by PTSB agents. In this
instance, the customer did not have a record of receiving an SMS notification when the
number was updated, however PTSB stated that it held a record which confirmed that the
SMS had issued.
44. PTSB stated that a fraudulent phone number was associated with these accounts from 6
May to 10 May 2022 and that this resulted in an unauthorised third party having access to
the customer's account. A number of unauthorised transactions in the amount of

13
In its submissions of this date, PTSB further noted that, in higher risk jurisdictions, the usual time lag on any
changes taking effect has been extended .

approximately €10,000 were made by the unauthorised third party. 14 PTSB placed
transaction holds on the customer's accounts on 9 May 2022 and the customer's phone
number was reverted on the bank's systems.
45. PTSB provided details of mitigating measures that were implemented following the breach:
“1. Feedback has been provided to the relevant department.
2. The fraudulent phone number has been removed from the Bank's systems.
3. The customer's online access number has been cancelled.
4. The staff members responsible for this security breach were removed from
customer calls and provided with emergency training, outlining the Bank's security
procedures.
5. An email reminding all staff in the Bank's contact centre of the correct security
procedures has been issued.
6. The Bank placed transaction holds on the customer’s accounts on 9 May 2022”
46. Subsequent to the breach notification BN 22-5-497, the DPC wrote to PTSB on 1 June 2022
seeking further information in relation to the breaches and in particular queried: (i) how
the malicious actor in this case gained access to the customer’s
;(ii) how the malicious actor came to be given the customer’s
given that these would normally be expected to be known by customers; (iii) if
applicable protocols and procedures, or any other rule or practice in effect at the relevant
time, required or advised placing an alert or warning on a customer’s account after
unsuccessful attempts to access customer accounts details by phone; (iv) if the verification
SMS message concerning the change of contact phone number was sent to the customer

47. PTSB responded on 8 June 2022. In relation to the query as to how the malicious actor
gained access to the customer’s PTSB stated:
“Further investigations of the calls received by the Bank have shown that the
customer’s [] was disclosed by the Bank’s agent. Regrettably, this
was due to a failure on the part of the Bank’s agent to properly follow the security
procedures in place. This information was obtained by malicious actor posing as

14
A full refund was provided on 9 June 2022.

the customer by completing some security questions and proceeding through the
Open24 registration process in a call on 6 May 2022.”15
48. As to how the malicious actor came to be given the customer’s ,
PTSB confirmed:
“In this case our records show that regrettably the agent did not follow proper
procedure and disclosed the customer’s We can
confirm that due to security failings by the Bank's agents, over the course of four
calls made between the 6 and 7 May 2022 the unauthorised third party was
provided with our customer's .”

49. PTSB additionally confirmed that its records showed that a verification SMS was sent to the
customer .
E. Scope of the Inquiry and the Application of the GDPR
50. The scope of the Inquiry, which was set out in the Inquiry Commencement Notice which
issued on 24 August 2022, was to examine whether or not PTSB discharged its obligations
in connection with the subject matter of the notified personal data breaches and to
determine whether or not any provision(s) of the 2018 Act and/or the GDPR have been
contravened by PTSB in that context.
51. The Inquiry Commencement Notice specified that the Inquiry would focus on PTSB’s
organisational and technical measures in place to ensure security of the personal data
particularly in relation to its telephone call handling processes. In this regard, the Inquiry
would examine associated policies and procedures that were in place that identify any risks
to data subjects and the organisational and technical measures to address those risks. The
Commencement Notice additionally stated that the Inquiry would focus on the areas of
Data Protection Governance, Training and Awareness, Records Management and Security
of Personal Data. The Commencement Notice also specified that the Inquiry would consider
PTSB’s compliance with the Article 33 GDPR obligations regarding notification of a personal
data breach to the supervisory authority.
52. The temporal scope (‘temporal scope’) of the Inquiry concerns the period from 25 May
2018 to 27 May 2022.

15
The response provided by PTSB on 8 June 2022 was subsequently corrected by PTSB in its submissions of 16
February 2024 due to a factual inaccuracy. The updated information appears in the quote.

F. Issues for Determination
53. Having reviewed the Issues Paper and the other relevant materials, the DPC considers that
the issues on which it must make a decision are as follows: (i) whether PTSB has infringed
Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR in respect of its processing of personal data via the Open24
Contact Centre and (ii) whether PTSB complied with the requirement, under Article 33(1)
GDPR, to notify personal data breaches to the DPC without undue delay when notifying the
Breaches.
G. Analysis of the Issues for Determination
a) Issue 1: Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR
54. Article 5 GDPR sets out principles relating to processing of personal data. Article 5(1)(f),
which relates to the ‘integrity and confidentiality’ of personal data, establishes security of
personal data processing as one of these core principles.
55. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR states, in this regard, that personal data shall be:
“…processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data,
including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against
accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or
organisational measures.”
56. Similarly, Recital 39 GDPR provides that:
“Personal data should be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security
and confidentiality of the personal data, including for preventing unauthorised
access to or use of personal data and the equipment used for the processing.”
57. The security principle in Article 5(1)(f) GDPR is closely associated with Article 32 GDPR.
Article 32(1) GDPR provides as follows:
“"1. Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the
nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying
likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the
controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk,
including inter alia as appropriate:
(a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data;
(b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and
resilience of processing systems and services;

(c) the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely
manner in the event of a physical or technical incident;
(d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness
of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the
processing.”
58. Article 32(2) GDPR provides:
“In assessing the appropriate level of security account shall be taken in particular
of the risks that are presented by processing, in particular from accidental or
unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to
personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.”
59. Those requirements are reflected in Recital 83 GDPR, which states:
“In order to maintain security and to prevent processing in infringement of this
Regulation, the controller or processor should evaluate the risks inherent in the
processing and implement measures to mitigate those risks, such as encryption.
Those measures should ensure an appropriate level of security, including
confidentiality, taking into account the state of the art and the costs of
implementation in relation to the risks and the nature of the personal data to be
protected. In assessing data security risk, consideration should be given to the risks
that are presented by personal data processing, such as accidental or unlawful
destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed which may in particular lead to
physical, material or non-material damage.”
60. Arising from the above, it is useful to outline a number of matters which are relevant to the
interpretation of Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32 GDPR.
61. First, it is clear that assessment of risk is an important concept in Article 5(1)(f), Article 32(1)
and Article 32(2) GDPR. Recitals 75 and 76 GDPR also provide guidance as to the types of
risk that can arise from data processing and how risk should be evaluated. In particular,
Recital 76 of the GDPR indicates that:
“The likelihood and severity of the risk to the rights and freedoms of the data
subject should be determined by reference to the nature, scope, context and
purposes of the processing. Risk should be evaluated on the basis of an objective
assessment, by which it is established whether data processing operations involve
a risk or a high risk.”

62. Second, Article 5(1)(f) GDPR refers to the requirement for a controller to ensure
appropriate security of the personal data, using appropriate technical and organisational
measures. The GDPR does not identify specific technical and organisational measures that
must be applied, nor does it set requirements in terms of the standard of such measures,
provided that they are appropriate. Likewise, Article 32 GDPR requires controllers and
processors to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a
level of security appropriate to the risk arising from the processing. Whereas that provision
does not specify particular measures which should be implemented, the chosen technical
and organisational measures should be effective and appropriate in terms of implementing
data protection into the processing.16
63. Third, Article 32(1)(a) to (d) GDPR provide certain examples of security measures which
may be considered in the context of Article 32, and so provides useful guidance as to the
types of measures which may be appropriate depending on the processing concerned.
64. For the purpose of assessing PTSB’s compliance with Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32 GDPR, the
primary issue for consideration is whether the technical and organisational measures which
PTSB implemented in respect of the Open24 Contact Centre ensured “appropriate security
of the personal data”, and in particular “a level of security appropriate to the risk” arising
from the processing. In order for PTSB to comply with Article 5(1)(f) or 32 GDPR, it was not
under an obligation to eliminate all risk of a personal data breach occurring, and a strict
liability standard is not imposed by the GDPR.
65. Article 32 GDPR in particular requires an assessment of the risks that are presented by the
processing, taking into account its nature, scope, context and purpose. Controllers must
also consider the risks for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Having taken these
factors into account, the controller must implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk.
i. Assessment of the Risks
66. The processing of personal data by PTSB in the context of its Open24 Contact Centre
involves a variety of risks. Those risks include the risk of the loss of access to user accounts
as well as unauthorised access and unauthorised disclosure of personal data to third
parties. This carries very significant risks for data subjects, including potential misuse of
data in the form of unauthorised access leading to financial loss or the disclosure of data

16
European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data Protection by Design and Default
Guidelines, pages 6-7.

leading to potential identify theft and loss of control over personal data. Furthermore,
there is a possibility of users being locked out of their accounts, meaning they no longer
have access to the funds contained therein for a period of time, or are required to close
their accounts.
67. The requirement in Article 32 GDPR (and Article 5(1)(f) GDPR) is that a controller must
assess the risks, or potential threats, associated with the processing of personal data in
determining the appropriate level of security to be applied. The purpose of assessing risk,
therefore, is to identify potential issues that could arise and the likelihood of same, and put
appropriate measures in place to prevent, or minimise the risk of, such issues materialising,
whether such occurrences arise unintentionally or otherwise.
68. In considering the risk assessment in the context of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR, it is
necessary to carry out an objective assessment of the risks presented by the processing to
determine the appropriate level of security. Risk must be assessed by reference to (i) the
likelihood of the risk, and (ii) the severity of the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons. Hence, the risk assessment for PTSB’s processing of personal data should have
considered, first, the likelihood of unauthorised disclosure or alteration of, or access to, the
personal data, and second, the severity of that risk in respect of the rights and freedoms of
the data subjects. These objective assessments should have been made by reference to the
nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing. In considering these factors, regard
must also be had to the quantity of personal data processed and the sensitivity of that data.
69. The assessment within this section of the Decision is concerned with how PTSB evaluated
the risk arising in respect of the security of personal data and, in particular, the risk arising
from the Open24 Contact Centre as PTSB’s primary point of customer contact. In particular,
the risk of fraud as a result of an insufficient level of security would severely undermine a
customer’s relationship with the bank as the relationship is premised on the agreement
that the bank would ensure the customers’ monies are secure and safe. In addition, the
risks posed to vulnerable users are particularly high. Such persons may lack the capacity to
realise they have been subject to fraud or financial theft.
70. As regards how PTSB evaluated risk arising in respect of the security of personal data in the
Open24 Contact Centre, PTSB outlined that, in its Operational Risk Management

Framework which was approved in December 2020 and implemented in January 2021, it
had taken into consideration:17
(i) the type of information which is processed via Open24,
(ii) the function of Open24 (front line contact centre) and its limitations (some
customer requests cannot be accommodated via Open24),
(iii) the capability of bad actors penetrating data security measures within Open24,
(iv) the likelihood of bad actors penetrating the Open24 data security measures and
the consequences of this materialising for both customers and PTSB,
(v) recent trends and developments of techniques that bad actors may use to
penetrate the Open24 security measures and systems,
(vi) the adequacy of PTSB’s procedures and systems to mitigate risk of customer data
being compromised, and
(vii) PTSB’s other legal and regulatory obligations such as the Consumer Protection
Code 2012 and Payment Account Regulations 2016.18
71. PTSB stated that as a regulated entity, it had an Internal Control Framework (‘ICF’) which
set out the structures, frameworks, policies and procedures employed by PTSB to ensure,
among other things, safe management of data protection and security.19 This is governed
by its Enterprise Risk Management Framework (‘ERMF’), which sets out an “approach to
risk identification, assessment, measurement, mitigation, control, monitoring, testing, and
reporting across the Three Lines of Defence.”2021
72. ERMF, it was noted, is in turn supported by “a set of frameworks, policies, and procedures
(including methodologies and standards) that provide the foundation and structure for
PTSB’s approach for effectively and efficiently designing, implementing, monitoring,
reviewing, and continually improving risk and compliance management across the

17
PTSB Operational Risk Management Framework January 2021, p2.
18
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p3.
19
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p4.
20
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p4.
21
The Three Lines of Defence is a common risk management and internal control framework. The first line owns
and manages risk directly. It identifies, assesses and controls risks as part of day-to-day activities. The second line
consists of separate risk management, compliance, monitoring and control functions, which provides inter alia
policies/frameworks and oversight to the first line. The third line consists of an internal audit function which
provides independent assurance of the first two lines.

enterprise (including data protection risk).”22 These risk management processes include
activities such as PTSB’s Risk and Control Self-Assessment exercise (‘RCSA’), monitoring risk
activities (including data protection risk), and the control testing of those risks.
73. As noted above, PTSB stated that it operates a ‘Three Lines of Defence’ approach to the
assessment and management of risk, including data protection risk. In the First Line of
Defence (‘1LOD’), PTSB stated that an active RCSA was maintained which set out an
assessment of Open24’s data protection risks and the risk to any data subject, which arise
from the team’s activities both in terms of likelihood of the risks, and the severity of the
impact of the occurrence of those risks. PTSB considered that the RCSA enabled it to carry
out an objective assessment of the risks presented by the processing to determine the
appropriate level of security.23 In this regard, the risk ratings were assessed using the Group
Materiality Matrix24 and PTSB then implemented technical and organisational measures in
Open24 to mitigate identified and inherent risks and the residual risk was also assessed.25
The 1LOD was also required to escalate and report on any
Risk Acceptance through the relevant governance process.26
74. In its submissions in response to the Inquiry Commencement Notice, the data protection
and data subject risks relevant to the Open24 Contact Centre RSCA, along with their risk
rating, were outlined by PTSB as follows. First, PTSB stated that the risk of inappropriate
disclosure of information to customers or third parties was given an inherent risk of
, the highest risk score within PTSB’s risk framework. Second, the risk of inadequate
protection of customer data, including customer data transmitted to and/or shared
to/from third parties engaged by PTSB, was also given an inherent risk of . Finally,
the risk of untimely or non-reporting of ‘Data Protection Breaches’ per PTSB’s Data Security
Breach Procedures, was given an inherent risk of which is the 2nd highest risk
score within PTSB’s risk framework. 27

75. However, in its submissions in response to the Issues Paper, PTSB clarified that, at the time
of the Breaches, Open24’s RSCA had six data protection related risks documented with the

22
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p4.
23
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p5.
24
According to which risks were rated as Critical, Significant, Important or Minor.
25
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p5.
26
Permanent TSB Bank, Risk and Control Self-Assessment Process, January 2022, p19.
27
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p5.

inherent risks rated as follows: 28 The relevant

extract from the RSCA is set out at Appendix 1 below and the risks identified therein were
as follows:
(i) The risk that the Bank does not have the appropriate technical and organisation
measures to secure data leading to unauthorised access or disclosure due to
human error or inadequate procedures or processes, resulting in potential data
breaches, regulatory censure, customer detriment, reputational damage and/or
financial loss.
(ii) The risk that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the Bank's assets,
including systems and data, are compromised potentially leading to data
breaches, unavailability of systems, inability to access data, unreliable data
resulting in negative customer impact, breach of regulatory obligations and
financial loss, reputational damage, regulatory censure or sanction.
(iii) The risk that new and/or existing staff are not suitably qualified or trained for their
role resulting in regulatory breaches, and / or customer detriment.
(iv) The risk of failure to attract, retain or engage staff leading to insufficient resources
to deliver business activity resulting in financial loss, reputational damage,
regulatory breaches and/or customer detriment.
(v) The risk of inadequate, incomplete, inaccurate, and lack of adherence to
frameworks and policies resulting in failure to consistently achieve and deliver
business objectives.
(vi) The risk of external fraud perpetuated on customers/PTSB accounts, banks
systems and/or bank staff resulting in breaches of regulatory requirements,
regulatory censure, customer detriment, reputational damage and/or financial
loss.
76. PTSB submitted that the RSCA “is robust and effectively considers the data protection risks
applicable to customers interacting with the Open24 Contact Centre”.29 In addition, it was
submitted that, in line with the ‘Three Lines of Defence’ approach to the assessment and
management of risk, the “RSCA is subject to frequent review and challenge by both the [First

28
Those risks where then assessed and assigned a residual risk rating (the risk that remained after considering the
extent to which controllers or other factors mitigate the risk) as follows: 3 Significant, 1 Important, 2 Minor.
29
PTSB response to the statement of issues of 16 February 2024, p4.

Line of Defence] and Second Line of Defence, and the maintenance of the Open24 RCSA and
its controls means PTSB monitors emerging data protection and data security risks and
mitigants within the Open24 Contact Centre.”30
77. PTSB submitted that its second line of defence (‘2LOD’), which operated as an independent
risk management function, supported and challenged its 1LOD RCSA and aimed to ensure
that appropriate technical and organisational data protection and data security measures
were in place, and were operating effectively, to manage the risks of customer data being
compromised.31 In addition to developing and maintaining relevant risk frameworks and
policies, the 2LOD was required to engage in “[r]egular reporting to [the] Board and Senior
Management.”32 Similarly, the 2LOD was required to monitor risk and challenge “the
sufficiency of business-unit monitoring activities”, as necessary. The 2LOD was also required
to escalate issues “if risk management concerns [we]re not adequately addressed by the
[1LOD]”.33
78. PTSB further stated that its third Line of defence (‘3LOD’), which comprised the Group
Internal Audit Function (‘GIA’), also formed part of this risk assessment and provides
independent reasonable assurance to PTSB’s Board of Directors regarding the effective
operation of the governance, risk management and control processes established and
maintained by the First and Second Lines of Defence.34
79. In assessing the relevant risks, the DPC notes that PTSB processed a vast quantity of
personal data in the Open24 platform in respect of a large number of data subjects. The
key elements of the service provided by Open24 include enabling customers to access their
account balance, get information about their transactions, set up or view standing orders,
carry out cheque searches, transfer funds and make payments, pay bills, request account
statements, top-up mobile phones, register and view other PTSB accounts, view recent
credit card transactions, customise current account transaction history on screen, and
show policy details. The potential risks associated with unauthorised persons being able to
access and use another user’s account include identity theft, fraud and financial loss.35

30
PTSB response to the statement of issues of 16 February 2024, p4.
31
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022, p5-6.
32
Permanent TSB Group Regulatory Compliance Framework, p20.
33
Permanent Operational Risk Management Framework, p15.
34
PTSB response to the statement of issues of 16 February 2024, p18.
35 See Recital 75 GDPR.

80. The DPC notes that PTSB had itself considered that a number of critical risks arose in the
context of its Open24 Contact Centre, including (i) that appropriate technical and
organisational measures were not in place to secure data, leading to unauthorised access
or disclosure due to human error or inadequate procedures or processes; (ii) the risk that
new and/or existing staff are not suitably qualified or trained for their role resulting in
regulatory breaches and (iii) the risk of external fraud perpetuated on customers/PTSB
accounts, banks systems and/or bank staff.36 Additional risks, given a rating of
included “the risk of inadequate, incomplete, inaccurate, and lack of adherence to
frameworks and policies”.
81. In the circumstances, the DPC considers that, on an objective assessment, PTSB’s
processing of personal data via its Open24 Contact Centre presented a variety of risks that
were of high likelihood, including unauthorised access, alteration or disclosure of customer
data, requiring proper evaluation and management. The DPC makes this finding in light of
the sensitivity of personal data processed which included financial data and therefore
poses a target for bad actors. The quantity of personal data processed, the number of users
and the purposes of that processing together posed a significant risk in terms of likelihood.
The high volume of calls received in the Open24 Contact Centre and the external fraud
environment also led to a high likelihood of those risks arising. This underscores the need
for appropriate measures to mitigate such high risk.
82. The severity of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects was also high. The DPC
makes this finding in light of nature of the personal data processed. This processing entailed
a significant amount of personal and financial data. In the event of unauthorised access by
bad actors, data subject identity, contact details, economic or financial data could be
misused to the detriment of data subjects, as was case in the Breaches. Therefore, having
regard to this high risk, it was incumbent on PTSB to implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures as required by Article 32 GDPR.
ii. Measures Implemented by PTSB and Appropriateness of those Measures
83. The principle of integrity and confidentiality set out in Article 5(1)(f) GDPR requires that the
controller ensures appropriate security of personal data when processing using appropriate
technical or organisational measures. Article 32(1) GDPR requires that the controller shall
assess the risk to data subjects of the particular processing and shall implement appropriate

36
PTSB response to the statement of issues of 16 February 2024, Appendix 3.

technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk,
taking into account the factors listed in that Article.
84. PTSB’s submissions outlined the technical and organisational measures that it had in place
at the time of the Breaches to ensure the ongoing confidentiality and integrity of personal
data processing in the Open24 Contact Centre.

(i) Technical measures

85. In addition to the policies and procedures noted below, PTSB described specific technical
measures that it stated were in place at the time of the Breaches, including:
(i) Strong Customer Authentication (‘SCA’) – PTSB implemented SCA, which required
multi-factor authentication for online transactions and push notifications on
completion of certain actions. In this regard, when a PTSB customer made an
online transaction, a push notification was received through the Open24 app or
via SMS for the customer to verify the transaction. As an additional control, a push
notification was sent to the customer’s registered mobile phone number when
completing certain actions through Open24 telephone and online services.
Examples of these included the adding of a payee on a bill payment or confirming
an online transaction.37
(ii) Fraud Monitoring System (‘ARIC’) – PTSB’s fraud monitoring system identified
certain changes to customer profiles and transactions conducted through the
Open24 Contact Centre.

.38
86. While PTSB did have technical measures in place, these technical measures did not include
additional controls to prevent foreseeable human error and respond to predictable attacks
likely to be faced by the Open24 Contact Centre. In relation to the Breaches, PTSB
staff/agents manually altered customer account information without any form of

37
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p6-7.
38
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p15.

mandatory backend validation measures or prompts to the staff member to use the
necessary security protocols. Staff/agents were in a position to alter important account
details, such the phone number used for two factor authentication, or allow bad actors to
re-register and take over accounts, while repeatedly failing to pass the relevant security
protocol. Where PTSB staff /agents are in a position to alter customers’ personal data with
the possible serious knock-on effect of unauthorised access to the customers’ accounts,
there is an obligation on PTSB to regularly assess and evaluate the effectiveness of
measures in place to ensure that they are appropriate and responsive to the level of risk
present. Furthermore, there must be an ongoing and verifiable oversight of how the
staff/agents give effect to the controller’s policies and procedures and technical measures
should be put in place to ensure that the relevant security protocols are followed before
significant actions are taken in relation to an account.
87. The lack of appropriate technical safeguards was significant and was exploited by the
fraudulent actors in the Breaches. There were a number of technical measures that PTSB
could have implemented prior to the breaches to provide a level of security appropriate to
the risk, including enforced backend validation of login attempts to reduce agent
subjectivity and error, logging of unsuccessful attempts at account access via the Open24
Contact Centre, warnings that a number of unsuccessful attempts had been made to access
the account in the previous days or weeks to access or change account information, or
prompts to ensure that correct security procedures are followed by staff/agents prior to
accessing an account or changing account details via the Open24 Contact Centre.
88. An appropriate level of security includes technical measures that have, amongst other
things, the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience
of processing systems and services. While PTSB had technical measures in place at the time
of the Breaches, the lack of a control on foreseeable human error meant that the level of
technical security measures was not sufficient to ensure the safety and confidentiality of
the data being processed by PTSB in the context of the Open24 Contact Centre, in light of
the high risks inherent in that processing. Therefore, the DPC considers that the technical
security measures in place at the time of the Breaches did not meet the standards required
by Article 5(1)(f) or Article 32(1) GDPR.

(ii) Organisational Measures

Data Protection Governance

89. PTSB outlined the data protection policies and procedures it had in place at the time of the
Breaches including:
(i) Data Protection Policy which was reviewed annually and/or following any
significant market, regulatory or business developments impacting it;39
(ii) Information Security Policy, which set out the requirements for PTSB (and third
parties with whom PTSB engages) to manage its information and information
technology systems in a manner that appropriately protects the security of the
information stored and processed in those systems such as Open24.40
(iii) Fraud Prevention Policy, which governed all staff and business units, and
according to which, all new products or changes to existing products require
consideration from a fraud risk perspective, engagement with the Financial Crime
& Loss Prevention Unit for advice, and where required, a complete Fraud Risk
Assessment.41
(iv) Digital and Direct Security Manual which provided information on all relevant
security procedures for PTSB’s Digital & Direct Service team, including the
“security journeys” for incoming calls.
42

(v) Data Management Policy which was derived from the best practices of the Data
Management Association’s Data Management Framework. Other policies, such as
the Records Management and Data Quality policies were subordinated to the Data
Management Policy.43

39
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p12-13.
40
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p14.
41
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p16.
42
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p32-33.
43
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p13.

(vi) Data Security Breach Policy which set out the responsibilities for all employees in
relation to the identification and reporting of breaches of personal data to the
2LOD.44
90. PTSB’s Data Protection Officer (‘DPO’) and data protection team which advised, monitored
and reported on compliance with data protection obligations as part of the 2LOD.45
91. PTSB further stated that the design of PTSB’s risk management process, in line with
European Banking Authority Guidelines, was underpinned by traditional risk management
objectives and principles. Risks were identified, assessed, measured, monitored and
reported on by business units and functions that incur risks as a result of their frontline
commercial and operational activities. The 2LOD, it was submitted, ensured that all risks
were identified, assessed, measured, monitored, managed and properly reported on by the
relevant units in PTSB.46
92. The DPC is satisfied that PTSB had a range of important Data Protection Governance policies
and procedures in place to provide for the integrity and security of customers’ personal
data. However, these policies and procedures were deficient because there was no
procedure in place to notify a manager or place any alert on an account following
unsuccessful attempts to access or change account details by phone. As a result, bad actors
in possession of certain information were able to repeatedly test the security procedures
without consequence, as evidenced by the Breaches. This further allowed bad actors to
seek to extract information from numerous agents in an effort to obtain the full range of
security questions associated with an account. For example, in the cases of BN-22-5-469
and BN-22-5-49, PTSB identified that the bad actor made 51 calls to the Open24 Contact
Centre.
93. Furthermore, policies and procedures cannot be effective where they are not adhered to
by staff and the Breaches provide evidence of significant non-adherence to some of those
policies. In the cases of the Breaches leading to financial loss (BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-
497) the DPC notes that the root cause was identified as “(i) agents not fully following the
security procedure and (ii) agents not being aware of the additional procedural
requirements when dealing with change of contact number requests for customers with a
connection and/or address in .47 The Breaches illustrate numerous instances

44
PTSB Data Security Breach Policy, May 2018.
45
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p12.
46
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p11.
47
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p19.

of staff/agents not following appropriate security procedures, including numerous
instances of different staff/agents not following appropriate procedures in the case of the
same data breach. For example, in the context of BN-22-5-497, the correct security
procedures were not followed on at least five calls with five separate agents. Similarly, in
the context of BN-22-5-469, appropriate procedures were not followed on at least three
separate occasions leading to the occurrence of repeated personal data breaches.
94. Given the high risk to the rights and freedoms of PTSB customers, and given the sensitivity
of the personal data processed by PTSB, PTSB ought to have implemented appropriate
procedures to ensure that its data protection policies and risk management policies were
followed by staff/agents. As detailed further in the DPC’s consideration of the training and
organisational measures below, the DPC considers that the checks and enforcement
measures in place, at the time of the Breaches, were inadequate to ensure this was the
case. In particular, the level of initial training and testing of staff on the relevant security
procedures was insufficient, an issue which was aggravated by the various security journeys
in place and the lack of appropriate measures to account for when they were repeatedly
not followed.48 Furthermore, the level of monitoring fell below the required standard in
light of the high risks to data subjects.

Training and Awareness

95. PTSB stated that team members in its Digital and Direct team, which houses the Open24
Contact Centre, were “required to complete on-going Data Protection Training and
Development Courses which have been developed by PTSB’s Data Protection Team”.
Completion was monitored by PTSB’s Human Resources team.49
96. PTSB also stated that the “Open24 contact centre provides detailed training to members of
staff handling calls on behalf of PTSB as part on the Onboarding Process”.50 This training
was two weeks long - now three weeks - and all staff were required to pass one simulated
call prior to handling calls from customers on the Open24 system.51

48
Security Journeys are described by PTSB as “internal security procedures and controls in place for dealing with
incoming calls” and are discussed in more detail at paragraph 105.
49
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p9-10.
50
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p9.
51
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p6.

97. PTSB also submitted that the data protection team release awareness notices to all PTSB
employees, including those in the Open24 Contact Centre. PTSB stated that “data security
and data protection risk” was a key component of these trainings. PTSB provided details of
the training courses, which have been given since 7 September 2022, and which included
training on account registration, security processes, and the changing of personal details.52
98. PTSB stated that staff, including those in the Open24 Contact Centre, are required to
complete annual ongoing mandatory Learning and Development courses on specific
subject matters. PTSB gave details of courses including Operational and IT Risk Awareness,
Business Continuity Management and Conduct Risk which were undertaken prior to the
Breaches in 2022. Training courses that have taken place subsequent to the Breaches have
included Fraud Awareness, Cyber Security and Data Protection.53 In the Data Protection
course launched in June 2023, specific reference was made to the Breaches. 54
99. In general, data protection training needs to be frequent and regular to a degree that is
appropriate to the risk of the processing having regard to the activities being carried out.
The sensitivity of the data processed by PTSB, the detailed nature of its Open24 platform
which users use to access their financial data means that training should have been
provided to staff frequently and in sufficient detail in order to reduce the likelihood of fraud
leading to loss of confidentiality of personal data, as occurred in the Breaches.
100. Training should also be informed by the risks arising from the processing activities, as
outlined in risk assessments, and should be regularly updated as the risk landscape
changes. PTSB had previously identified phone calls from South African numbers as a
contributing factor in relation to the unauthorised disclosure of account information in
certain cases. This issue was originally identified by PTSB as early as 2020 and accordingly
it put additional steps in its staff onboarding programme. However, these steps were
removed before the Breaches occurred. The steps have subsequently been reintegrated
into the onboarding training programme.55
101. The DPC finds that the level of training provided to new staff prior to the Breaches,
including only one simulated call, was insufficient in light of the serious risks involved in the
processing, coupled with the ability of call agents to manually alter data without security
protocols being followed. This is particularly the case where the processing had a high risk

52
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p35.
53
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p35-37.
54
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p14.
55
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p41.

to the rights and freedoms of natural persons including identity theft, fraud or financial loss
as highlighted by Recital 75 GDPR.56 The DPC additionally notes that an internal audit
conducted by PTSB following the Breaches identified issues with initial staff training and
concluded that the structure of this training was “not sufficient given the evolving nature
of Customer Contact Centre processes and systems”.57 This is particularly relevant in the
context of the Breaches as the events that are the subject of this Inquiry involved staff who
were new to the Bank at the time and had thus recently completed their initial training.58
102. Considering the importance of maintaining the security of customers’ accounts and the
high risks to the customer arising as a result of unauthorised disclosure, PTSB ought to have
implemented more comprehensive training and evaluation processes to ensure that the
likelihood of agent error, either through unfamiliarity with PTSB procedures, social
engineering methods employed by bad actors or human error in relation to data entry, was
minimised appropriately. In particular, the nature of the personal data processed through
the Open24 Contact Centre increased the likelihood of bad actors carrying out targeted
attacks in order to carry out fraud. As a result, more rigorous initial training and testing with
simulated calls to ensure adherence to the relevant security procedures ought to have been
put in place.

Additional organisational measures

103. PTSB outlined that it had a range of additional organisational measures relating to security,
the most relevant of which are detailed below.

Security Journeys

104. The Open24 Contact Centre allowed a customer to securely identify themselves outside of
the SCA via either the Branch Security (Standard) process or the Enhanced Security process.
PTSB stated that these alternative processes could apply in situations including where

56
Recital 75 states: “The risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may
result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage, in particular:
where the processing may give rise to discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the
reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorised reversal of
pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage;…”
57
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022, Appendix 14.
58
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p13.

customers lacked the capability or capacity to operate in the on-line channel or were
unable to attend physically.59
• Branch Security (Standard) process -

This process did not allow the agent to give out any additional information
on the account and was only used when customers required very basic services, such
as the confirmation of an expected lodgement.60
• The Enhanced Security process –

.61
105. PTSB also provided details of the four “security journeys” available to agents for incoming
calls at the time of the incidents. In Security Journey number 1, callers were verified by

No further security questions were required as PTSB considered that this was sufficient for
the customer to demonstrate that they were a registered customer.
106. Security Journey number 2 applied to callers who were registering for Open24 access and
required
107. Security Journey number 3 applied to callers who were not registered for Open24

No financial transactions could be instructed under this security
journey.
108. Security Journey number 4, "Enhanced Security", was used in situations where a customer
was requesting to complete a change in their personal details and/or setting up a

59
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p7-8.
60
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p7.
61
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p7.

payee/standing order. The customer was asked to either

109. The DPC notes that following the Breaches, PTSB limited use of the third security journey
(standard/ branch security) to customers who completed either the Enhanced Security
process or were registered for Open24 access. The DPC finds that this was an inadequate
security measure in light of the risk in the circumstances and considers that the use of such
minimal purely knowledge-based authentication should be avoided. The ease with which
an attacker can discover the answers to many static knowledge-based questions, and the
relatively small number of possible choices for responding to many of them, results in this
method having a high risk of successful use by an attacker. This was aggravated in this case
by PTSB staff/agents accepting only partial answers with no technical safeguards in place
to prevent this. Whilst static knowledge-based questions may provide an additional
security layer in the absence of more secure measures, in certain limited circumstances,
they should not be relied upon as the sole mechanism to identify a user. This is all the more
the case when the processing is high risk in nature and has potentially severe consequences
for data subjects, including financial loss.
110. As evidenced by the Breaches, bad actors in possession of account holder information such
as name, address, email address, mobile phone numbers etc. can use such information to
bypass weak security requirements, in order to obtain more information, which can be used
to further an attack. In addition, in the context of the Open24 Contact Centre, as detailed
above, bad actors were able to repeatedly test the security procedures as there was no
rate limit when incorrect answers were provided, and repeated failed authentication
attempts via the Open24 Contact Centre were not logged or notified to the account holder,
which heightened the risk flowing from such inadequate procedures. It also appears that
the use of more minimal security measures for certain actions may also have caused
confusion to PTSB agents, leading to potential use in scenarios where it was identified as
not being appropriate,62 with no technical measures in place to prevent this. Ultimately,
the Open24 Contact Centre provided a less secure backdoor in to otherwise secure
accounts and presented a clear and predictable target for attackers.

62
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022, Appendix 15 p 5.

Monitoring of Calls/Adherence to Security Procedures

111. In addition to the above, PTSB carried out call quality assurance on calls handled by
staff/agents, including the following:
• The Retail Channel Assurance Team (‘RCAT’) monitoring compliance with the Digital
and Direct Security Manual and more particularly the Scripting & Adherence
contained in the Digital & Direct Security Manual, and the Open24 Service Scripting.
The frequency of checks to monitor compliance was determined on a risk-based
approach with calls pertaining to change of personal information to be deemed to be
high risk. Such calls were thus regularly monitored by the RCAT. In the case of a
change of a mobile phone number, 25% of these calls were monitored by the RCAT
for a data quality check (i.e. to confirm that the number was transcribed correctly, as
per customer instruction). One call out of this 25% of calls was reviewed in full daily,
to monitor compliance including the adequacy of the security check completed. If
non-compliance was identified, the RCAT escalated the matter to team leader level
in the Open24 Contact Centre.63
• Call monitoring quality assurance was completed on between 2 – 5 calls per agent
per month, on a risk-based approach. Quality assurance was also provided by RCAT
with quality checks on the sample of calls taken by PTSB agents in the Open24
Contact Centre each month using a pre-determined ‘Score Card’ of standards. The
monitoring aimed to evaluate the area of agent calls with customers “including the
adequacy of the security check completed to identify that the agent is in fact speaking
with the customer; overall quality; customer interaction standards; procedures
including the Digital & Direct Security Manual; the Open24 Service Script; relevant
legislation including the Act, the GDPR and the Consumer Protection Code 2012
relating to security and telephone contact provisions; the actions taken on the call”.64

• The RCAT evaluated the percentage of administrative actions completed by PTSB
agents in the Open24 Contact Centre on an information technology system. These
checks were selected from an automated report which was sent from an information
technology system to the RCAT each day. The RCAT also collated data and provided a

63
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p8.
64
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p38.

monthly analysis trend report to highlight risks, including data protection risks, and
support continuous training and development of staff.

• Any specific quality assurance findings were notified to agents on the same day upon
identification and issues and trends identified as part of the quality assurance
processes were shared and discussed with Open24 management to action.

• On a semi-annual basis all Open24 procedures were reviewed by the management
team to ensure that the procedures contained correct information and security
processes and were compliant with applicable regulations including, but not limited
to the Consumer Protection Code 2012 and the Data Protection Act 2018.65
112. While there were follow-ups on the part of PTSB with regard to breaches caused by staff
not following policies and procedures, the DPC considers that the checks and enforcement
measures put in place by PTSB at the time of the Breaches were inadequate. Creating
policies and procedures is essential to implementing an appropriate level of security.
However, policies and procedures alone are not sufficient to mitigate the risk to data
subjects. Where staff handle phone calls pertaining to customer financial information,
there is an obligation on a controller to regularly assess and evaluate the effectiveness of
measures in place and therefore, there must be an ongoing and verifiable oversight of how
staff members give effect to the controller’s policies and procedures. This obligation was
heightened where there is evidence to suggest that PTSB was previously aware of possible
security issues relating to calls originating from PTSB stated that it had
experience of post being intercepted in and previously implemented an
“additional steps” guide to be used prior to inputting a mobile telephone
number on the PTSB customer database. The DPC accepts that it may not have been
commercially feasible to monitor all calls pertaining to the changing of a mobile telephone
number on a customer file or all calls originating from a mobile phone
number. However, in circumstances where these two risk factors overlapped, this should
have alerted PTSB to the potential risk of unauthorised access and alteration of personal
data on the customer account.
113. The DPC has had regard to PTSB’s monthly call monitoring, whereby on average between
two and five calls per agent per month were monitored and that any issues were notified
to agents on the same day. PTSB also stated that it considers calls where a change of

65
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p6-7.

personal information is requested, to be
high risk and in those instances “25% of calls are monitored by the Retail Channel Assurance
Team”. However, as noted above, only one call out of this 25% was reviewed in full daily
for all aspects of regular call monitoring including the adequacy of the security completed.
The DPC finds that the level of monitoring of adherence to security procedures was not
appropriate to the high risk, particularly in light of the level of initial training and testing
and lack of technical safeguards described above. In light of the weaknesses in those areas
identified above, and the high risk of the processing, more stringent monitoring ought to
have been implemented in order to determine how security procedures were being
implemented in practice. The confluence of factors led to a situation where initial training
and testing of agents was insufficient, there was an absence of sufficiently robust technical
safeguards to combat entirely predictable security lapses by those agents, and there was
an insufficient level of monitoring meaning that PTSB did not have a clear picture of how
its security procedures were in fact being implemented in practice in the Open24 Contact
Centre.
114. The Breaches provide clear evidence of significant non-adherence to security procedures
by PTSB staff/agents when faced with a motivated attacker. For example, as detailed above,
in the context of BN-22-5-497, the correct security procedures were not followed on at
least five calls with five separate agents. Similarly, in the context of BN-22-5-469,
appropriate procedures were not followed on at least three separate occasions leading to
the occurrence of repeated personal data breaches. From an overview of the organisational
measures employed by PTSB, there were several areas that posed a risk of personal data
breaches including the different forms of customer secure identification which could lead
to unauthorised access to account information from malicious actors. Considering the
importance of maintaining the security of customers’ accounts and the high risks to the
customer arising as a result of accounts being compromised, PTSB ought to have
implemented more robust monitoring measures to ensure its policies and procedures were
being implemented correctly and that it was enabled to promptly identify when they were
not.
115. For the above reasons, the DPC therefore finds that PTSB infringed Article 5(1)(f) and Article
32(1) GDPR.

b) Issue 2: Article 33 GDPR
i) The Obligation to Notify Without Delay

116. Article 33 sets out the requirements in respect of notification by a controller to the
supervisory authority of a personal data breach. Article 33(1) of the GDPR provides:

“In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay and,
where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the
personal data breach to the supervisory authority competent in accordance with
Article 55, unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights
and freedoms of natural persons. Where the notification to the supervisory authority
is not made within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by reasons for the delay.”

117. The obligation to notify the DPC applies to all personal data breaches unless the personal
data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.
Under Article 4(12), a ‘personal data breach’:

“…means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss,
alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored
or otherwise processed.”

118. Article 33(1) requires that notifications must occur ‘without undue delay.’ This must be
assessed by reference to when PTSB became aware of the personal data breach. In its
‘Guidelines 9/2022 on Personal Data Breach Notification under GDPR’ (the ‘Breach
Notification Guidelines’) the European Data Protection Board (‘EDPB’) addressed the
meaning of the term ‘undue delay’ in the related context of the requirement to
communicate a breach to affected individuals under Article 34 GDPR:

“The GDPR states that communication of a breach to individuals should be made
‘without undue delay,’ which means as soon as possible. The main objective of
notification to individuals is to provide specific information about steps they should
take to protect themselves.”66

66
Breach Notification Guidelines p11.

119. The Breach Notification Guidelines further provide that:

“[A] controller should be regarded as having become ‘aware’ when that controller has
a reasonable degree of certainty that a security incident has occurred that has led to
personal data being compromised. However…the GDPR requires the controller to
implement all appropriate technical protection and organizational measures to
establish immediately whether a breach has taken place and to inform promptly the
supervisory authority and the data subjects. It also states that the fact that the
notification was made without undue delay should be established taking into account
in particular the nature and gravity of the breach and its consequences and adverse
effects for the data subject. This puts an obligation on the controller to ensure that
they will be ‘aware’ of any breaches in a timely manner so that they can take
appropriate action.67” (Emphasis added)

120. The Breach Notification Guidelines go on to consider cases where there is uncertainty as to
whether a personal data breach has occurred:

“In some cases, it will be relatively clear from the outset that there has been a breach,
whereas in others, it may take some time to establish if personal data have been
compromised. However, the emphasis should be on prompt action to investigate an
incident to determine whether personal data have indeed been breached, and if so,
to take remedial action and notify if required.

[…]

After first being informed of a potential breach by an individual, a media organisation,
or another source, or when it has itself detected a security incident, the controller may
undertake a short period of investigation in order to establish whether or not a breach
has in fact occurred. During this period of investigation the controller may not be
regarded as being “aware”. However, it is expected that the initial investigation
should begin as soon as possible and establish with a reasonable degree of certainty
whether a breach has taken place; a more detailed investigation can then follow.

67
Breach Notification Guidelines p11.

Once the controller has become aware, a notifiable breach must be notified without
undue delay, and where feasible, not later than 72 hours. During this period, the
controller should assess the likely risk to individuals in order to determine whether the
requirement for notification has been triggered, as well as the action(s) needed to
address the breach.

[…]

In most cases these preliminary actions should be completed soon after the initial alert
(i.e. when the controller or processor suspects there has been a security incident which
may involve personal data.) – it should take longer than this only in exceptional
cases.”

121. There is also provision for phased notification, as set out in Article 33(4) GDPR, which
provides that “[w]here, and in so far as, it is not possible to provide the information at the
same time, the information may be provided in phases without undue further delay.”
122. With regard to the requirement to put in place appropriate measures to establish whether
a data breach has occurred, Recital 87 GDPR states:

“It should be ascertained whether all appropriate technological protection and
organisational measures have been implemented to establish immediately whether a
personal data breach has taken place and to inform promptly the supervisory
authority and the data subject. The fact that the notification was made without undue
delay should be established taking into account in particular the nature and gravity
of the personal data breach and its consequences and adverse effects for the data
subject. Such notification may result in an intervention of the supervisory authority in
accordance with its tasks and powers laid down in this Regulation.”

123. The Breach Notification Guidelines state that:

“[T]he GDPR requires both controllers and processors to have in place appropriate
technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk posed to the personal data being processed. They should take into account the
state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and
purposes of processing, as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the
rights and freedoms of natural persons. Also the GDPR requires all appropriate
technological protection and organizational measures to be in place to establish

immediately whether a breach has taken place, which then determines whether the
notification obligation is engaged. Consequently, a key element of any data security
policy is being able, where possible, to prevent a breach and, where it nevertheless
occurs, to react to it in a timely manner.”68

124. Article 33(1) GDPR cannot be viewed in isolation and must be understood within the
context of the broader obligations on controllers under the GDPR, such as the obligation of
accountability under Article 5(2) and the obligation to implement appropriate (and
effective) technical and organisational measures, in accordance with Articles 24, 25 and, in
particular, Article 32 GDPR. Regard must be had to these obligations in determining the
point in time in which the controller should have been ‘aware’ of the existence of a personal
data breach for the purposes of Article 33 GDPR.
125. In considering whether PTSB complied with its obligation to notify a personal data breach
under Article 33(1), therefore, the DPC has considered the objectives underlying this
obligation and the broader context in which this obligation arises.

ii) The Breach Notifications

126. By way of brief recap, initial contact with the DPC was made by a PTSB member of staff on
26 May 2022 in respect of BN-22-5-459 stating that a personal data breach had occurred at
PTSB on 8 April 2022. PTSB initially indicated that it became aware of the breach via data
subject notification on 8 April 2022. However, it transpired that the Data Protection Team
had not been informed of the potential data breach at that time and only became aware
of the matter over the course of an investigation into a formal complaint lodged by the
customer.
127. PTSB subsequently stated in its submissions that, notwithstanding that the initial breach
notification form stated that PTSB became aware of the personal data breach aspects on 8
April 2022, this was in fact the date on which PTSB became aware of the fraud aspect of
the incident when contacted by the customer.69 The customer contacted PTSB again on 16
April, whereby he notified PTSB that he was having difficulty completing transactions from
a different, joint-owner current account held with PTSB. Upon further investigation, PTSB
determined that the phone number on file had been updated by a malicious actor, on 8

68
Breach Notification Guidelines, p6.
69
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p27.

April 2022, and that this incorrect number remained on the account until 16 April. In
correspondence to the data subject, dated 1 July 2022, PTSB confirmed that following the
call from the data subject on 16 April, “it was at this stage following a full investigation that
the extent of the breach and compromise became clear to us.” PTSB thereafter removed
the fraudulent phone number from the bank systems, cancelled the PAN and debit cards
and placed transaction holds on the accounts. The fraud team further contacted the data
subject by phone on 20 April to advise of the closure of the data subject’s account on the
same date. The Data Protection Team were not informed.
128. PTSB submitted that it was only following the receipt of the monthly complaint listings from
its Customer Resolution Centre,70 on 6 May 2022, that the data protection team ultimately
initiated an investigation into the matter (on 19 May 2022) to determine whether a data
breach had in fact occurred. PTSB stated that, on 20 May 2022 (at 12:17), the data
protection team determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that a personal data
breach had occurred requiring notification to the DPC and the data subject. 71 Thereafter,
on 26 May 2022 (at 16:52), the data protection team submitted a personal data breach
notification to the DPC in relation to incident.
129. In respect of the remainder of the Breaches, initial contact was made with the DPC on 27
May 2022 via Breach Notification forms BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497 stating that personal
data breaches had occurred at PTSB respectively on 20 April and 6 May 2022. PTSB initially
indicated that it became aware of these breaches via data subject notification on 3 May
and 9 May 2022 respectively. However, the Data Protection Team had not been informed
and only became aware of these breaches over the course of a fraud investigation.
130. PTSB subsequently stated in its submissions that the above date of data subject notification
in BN-22-5-497 was in fact the date that PTSB’s “fraud team became aware of the
fraudulent attack committed by the bad actor on PTSB and its customer”.72 Following a full
review of all of the call transcripts involving the bad actor by the digital and direct risk team,
the Data Protection Team was subsequently engaged “on 24 May 2022 (at 13:46) and

70
In relation to customer complaints, where the CRC receives a complaint that CRC suspect may be a data breach
CRC must engage with the data protection team as per PTSB’s Data Security Breach Procedure and the procedure
set out above must be followed. Additionally, the data protection team engage with CRC on a monthly basis to obtain
a list of complaints which indicate that there is a data protection related grievance on PTSB’s complaint management
system. This list is reviewed and compared to the data protection team’s records in order to ensure that all data
security breach incidents have been referred to the data protection team for review.
71
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p27.
72
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p22.

determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that a personal data breach had occurred
requiring notification to the DPC and the data subject.”73 A risk event was also logged by
the Digital & Direct Risk Team on 24 May 2022 (at 16:38) on the Governance, Risk and
Compliance (‘GRC’) system in order to flag a potential personal data breach. The Data
Protection Team then carried out an assessment of the incident and, on 27 May 2022
(17:50), the Data Protection Team submitted a personal data breach notification to the
DPC.74
131. Similarly, in relation to BN-22-5-469, PTSB stated that “[n]otwithstanding that the initial
breach notification form from PTSB to the DPC in relation to BN-22-5-469 (R2217) stated
that PTSB became aware of the personal data breach on 3 May 2022, this is in fact the date
on which PTSB became aware of the fraud aspect of the incident. PTSB had a reasonable
degree of certainty that a personal data breach occurred on 23 May 2022.”75 In this
instance, a risk event was logged by the Digital & Direct Risk Team on 23 May 2022 (at
11:05) on the GRC system in order to flag a potential personal data breach. The Data
Protection Team carried out an assessment of the incident and issued an email to the Digital
& Direct Risk Team on 23 May 2022 (at 12:54) confirming the incident was deemed a
reportable event. PTSB subsequently submitted a personal data breach notification to the
DPC on 27 May 2022 (at 16:07).
132. The DPC considers that there is no justification for the considerable length of time taken to
determine that a data breach had occurred in each of the above three instances. The fact
that financial fraud had been committed in two cases, and that customer account contact
details had been altered in all three instances, shortly before the customers advised PTSB
of the issues, should have immediately alerted PTSB to the probability that personal data
breaches may have occurred. In light of this, and the potentially severe financial
consequences for the affected data subjects, it was incumbent on PTSB to take prompt
action to investigate the incidents to determine whether personal data had indeed been
breached, and if so, to take remedial action and notify the DPC if required.
133. The DPC has also had regard to PTSB’s Data Security Breach Procedure which clearly set out
PTSB’s obligations to report on data breaches. The Procedure noted that PTSB was
“required to report personal data breaches to the Data Protection Commission (DPC) within

73
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p28.
74
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p28.
75
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p28.

72 hours”, which is the requirement under Article 33(1) GDPR.76 This referred to all
instances of loss of control of personal data, regardless of the number of customers
impacted. The Breach Procedure also provided that in the event of doubt as to whether a
breach had occurred, that the staff member “should contact the Data Protection team by
email… or telephone a member of the team.”77
134. The DPC considers that this is an adequate policy in the circumstances and that if
implemented properly should allow PTSB to meet its reporting obligations, provided the
data protection team ensures that a personal data breach notification issues to the DPC
within the prescribed 72-hour period. In particular, a cautious approach is warranted
whereby any issues potentially relating to any loss of control of personal data will be
reported to the data protection team. This is especially important in light of the sensitive
nature of the financial data involved. However, in the case of the Breaches, they were not
brought to the attention of the data protection team in a timely manner, even when the
instances of fraud should have alerted any staff member involved of the necessity to report
the incidents.
135. In its submissions in response to the Inquiry Commencement Letter, in referring to the
delay in notification of the Breaches, PTSB advised that “[a]s soon as the Digital & Direct
Risk Team had carried out their review of the accounts, listened to the relevant call
transcripts involving the bad actors and identified the occurrence of a potential personal
data breach, the Data Protection Team was made aware.”78 However, in light of the
requirement for notification to the DPC within 72 hours of having a reasonable degree of
certainty that a breach had occurred, and PTSB’s own policy that potential incidents should
be brought to the attention of the Data Protection Team to make such a determination, it
is the view of the DPC that the Data Protection Team were not notified in a timely manner,
and in line with PTSB’s policy, in each of the Breaches.
136. The DPC takes note that PTSB subsequently took steps to prevent such a recurrence. For
example, the PTSB fraud team issued instructions on data security and breach reporting
procedural requirements to all staff on 12 July 2022. An amended response strategy was
also put in place to respond to urgent requests for investigation of potential data breaches
that require review and escalation to assist fraud investigations.79 Nonetheless, the

76
PTSB Data Security Breach Policy, May 2018 p1.
77
PTSB Data Security Breach Policy, May 2018 p1.
78
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p27.
79
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p30.

appropriate procedure was not followed in the context of the Breaches, leading to a
significant delay in notification.
137. In referring to the additional delay in notification, once the Data Protection Team had
eventually been notified, PTSB also stated that:
“[T]he Data Protection Team wanted to ensure that all relevant information, facts
and documents relating to the incident were reviewed in order to make a
notification to the DPC. This involved numerous engagements with the Digital &
Direct Risk Team and the Fraud Team.”80
138. While PTSB may not have been fully aware of all of the elements of the Breaches within 72
hours of becoming aware of each breach, it would have been a more correct course of
action to alert the DPC to the possibility of a data breach without undue delay,
supplementing this with any subsequent relevant information that came to light. Article
33(4) GDPR explicitly recognises the possibility of the controller providing breach
information in phases. This is especially important in circumstances where there was a
significant delay in PTSB determining that data breaches may have occurred, following the
notification from each of its customers, and in circumstances where its Data Protection
Team had not been notified in a timely manner, as envisaged by its own internal Data
Security Breach Procedure. In the circumstances, the DPC is satisfied that PTSB did not
proceed in a sufficiently timely manner to determine whether personal data breaches had
occurred upon being notified of the incidents.
139. Controllers are not under an obligation to notify the DPC if a personal data breach is unlikely
to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. However, the DPC is
satisfied that the Breaches did result in such a risk, as evidenced by the financial fraud
perpetrated and the risk of further financial fraud and loss of data subject control over their
accounts. In assessing risk, regard must also be had, objectively, to both the likelihood and
severity of the risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. It is also appropriate to have
regard as to whether the personal data has come into the possession of individuals whose
intentions are unknown or possibly malicious. In the circumstances, the DPC is satisfied that
the Breaches resulted in a risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, including, but

80
PTSB response to commencement Notice 12 September 2022 p27.

not limited to, financial loss and loss of control over the data subjects’ accounts. Therefore,
PTSB was obliged to notify the DPC of the Breaches without undue delay.
140. In light of the above, the findings of the DPC in relation each of the Breaches are
summarised below:
(i) In BN-22-5-459, PTSB claimed that it became aware of possible fraud on 8 April
2022 and only determined that a personal data breach had occurred on 20 May
2022. An official breach notification was submitted to the DPC on 26 May 2022,
which is 48 days after PTSB first became aware of the fraud incident and 6 days
after its Data Protection Team was notified of the incident. The incident was not
brought to the attention of the Data Protection Team prior to this date, despite
calls from the data subject on 8 April 2022 and 16 April 2022, following which the
existence of the breach became apparent. In correspondence to the data subject,
dated 1 July 2022, PTSB confirmed that following the call from the data subject on
16 April, “it was at this stage following a full investigation that the extent of the
breach and compromise became clear to us.” PTSB thereafter removed the
“fraudulent phone number” from the bank systems, cancelled the PAN and debit
cards and placed transaction holds on the accounts. The fraud team further
contacted the data subject by phone on 20 April to advise of the closure of the
data subject’s account on the same date. The Data Protection Team still had not
been informed at this point, by which PTSB ought to have been aware of the
breach. The data subject later made a complaint, which was only brought to the
attention of the Data Protection Team by way of its receipt of monthly complaint
listings from the CRC on 6 May 2022. There was a subsequent delay in the Data
Protection Team investigating the incident (which occurred on 19 May 2022) and
determining that a breach had occurred (which occurred 20 May 2022). There was
then an additional delay in the breach notification being submitted to the DPC, on
26 May 2022. The DPC is therefore satisfied that PTSB did not meet its obligations
to determine whether a breach had occurred in a timely manner and notify the
DPC of the data breach without undue delay and where feasible not later than 72
hours of having become aware of it (i.e. from 16 April 2022 at the latest).
(ii) In BN-22-5-469, PTSB claimed that it became aware of possible fraud on 3 May
2022 and only determined that a personal data breach had occurred on 23 May
2022. The official breach notification was submitted to the DPC by PTSB on 27 May
2022, which is 23 days after it became aware of the fraud incident and 4 days after
its Data Protection Team had fully determined that a data breach had occurred,

following an internal delay in notification. The fraud team had first conducted a
detailed investigation, including a call listening exercise, which took place from 19-
24 May, and it appears that it was in the course of this fraud investigation that it
was established that a data breach had occurred. The DPC is therefore satisfied
that PTSB did not meet its obligations to determine whether a breach had
occurred in a timely manner and notify the DPC of the data breach without undue
delay and where feasible not later than 72 hours of having become aware of it.
(iii) In BN-22-5-497, PTSB claimed that it became aware of possible fraud on 9 May
2022 and only determined that a personal data breach had occurred on 26 May
2022. The official breach notification was submitted to the DPC by PTSB on 27 May
2022 (at 17:50), which is 18 days after it became aware of the incident and 1 day
after PTSB asserts that its Data Protection Team determined that a data breach
had occurred. However, it appears that the data protection team was engaged via
email by the Digital & Direct Risk Team on 24 May 2022, “on foot of the Digital &
Direct Risk Teams review of the call transcripts with the bad actor by the Digital &
Direct Team” and that a “risk event was also logged by the Digital & Direct Risk
Team on 24 May 2022 (at 16:38) on the GRC system in order to flag a potential
personal data breach.” In this respect, the notification to the Data Protection
Team was preceded by a detailed fraud investigation, which included listening to
all relevant call transcripts and which concluded on 24 May 2022 (at 13:46). On
foot of this, “PTSB had a reasonable degree of certainty that, in addition to a
fraudulent attack on PTSB and the customer, a personal data breach had also
occurred in relation to the customer’s bank account.” The DPC is therefore
satisfied that PTSB did not meet its obligations to determine whether a breach had
occurred in a timely manner and notify the DPC of the data breach without undue
delay and where feasible not later than 72 hours of having become aware of it.
141. For the above reasons, the DPC therefore finds that PTSB infringed Article 33(1) GDPR.
H. Findings
142. The DPC has set out above, pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the 2018 Act, findings that
PTSB:
• infringed the principle of integrity and confidentiality of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR by failing
to ensure appropriate security of the personal data related to accounts of its
customers using appropriate technical and organisational measures;

• infringed Article 32(1) GDPR by failing to implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented
by its processing of personal data within the Open24 Contact Centre; and
• infringed Article 33(1) GDPR by its failure to notify the DPC without undue delay and
within 72 hours of becoming aware of the Breaches.
I. Decision on Corrective Powers
143. Under section 111(2) of the 2018 Act, where the DPC makes a decision, it must, in addition,
make a decision as to whether a corrective power should be exercised in respect of the
controller or processor concerned and, if so, the corrective power to be exercised. The
remaining question for determination in this Decision is whether or not any of those
infringements merit the exercise of any of the corrective powers set out in Article 58(2)
GDPR and, if so, which corrective powers.
144. Article 58(2) GDPR sets out the corrective powers that supervisory authorities may exercise
in respect of non-compliance by a controller or processor. In deciding whether to exercise
those powers, Recital 129 provides guidance as follows:
“…each measure should be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in view of
ensuring compliance with this Regulation, taking into account the circumstances
of each individual case…”
145. Having carefully considered the infringements identified in this Decision, the DPC has
decided to exercise certain corrective powers in accordance with section 115 of the 2018
Act and Article 58(2) GDPR. In summary, the corrective powers that the DPC has deemed
appropriate to impose in order to address the infringements in the particular circumstances
are:

• A reprimand to PTSB in respect of its infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1)
and 33(1) GDPR;
• One administrative fine in respect of the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and
32(1) GDPR; and
• One administrative fine in respect of the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR.
146. Set out below are further details in respect of each of the corrective powers that the DPC
has decided to exercise and the reasons why it has decided to exercise them.
J. Decision on Reprimand
147. Article 58(2)(b) GDPR provides that a supervisory authority shall have the power:

“…to issue reprimands to a controller or a processor where processing operations
have infringed provisions of this Regulation”.

148. The DPC hereby issues PTSB with a reprimand in respect of its infringements of Articles
5(1)(f), 32(1), and 33(1) GDPR identified in this Decision. The purpose of the reprimand is
to dissuade non-compliance with the GDPR. The reprimand will contribute to ensuring that
PTSB and other controllers and processors take appropriate steps in relation to current and
future processing operations in order to comply with their obligations under the GDPR.
K. Decision on Order to Bring Processing into Compliance
149. Article 58(2)(d) GDPR provides that a supervisory authority shall have the power:

“…to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into compliance
with the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate, in a specified manner and
within a specified period”.

150. In circumstances where it has been found that the processing at issue was not in
compliance with the GDPR, the DPC has the ability to make an order pursuant to Article
58(2)(d) GDPR. Due to the remedial actions taken by PTSB in response to the Breaches, the
DPC does not consider it appropriate, necessary and proportionate to make an order for
PTSB to bring its processing into compliance with Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR. In
this regard, the DPC acknowledges PTSB’s ongoing remedial actions, as outlined in its
submissions throughout the Inquiry. The DPC’s acknowledgement of those improvements
does not however relieve PTSB of its obligation to continually evaluate the effectiveness of
its measures and the measures that are necessary to ensure a level of security that is
appropriate to the dynamic risk presented by its processing.
L. Decision on Administrative Fines
151. Article 58(2)(i) GDPR provides that a supervisory authority shall have the power:

“…to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83, in addition to, or instead
of measures referred to in this paragraph, depending on the circumstances of each
individual case”.

152. The purpose of administrative fines is to strengthen the enforcement of the rules of the
GDPR.81 Fines sanction non-compliance and seek to re-establish compliance with the GDPR.
153. As the DPC has identified infringements of the GDPR, the DPC will decide whether to
impose an administrative fine in respect of those infringements. In conducting this
assessment, the DPC has had regard to Article 83 GDPR, which sets out ‘General conditions
for imposing administrative fines.’ The DPC has also had regard to EDPB guidelines which
are designed to ensure a harmonised approach to fining. These sets of guidelines include
the EDPB’s Guidelines on the calculation of administrative fines (the ‘EDPB Fining
Guidelines’),82 and the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines on the application and setting
of administrative fines (the ‘A29WP Fining Guidelines’),83 which have been endorsed by
the EDPB.
154. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB stated that the EDPB Fining Guidelines “do
not have legal status like Article 83(2) GDPR” and that the DPC should have regard to this
“where wording within the EDPB Guidelines goes beyond the text and spirit of Article 83(2)
GDPR.”84 In this regard, Article 70(1) GDPR provides that the EDPB shall ensure the
consistent application of the GDPR. To that end, it shall, inter alia, “issue guidelines,
recommendations and best practices in order to encourage consistent application of [the
GDPR]” and “draw up guidelines for supervisory authorities concerning […] the setting of
administrative fines pursuant to Article 83”. The EDPB Fining Guidelines do not impose new
standards or requirements but, rather, outline the manner in which individual supervisory
authorities might achieve a harmonised approach to the assessment of fining matters. They
reflect the detailed assessment that is required to be carried out pursuant to Article 83
GDPR. As noted in the guidelines, the calculation of the amount of the fine is at the
discretion of the relevant supervisory authority, subject to the rules provided for in the
GDPR, which requires that the amount of the fine in each individual case shall be effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive.
155. The calculation of any administrative fine is based on a specific evaluation carried out in
each case, within the parameters provided for by the GDPR.85 While the DPC considers it

81
GDPR, rec 148.
82
Guidelines 04/2022 on the calculation of administrative fines under the GDPR, version 2.1, adopted on 24 May
2023.
83
WP253.
84
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.3
85
EDPB Fining Guidelines, page 3.

appropriate to have regard to the EDPB Fining Guidelines as an important interpretative
tool in ensuring the consistent application of the GDPR, this Decision contains a
comprehensive explanation of the manner in which the DPC has applied each of the Article
83 criteria to the individual circumstance of this particular case.
156. As a first step, the DPC will thus consider whether to impose a fine by applying the criteria
set out in Article 83(2) GDPR. If the outcome of the assessment is that a fine should be
imposed, then the DPC will proceed to calculate the amount, by reference to the criteria in
Article 83(2) GDPR and by considering the other factors set out in Articles 83(1)-(9) that
apply in this case. In particular, Article 83(1) GDPR requires fines to be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. These principles will inform the calculation of any fine that is
imposed in this Decision.
a) Whether to impose an administrative fine
157. Article 83(2) GDPR states,

“Administrative fines shall, depending on the circumstances of each individual case,
be imposed in addition to, or instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and
(j) of Article 58(2). When deciding whether to impose an administrative fine and
deciding on the amount of the administrative fine in each individual case due regard
shall be given to the following…”

Article 83(2) goes on to list 11 criteria from (a) to (k) to be taken into account when deciding
whether to impose an administrative fine. Those provisions are set out below where they
are also applied to the infringements identified herein.

i. Article 83(2)(a) GDPR: the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking
into account the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the
number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them

158. Article 83(2)(a) requires consideration of the identified criterion by reference to ‘the
infringement’ as well as ‘the processing concerned.’ The phrase ‘the processing concerned’
in this Article 83(2) analysis should be understood as meaning the processing operations
that PTSB carries out on personal data in the context of its Open24 Contact Centre.
159. Considering next the meaning of ‘infringement’, it is clear from Articles 83(3)-(5), that
‘infringement’ means an infringement of a provision of the GDPR. PTSB has been found to
have infringed Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR. Thus, ‘the infringement’, for the
purpose of the DPC’s assessment of the Article 83(2) criteria, should be understood

(depending on the context in which the term is used) as meaning an infringement of Articles
5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR. While each is an individual ‘infringement’ of the relevant
provision, they all concern the processing concerned and, by reason of their common
nature and purpose, are likely to generate the same, or similar, outcomes in the context of
some of the Article 83(2) assessment criteria. Accordingly, and for ease of review, the DPC
will assess all of these infringements simultaneously, by reference to the collective term
‘infringements’ unless otherwise indicated.
160. As all of the infringements relate to the processing concerned, the considerations and
assessments set out below, save where otherwise indicated, should be understood as being
assessments of the individual Article 83(2) criteria in the context of the infringements
generally.
Taking into account the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as
well as the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered
by them
161. This section will consider the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned, before
considering the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by
them.
162. The nature of the processing can include:

“…the context in which the processing is functionally based (e.g. business activity,
non-profit, political party, etc.) and all the characteristics of the processing.”86

163. The nature of the processing is PTSB’s processing of personal data – including financial data
– through its Open24 Contact Centre. PTSB is a leading provider of personal and business
banking services in the Irish market and the Open24 Contact Centre functions as PTSB’s
primary point of customer contact. It allows customers to take actions such as checking
their account balance, transactions, or standing orders or make fund transfers and
payments to other designated accounts.
164. The scope of the processing is assessed

“…with reference to the local, national or cross-border scope of the processing carried
out and the relationship between this information and the actual extent of the

86
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.b.i].

processing in terms of the allocation of resources by the data controller… The larger
the scope of the processing, the more weight the supervisory authority may attribute
to this factor.”87

165. The scope of the processing concerned is broad in nature. As PTSB’s primary point of
customer contact, a large volume of calls are received from customers seeking to take
action in relation to their account, including the amendment of account details and making
of payments. In this respect, PTSB has advised that the Open24 Contact Centre received
million calls during 2022 and that it recruited and trained over staff specifically
88
to work within the Open24 Contact Centre in the same period. The quantity of personal
data potentially stored on any given account was also broad in scope and sensitive in
nature, including data subject identity, contact details, and economic and/or financial data.
The likelihood of any error resulting in a data breach was therefore high. The DPC has had
regard to the fact that, insofar as the DPC is aware, only three accounts were affected by
the Breaches considered in this Decision, however a much wider range of data subjects
were at risk in light of the broad scope of the processing.
166. The purpose of the processing:

“…will lead the supervisory authority to attribute more weight to this factor. The
supervisory authority may also consider whether the processing of personal data falls
within the so-called core activities of the controller. The more central the processing
is to the controller’s or processor’s core activities, the more severe irregularities in this
processing will be. The supervisory authority may attribute more weight to this factor
in these circumstances. There may be circumstances though, in which the processing
of personal data is further removed from the core activities of the controller or
processor, but significantly impacts the evaluation nonetheless (this is the case, for
example, of processing concerning personal data of workers where the infringement
significantly affects those workers’ dignity).”89

167. The purpose of the processing identified herein was to facilitate customers carrying out a
range of banking functions via telephone. This included checking their account balance,
information about transactions, information regarding standing orders, fund transfers and

87
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.b.ii].
88
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p1-2.
89
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.b.iii].

payments to other designated accounts, bill payments and requesting account statements
for current, savings and loan accounts. The purposes of the processing relate to the core
functions of PTSB.
168. In relation to the number of data subjects, the EDPB Fining Guidelines state:

“The higher the number of data subjects involved, the more weight the supervisory
authority may attribute to this factor. In many cases, it may also be considered that
the infringement takes on ‘systemic’ connotations and can therefore affect, even at
different times, additional data subjects who have not submitted complaints or
reports to the supervisory authority. The supervisory authority may, depending on the
circumstances of the case, consider the ratio between the number of data subjects
affected and the total number of data subjects in that context (e.g. the number of
citizens, customers or employees) in order to assess whether the infringement is of a
systemic nature.”90

169. The number of data subjects affected by the Breaches identified herein is three. However,
all PTSB customers using the Open24 Contact Centre were potentially affected by the
infringements regarding the lack of appropriate security caused by vulnerabilities in PTSB’s
procedures and policies, training, and technical and organisational measures. The lack of
appropriate technical and organisational measures means that these other PTSB customers
were vulnerable to a loss of control of their personal data, its accuracy, or in extreme cases
to theft, fraud or financial loss due to the actions of other malicious actors.
170. The level of damage is considered by reference to any harm suffered by data subjects or
the “extent to which the conduct may affect individual rights and freedoms.” The EDPB
Fining Guidelines note:

“The reference to the ‘level’ of damage suffered, therefore, is intended to draw the
attention of the supervisory authorities to the damage suffered, or likely to have been
suffered as a further, separate parameter with respect to the number of data subjects
involved (for example, in cases where the number of individuals affected by the
unlawful processing is high but the damage suffered by them is marginal). Following
Recital 75 GDPR, the level of damage suffered refers to physical, material or non-
material damage. The assessment of the damage, in any case, be limited [sic] to what

90
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.b.iv].

is functionally necessary to achieve correct evaluation of the level of seriousness of
the infringement as indicated in paragraph 60 below, without overlapping with the
activities of judicial authorities as tasked with ascertaining the different forms of
individual harm.”91

171. In this case, the level of damage suffered is high. In two instances, data subjects suffered
considerable financial loss.92 In all instances, the three data subjects concerned suffered
loss of control over their personal data, were put at increased risk of additional theft, fraud,
or financial loss due to the disclosure of their personal data by PTSB, were forced to close
their accounts and were therefore not free to exercise control over their monies held with
PTSB. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB submitted that “it is not clear” how
the level of harm was considered high, and that it should not be held responsible for the
fraudulent attacks committed on the data subjects prior to the Breaches. PTSB further
reiterated that it had provided a full refund to the affected data subjects and noted that,
rather than being forced to close their accounts with PTSB, the affected data subjects were
informed that “PTSB would no longer be in a position to continue to guarantee the safety
of the account in the future.”93
172. In this regard, the DPC notes that, as detailed above, while bad actors came into possession
of customer information prior to contacting PTSB, the information should not have been
sufficient to access their accounts. Repeated data breaches ultimately occurred due to
failures by PTSB staff/ agents in following identity verification protocols. The failings which
the DPC has concluded above were enabled by a lack of appropriate technical and
organisational measures. The DPC has not sought to hold PTSB responsible for any prior
attacks committed on the data subjects, but rather for the failings in its own technical and
organisational measures. Due to those failings, information on data subjects was
repeatedly disclosed to bad actors, bank account details were changed and, in two cases,
numerous fraudulent transactions occurred. As a result of the Breaches, data subjects were
also without access to their bank accounts for a period of time.

91
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.b.v].
92
The affected customers were later refunded the monies taken from their bank accounts. In BN-22-5-469, the
fraudulent transactions, totalling €34,087.82 occurred between 20 and 23 April 2022. The refund was made
available on 27 June 2022 and collected by the customer in branch on 5 July 2022. In BN-22-5-497, the fraudulent
transactions, totalling €10,000, occurred on 7 May 2022 and a refund was provided by PTSB on 9 June 2022.
93
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, pages 9-11.

173. The DPC acknowledges that the affected customers were later refunded (and has
considered this under Article 83(2)(c) below, in addition to other measures taken by PTSB
to secure the relevant accounts), however, this took a significant period of time to occur
(in excess of one month in both cases) and data subjects were without access to those funds
in the interim. While the DPC also acknowledges that the prior fraudulent attacks
contributed to PTSB advising the data subjects that it could not guarantee the safety of
their accounts, the Breaches, for which PTSB was ultimately responsible, undoubtedly
played a key role in the compromising of those accounts and directly led to this additional
damage suffered by the data subjects. In the circumstances, the DPC is satisfied that it has
appropriately considered the level of damage to data subjects.
174. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB further stated:

“[T]he DPC considers in detail the nature, scope and purpose of the processing of
customer personal data within Open 24 generally. The DPC place significant reliance
on the EDPB Fining Guidelines in this context. However, it is respectfully submitted
that the DPC provides comparatively limited analysis concerning the legal principles,
within articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) of the GDPR, to the specific factual
circumstances surrounding the nature and gravity of the actual alleged infringement
set out in the Notice of Commencement of an Inquiry dated 24 August 2022 (i.e. three
specific incidents the subject of the Inquiry) including the prior customer-initiated data
compromise involving the same three customers the subject of the Inquiry.”94

175. However, as detailed above, the ‘processing concerned’ in this Article 83(2) analysis should
be understood as meaning the processing operations that PTSB carries out on personal data
in the context of its Open24 Contact Centre. Furthermore, ‘the infringements’ for the
purpose of the DPC’s assessment of the Article 83(2) criteria, should be understood
(depending on the context in which the term is used) as meaning an infringement of Articles
5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR. In this regard, the Inquiry considered, inter alia, the question
of whether PTSB infringed Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR in respect of its processing of
personal data in the Open24 Contact Centre and detailed analysis on this issue is set out
above. The Notice of Commencement clearly details that:

94
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.4

“[T]he scope of the inquiry will focus on PTSB’s organisational and technical measures
that are in place to ensure security and accuracy of the personal data involved,
particularly in relation to its telephone call handling processes. The Inquiry will also
examine associated policies and procedures that are in place that identify any risk to
data subjects and the organisational and technical measures to address those risks.”

176. PTSB was similarly advised of the material scope by way of the Statement of Issues and
Draft Decision. While the Breaches are a highly relevant consideration in this regard (and
are central with regard to the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR for failing to notify the
DPC in the required timeframe), it is appropriate that the DPC has regard to the full extent
of the processing as considered in the Inquiry, which encompasses the processing of
customer data in the Open24 Contact Centre and the absence of appropriate technical and
organisational measures in this regard.
177. The DPC has concluded in this Decision that PTSB infringed inter alia, Article 5(1)(f) GDPR
and Article 32(1) GDPR by failing to implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented by its processing
of personal data within the Open24 Contact Centre. In submitting that the DPC provides
insufficient analysis concerning the “the nature and gravity of the actual alleged
infringement” and has placed “significant reliance on the EDPB Fining Guidelines in this
context”, the submission of PTSB misstates the nature of both the ‘processing concerned’
and the ‘infringement’ as detailed throughout this Decision, which is not limited in the
manner suggested by PTSB (i.e. in all circumstances to three specific incidents rather than
a broader consideration of the technical and organisation measures in the Open24 Contact
Centre). Furthermore, as is required by Article 83(2)(a) GDPR, the DPC has assessed the full
extent of the nature, scope, and purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number
of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them, in this section, before
proceeding to consider below the nature, gravity and duration of the infringements in light
of this.
The nature of the infringements
178. The EDPB Fining Guidelines state that the nature of the infringement is ‘assessed by the
concrete circumstances of the case.’ In this assessment, the supervisory authority may:

“…review the interest that the infringed provision seeks to protect and the place of
this provision in the data protection framework. In addition, the supervisory authority

may consider the degree to which the infringement prohibited the effective
application of the provision and the fulfilment of the objective it sought to protect”.95

179. In line with the GDPR, the nature, gravity and duration of the infringements are all assessed
by taking into account the nature, scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as
the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them. 96
180. The nature of the infringement identified herein regarding Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR
comprises a failure of PTSB to comply with its obligation to implement appropriate
technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk
in respect of its processing operations via its Open24 Contact Centre. The objective of
Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR is to protect the rights and freedoms of natural persons by
ensuring that their personal data are processed in a manner that ensures appropriate
security. A failure to implement an appropriate level of security increases the risk of
personal data breaches. This, in turn, poses a threat to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons because of the potential for damage to them where personal data breaches occur,
leading to, inter alia, unavailability or destruction of essential personal data or
unauthorised access, alteration or disclosure of that personal data. Therefore, compliance
with Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) is central to the protection of the rights and freedoms of
natural persons pursuant to the GDPR. As such, non-compliance with this obligation has
serious consequences in that it has the potential to result in damage to natural persons.
181. The nature of the infringement identified herein regarding Article 33(1) comprises a failure
on the part of PTSB to notify the DPC of personal data breaches within the appropriate time
after the controller ought to have become aware of them. The nature of this infringement
must be assessed in light of the purpose of Article 33(1), which is to ensure prompt
notification of personal data breaches to supervisory authorities. This enables a supervisory
authority to assess the circumstances of the data breach, including the risks to natural
persons. It can then decide whether the interests of those persons must be safeguarded to
the extent possible, by mitigating the risks to them arising from a data breach,97 for
example by ordering a controller to communicate a personal data breach to affected data
subjects under Article 34(4) or 58(2)(e) of the GDPR.

95
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [53.a].
96
Article 83(2)(a).
97
Recital 85 GDPR.

182. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB submitted that “the nature of the alleged
infringements - should be considered within the particular factual context in which these
incidents arose within Open 24 and, as the DPC acknowledges in the Draft Decision, the ‘low
number of data subjects’ involved in these three data breaches the focus of the Inquiry.”98
In this regard, the DPC has had detailed regard to the nature, scope and purposes of the
processing concerned (i.e., the processing operations that PTSB carries out on personal
data in the context of its Open24 Contact Centre), when considering the nature of the
infringements and, in addition, considered above the number of data subjects affected by
the infringements and the level of damage suffered by them. This is required by Article
83(2)(a) GDPR.
183. PTSB further asserted that, in considering the nature of the infringement, the DPC has not
had sufficient regard to “the factual context surrounding the three specific PTSB data
breaches including the prior inadvertent disclosure of personal data by these three affected
customers.”99 The DPC considers the fact that the relevant personal data breaches were
contributed to by “prior customer-initiated data compromise” to be of more limited
relevance in the specific circumstances of the infringements. Whilst bad actors were
successful in obtaining certain information concerning the data subjects affected by the
Breaches, prior to those bad actors contacting PTSB, the information obtained should not
have been sufficient to compromise those data subjects’ PTSB accounts and/or led to the
disclosure of additional information concerning them by PTSB. PTSB as a controller was
under an obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in
order to ensure the appropriate level of security and to report data breaches as they arose
without undue delay. As detailed above, the DPC has found that PTSB failed to implement
appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate
to the risk presented by its processing of personal data within the Open24 Contact Centre
and failed to meet its obligations to notify the DPC of the Breaches within the timeframe
required by law.

98
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.4
99
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.6.

The Gravity of the Infringements
184. The gravity (as well as the nature and duration of the infringements) is assessed taking into
account the nature, scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number
of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them. 100
185. The gravity of the infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) of the GDPR is moderate in
circumstances where the infringements resulted in the Breaches and, in light of the nature,
broad scope and purposes of the processing, put a large number of data subjects at risk.
The infringement directly impacted the confidentially, integrity and availability of the data
of the data subjects concerned and led to a significant financial loss to two of those data
subjects. However, the DPC also acknowledges that PTSB accurately assessed the high risk
of the processing and put in place a range of policies to mitigate the risk. Similarly, PTSB
closed the affected accounts and reimbursed the data subjects for the financial loss they
suffered in BN 22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497. Nonetheless, in light of the failure to implement
a number of those policies in practice, and the flaws identified in this Decision, the DPC
considers that the gravity of PTSB’s failure to implement sufficient and appropriate
technical and organisational measures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of customer data to be moderate.
186. The infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR concerned the personal data of a low number of
data subjects and the DPC has found that there was an infringement of the GDPR in PTSB’s
failure to notify the DPC of the Breaches at the required time. Any assessment of the gravity
of the infringement must necessarily take account of how it interfered with the overall
purpose of notifying a personal data breach to the supervisory authority. In this case, there
was a delay in notifying each of the Breaches to the DPC which, in turn, delayed the
assessment by the DPC of the Breaches and their potential impact, thereby interfering with
this legislatively mandated additional layer of protection. The DPC accepts, however, that
despite the potential for damage to data subjects arising from the potential for consequent
delays in actions taken by the DPC to safeguard/ mitigate risks to data subjects, as matters
materialised, there was no additional direct damage to data subjects arising from the
delayed notification. Furthermore, the infringement must be assessed in light of the fact
that it is also usually capped at the lower threshold under Article 83(4) GDPR. Nonetheless,
as outlined above, the DPC considers that PTSB did not meet its obligations to determine

100
Article 83(2)(a).

whether personal data breaches had occurred in a timely manner and this led to an
increased risk for data subjects that were subject to the Breaches, including of additional
fraud which would likely have been addressed had notification to the DPC within 72 hours
occurred. The Breaches further illustrated significant non-adherence to PTSB’s own Data
Security Breach Procedure. In those circumstances, and in light of the importance of the
notification process in protecting the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the gravity of
the finding of an infringement of Article 33(1) is moderate.
187. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB took issue with the DPC’s conclusion that
the infringements put a large number of data subjects at risk, in light of the broad scope of
the processing concerned. PTSB stated that that when considering the gravity of the
infringements by PTSB pursuant to Article 83(2)(a) of the GDPR, “the DPC is required to
have ‘due regard’ to ‘the number of data subjects affected, and the level of damage suffered
by them [i.e. the affected data subjects[sic].’”101 It asserts, in this regard that, “the provision
is objectively clear in that there were only three specific data subjects affected in the context
of the scope of the Inquiry.” Elsewhere in its submissions on this point, PTSB refers to “the
three specific data subjects the subject of the inquiry” and the “three specific incidents under
inquiry”. This illustrates a misunderstanding on the part of PTSB of the nature of its
obligations under Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR.
188. In order for PTSB to comply with Articles 5(1)(f) or 32 GDPR, it was not under an obligation
to eliminate all risk of a personal data breach occurring, insofar as a strict liability standard
is not imposed by the GDPR. Put otherwise, the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32
GDPR in this instance do not solely stem from the existence of the Breaches, but rather the
failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring the
appropriate level of security in the Open24 Contact Centre. This is examined in detail by
way of issue 1 above, which is manifestly not limited to a consideration of security
measures in place insofar as they relate to three specific data subjects only, but rather
concerns the Open24 Contact Centre in general. Therefore, while the number of data
subjects affected by the failure to notify the Breaches within the legally required timeframe
was three in number, all PTSB customers using the Open24 Contact Centre were potentially
affected by the infringements regarding the lack of appropriate technical and
organisational measures in the Open24 Contact Centre.

101
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.6

189. Furthermore, the DPC notes that the EDPB Fining Guidelines support this position and state
that when considering the number of data subjects affected, in assessing the gravity of an
infringement, supervisory authorities should consider:
“[t]he number of data subjects concretely but also potentially affected. The higher
the number of data subjects involved, the more weight the supervisory authority
may attribute to this factor.”102
190. With regard to the infringement of Article 33(1), the DPC has detailed above that this
concerned the personal data of a low number of data subjects and factored this into its
assessment of the gravity of the infringement. However, the DPC does not accept the
submission of PTSB that the low number of data subjects affected necessarily means that
the overall gravity of the infringement must be assessed as low. This is one of several
factors relevant to the assessment of gravity and the DPC has taken it into consideration in
its examination above.
The duration of the infringements
191. In relation to the duration of an infringement, the EDPB Fining Guidelines state:

“…a supervisory authority may generally attribute more weight to an infringement
with longer duration. The longer the duration of the infringement, the more weight
the supervisory authority may attribute to this factor.”103

192. The A29WP Fining Guidelines note that duration may be illustrative of:

a) wilful conduct on the data controller’s part, or

b) failure to take appropriate preventive measures, or

c) inability to put in place the required technical and organisational
measures.104

102
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [53.b.iv].
103
EDPB Fining Guidelines [53.c].
104
A29WP Fining Guidelines, p11.

193. The duration (as well as the nature and gravity of the infringements) is assessed taking into
account the nature, scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number
of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them. 105
194. In this case, the duration of PTSB’s infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR regarding
the processing concerned commenced at the application of the GDPR on 25 May 2018
when the GDPR became law. The obligation to implement and be able to demonstrate the
appropriate organisational and technical measures applied from 25 May 2018. The
infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR found here were ongoing for the entirety
of the temporal scope in circumstances where PTSB failed to implement appropriate
measures required by those provisions for the entirety of that time frame. Therefore, for
the purposes of deciding whether to impose an administrative fine, and for calculating the
appropriate amount if applicable, the DPC proceeds on the basis that the infringement of
Articles 5(1)(f), and 32(1) GDPR lasted at least from 25 May 2018 until 27 May 2022.
195. Regarding the duration of the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, as outlined above, the
DPC finds that there are no circumstances concerning the Breaches that justify a failure to
notify the DPC without undue delay and within 72 hours of when PTSB became aware of
them. This is especially the case in circumstances where the DPC has also found that PTSB
did not proceed with all due diligence to ensure that the Breaches were identified in a
timely manner and ought to have been aware of them from an earlier point in time. As
detailed in paragraph 140, the Breaches were notified to the DPC on 26 May 2022 (BN-22-
5-459) and 27 May 2022 (BN-22-5-469, and BN-22-5-497), while the respective fraud
incidents were first brought to the attention of PTSB on 8 April 2022 (BN-22-5-459), 3 May
2022 (BN-22-5-469) and 9 May 2022 (BN-22-5-497).
196. While PTSB ought to have taken prompt action to ensure that it was aware of the Breaches
in a timely manner, this did not occur. It appears that the existence of the personal data
breaches in BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497 was fully established during a subsequent fraud
investigation, and at the very latest by 23 May 2022 and 24 May 2022, whereas they ought
to have become apparent to PTSB shortly following contact from the affected data subjects.
In the case of BN-22-5-459, PTSB was aware of the circumstances of the breach by 16 April
2022 following a call from the data subject and subsequent investigation. While the DPC
considers that the delay in PTSB determining with a reasonable degree of certainty that

105
Article 83(2)(a).

breaches had occurred was significant, and the notifications each occurred outside the
relevant statutory timeframe once this occurred, it is acknowledged that the delay in
notification once PTSB was subjectively aware of the Breaches is less significant in the cases
of BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497. In BN-22-5-459, the DPC considers the breakdown in
communications and resultant delay in notification to be more significant. Indeed, had the
affected data subject not made a complaint and further followed up, it appears that the
breach may not have been discovered or brought to the attention of the Data Protection
Team or ultimately reported to the DPC. The DPC finds the duration of the infringement is
at a relatively lower level of the scale of culpability in the circumstances in BN-22-5-469 and
BN-22-5-497. However, given the short overall timeframe generally permitted for breach
notifications i.e. 72 hours or three days, it is not insignificant. In BN-22-5-459, the delay is
more significant and of moderate duration.
197. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB asserted that the duration of the
infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR “should be limited to the period of the three
incidents from 8 April (earliest awareness of a possible personal data breach )to 29 June
2022 (final remediation steps carried out including team briefing delivered by the Data
Protection Team).”106 However, the occurrence of the Breaches does not limit the duration
of the infringements in the manner suggested by PTSB. The obligation to implement and
be able to demonstrate the appropriate organisational and technical measures applied
from 25 May 2018 and the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR were ongoing
for the entirety of the temporal scope. The DPC is therefore satisfied that the duration of
those infringements has been appropriately considered.
198. In relation to the duration of the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, PTSB contend that
there is “a rational justification for this delay” (in notification) as:

“…the focus of PTSB’s Fraud Team was investigating and determining the scale of the
fraud attack committed on the affected customers. The Fraud Team were actively
taking steps to halt any further fraud and support the three affected customers. To
determine whether this was also a data breach the Digital & Direct Risk Team was
required to listen to a significant number of calls from the bad actors.”107

106
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.11.
107
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.12

199. PTSB further stated that its delay in submitting the breach notifications did not materially
impact its ability to respond to the incidents and did not detrimentally impact the affected
data subjects. PTSB refers to mitigating measures that it put in place following the Breaches
(which the DPC has acknowledged and accounted for elsewhere in this Decision) and
submits that the delay in notification:

“[S]hould be viewed in light of the factual context including (i) once each of the three
frauds were identified by PTSB, the Fraud team took swift steps to secure those
customer accounts by putting transaction holds on them (ii) the money lost by two of
the three data subjects involved was quickly refunded by PTSB, and (iii) as transactions
holds were placed on the affected accounts well in advance of the breach notification
made to the DPC, the level of risk to the three affected customers was not increased
by the delayed reporting to the DPC.”108

200. Article 33(1) GDPR provides that a personal data breach should be reported by the
controller without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming
aware of a breach. There is no provision for a derogation from the timeline provided for in
Article 33(1) GDPR for the specific circumstances outlined by PTSB, whereby a controller
may independently consider that it has subsequently remedied the issues which may have
allowed further harm to occur and delay notification on that basis. The obligation to report
breaches promptly is an important measure to ensure accountability of controllers and, as
Recital 87 GDPR makes clear, an important purpose of Article 33(1) is to enable the
supervisory authority to intervene in accordance with its tasks and powers. A failure to
notify without undue delay can deprive data subjects of this legislatively mandated
additional layer of protection, whereby a supervisory authority can consider using its
powers to protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects. The DPC is satisfied that PTSB
did not take the necessary action to ensure that it was aware of the Breaches in a timely
manner. PTSB was not entitled to suspend its consideration of whether data breaches may
have occurred, and delay notifying the supervisory authority, pending completion of a
separate and lengthy fraud investigation. Indeed, the DPC notes that, in the circumstances
of each of the Breaches, PTSB failed to comply with its own internal Data Security Breach
Procedure in so doing. The DPC is also satisfied that once PTSB’s Data Protection Team were
made aware of the incidents, after a detailed fraud investigation had concluded, there were

108
Ibid.

no circumstances which justified a further delay in notification in excess of 72 hours. The
DPC is satisfied that it has appropriately considered the duration of the infringements of
Article 33(1) in full knowledge of the facts surrounding each of the Breaches, which are
outlined in detail above.
201. Whilst the DPC also acknowledges that the money lost by two data subjects was later
refunded by PTSB, the DPC does not consider this to be of particular relevance to the
duration of the infringements. However, the DPC has noted the mitigating effect of this
measure under its consideration of Article 83(2)(c) below.
Assessment of Article 83(2)(a) GDPR
202. Taking account of all of the factors assessed in this section, the DPC assesses the
infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR to be of a moderate gravity and of a
substantial duration. PTSB’s processing of personal data via its Open24 Contact Centre in
the absence of sufficient oversight, training and the implementation of appropriate
organisational and technical measures resulted in unauthorised access, alteration and
unauthorised disclosure of personal data to third parties and subsequent fraud. It also
directly led to loss of control over personal data and financial loss and put a larger cohort
of data subjects at risk.
203. With regard to the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, the Breaches resulted in a high risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, as evidenced by the financial fraud
perpetrated and so should have been notified to the DPC within 72 hours of PTSB becoming
aware of them. Such notifications are crucial for enabling supervisory authorities to assess
the circumstances of a data breach, including the risks to data subjects, and decide whether
action is required to mitigate those risks. PTSB did not proceed to determine that the
Breaches had occurred in a timely manner, and once it belatedly did so, there was an
additional delay in notification. Taking account of all of the factors assessed in this section,
the DPC assesses the infringement to have a moderate gravity. As stated above at
paragraph 196, the DPC finds that the duration of the infringement is at a relatively lower
level of the scale of culpability in respect of BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497. In respect of
BN-22-5-459, the delay is more significant and thus represents an infringement of
moderate duration.

ii. Article 83(2)(b) GDPR: the intentional or negligent character of the infringement

204. The A29WP Fining Guidelines state:

“[I]n general, intent includes both knowledge and willfulness in relation to the
characteristics of an offence, whereas ‘unintentional’ means that there was no
intention to cause the infringement although the controller/processor breached the
duty of care which is required in the law.”109

205. The EDPB Fining Guidelines state:

“The intentional or negligent character of the infringement (Article 83(2)(b) GDPR)
should be assessed taking into account the objective elements of conduct gathered
from the facts of the case. The EDPB highlighted that it is generally admitted that
intentional infringements, ‘demonstrating contempt for the provisions of the law, are
more severe than unintentional ones’.110 In case of an intentional infringement, the
supervisory authority is likely to attribute more weight to this factor. Depending on
the circumstances of the case, the supervisory authority may also attach weight to
the degree of negligence. At best, negligence could be regarded as neutral.”

206. PTSB’s infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR regarding the processing concerns
its failure to implement appropriate measures to protect the rights and freedoms of natural
persons by ensuring that their personal data are processed in a manner that ensures
appropriate security and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing. Hence,
the characteristics of this infringement concern the lack of the implementation of
appropriate technical and organisational measures for the duration of the infringement. In
order to classify this infringement as intentional, the DPC must be satisfied that (i) PTSB
wilfully omitted to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures and (ii)
that it knew at the time that the measures that it implemented were not sufficient to meet
the standards required by Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR.
207. While PTSB’s attempts to implement appropriate measures were not sufficient for the
purposes of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, the DPC does not consider that PTSB knew that
the measures implemented were not sufficient at the time such as to render the
infringement intentional. Notwithstanding the absence of an intentional infringement, in
the circumstances, PTSB ought to have been aware that it was falling short of the duty owed
under Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR. For example, PTSB ought to have been aware that its
removal of the extra training procedures regarding calls received from may

109
A29WP Fining Guidelines, p11.
110
Footnote from EDPB Fining Guidelines: Guidelines WP 253 p 12.

lead to the risk of staff error in handling such calls and that the technical and organisational
measures employed in the Open24 Contact Centre were not sufficiently robust to respond
to the high risk and therefore presented a weak point open to exploitation by bad actors.
Similarly, PTSB should have been aware that some of the audit and training measures in
place for PTSB staff and agents may not have been robust enough to correspond to the high
level of the risk of unauthorised access by malicious actors. The DPC therefore finds that
the infringement was of a negligent character and, in light of the level of negligence
present, the DPC finds this factor to be aggravating to a moderate degree in considering
the need for an administrative fine and the amount of any such fine.
208. In relation to the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, PTSB ought to have been aware of
the obligation to examine the data protection aspects of the incidents in a prompt manner
and the repeated failure to do so was indicative of a systemic issue. The lack of escalation
by teams dealing with the fraud aspects of the Breaches at an appropriate point, and as
outlined in PTSB’s own procedures, contributed and resulted in the failure to deal with the
personal data breaches correctly at the time at which they occurred and led to a significant
delay in notification. PTSB also ought to have been aware of its obligation to inform the
DPC within 72 hours of becoming aware of a data breach. The DPC therefore finds that the
infringement was of a negligent character and, in light of the level of negligence present,
the DPC finds this factor to be aggravating to a moderate degree.
209. In line with the approach in the EDPB Fining Guidelines, the DPC has considered this factor
below, in addition to those in Articles 83(2)(a) and (g) GDPR, in determining the overall level
of seriousness of the infringements, when considering the amount of the administrative
fine to be imposed. To be clear, the DPC has not additionally considered this factor as
further aggravating beyond this but rather thereafter considered the remaining aggravating
and mitigating factors in Article 83(2) GDPR before determining the level of administrative
fines to be imposed.
210. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB stated that, with regard to the infringements
of Article 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR:

“While it is accepted that a finding of intentional behaviour may constitute an
aggravating factor, where the DPC’s finding is that of negligence (as is the position
here), then it is respectfully submitted that, for the DPC to conclude that this
negligence finding represents an aggravating factor at all (leaving aside that this
could amount to a finding of “aggravating to a moderate degree”) this does not

appear to be consistent with the purpose and spirit of article 83(2)(b) of the GDPR
when the surrounding circumstances are considered.”111

211. PTSB further asserts that the DPC did not elaborate on what was meant by the level or
degree of negligence, that Article 83(2)(b) only provides for the DPC to conclude whether
the alleged infringement was negligent or intentional (and not an aggravating factor) and
that in a previous decision of the DPC concerning Bank of Ireland the DPC did not consider
this as an aggravating factor despite concluding that negligence was present. On this point,
PTSB also submits that the DPC should account for the fact that the types of attacks as
considered in this inquiry are “unavoidable”, involved bad actors who were armed with a
significant amount of customer data and involved isolated human error by PTSB staff/
agents. For completeness, the DPC notes that PTSB also submits that it is also relevant that
it took prompt action in identifying the root causes of the Breaches and adopting measures
to prevent a reoccurrence. However, this is dealt with separately under the DPC’s
consideration of Article 83(2)(c), in considering the action taken to mitigate the damage
suffered by data subjects following the Breaches.
212. In respect of the infringements of Article 33(1) GDPR, PTSB stated that it appeared that the
DPC did not have sufficient regard to the factual circumstances relating to the reason for
the delayed notification to the DPC or when viewed in the context of a “sophisticated and
significant fraudulent attack committed by bad actors on PTSB and its customers at this
time”.112 In this regard, PTSB notes that its fraud team were required to engage with its
Digital and Direct Risk team, which thereafter were required to conduct a review of the
relevant accounts and listen to all relevant call recordings. PTSB further notes that the delay
in the notification in BN-22-5-497 was minimal in nature.
213. Based on the above considerations, PTSB therefore submits that the level of negligence
should be regarded as neutral.
214. In this regard, Article 83(2) GDPR is clear that when deciding to impose an administrative
fine, and the amount of any such fine, the DPC shall have due regard to, inter alia, the
intentional or negligent character of the infringement. As noted above, the EDPB Fining
Guidelines further note that supervisory authorities may attach weight to the degree of
negligence and, at best, negligence could be regarded as neutral.113 The DPC considers that

111
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.13
112
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.14
113
EDPB Fining Guidelines [56].

its analysis at paragraphs 207 and 208 illustrates, with reference to specific examples, that
PTSB’s technical and organisational security measures at the time of the Breaches did not
meet the standard required under Article 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, and that PTSB was or
ought to have been aware of same. While the failure of PTSB to meet its obligations was
not intentional, the DPC considers that PTSB ought to have been aware that the measures
implemented were not sufficient to meet its obligations under the GDPR and considers that
PTSB was negligent in failing to modify existing measures or to implement further
appropriate measures.
215. In particular, and as outlined in detail in the assessment of Issue 1 above, the DPC is
satisfied that PTSB appropriately assessed the high risks inherent in the processing carried
out in the Open24 Contact Centre - indeed, in its submissions, PTSB has described the type
of attacks considered in the Inquiry as “unavoidable” and a “continuing external threat”.
Given the proliferation of information about individuals online and the availability of
information to bad actors through, for example, prior data breaches, attacks such as those
considered in this Decision form an obvious part of PTSB’s external threat environment.
However, having correctly assessed the high risks, the technical and organisational
measures subsequently implemented by PTSB in the Open24 Contact Centre fell short in a
range of significant respects and were not sufficiently robust to respond to entirely
predictable attacks which were highly likely to arise in the circumstances.114 Those
shortcomings were exploited during the Breaches and led to increased risks for a much
larger cohort of data subjects whose personal data was processed. While the DPC accepts
that the bad actors came into possession of customer data prior to contacting PTSB, such
information generally should not on its own have been sufficient for them to obtain or
change account details and thereafter fraudulently make use of funds in those accounts. It
was ultimately PTSB’s failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures that led to the Breaches. The DPC is therefore satisfied that it has detailed the
reasons why this factor cannot be regarded as neutral and weighs in the balance in
considering both the need for an administrative fine, and the amount of any administrative
fine, based on the particular facts of this case.
216. With regard to references to other cases concerning Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, the
DPC notes, firstly, that Articles 58(2)(i) and 83(2) GDPR each expressly state that
administrative fines depend on the circumstances of the individual case. In coming to the

114
See, for example, paragraphs 86-88, 92-94, 101-102, 109-110 and 112-114 above.

conclusions above, the DPC has considered the particular facts of this case. It is well
established that negligence can either be an aggravating factor or a neutral factor,
depending on the circumstances of the case. This is inherently a case-specific analysis. For
the reasons set out in this Decision, the DPC finds that the degree of negligence on the part
of PTSB is an aggravating factor in the particular circumstances.
217. In respect of the infringements of Article 33(1) GDPR, the DPC has considered the
circumstances of each of the specific breaches in detail in determining that PTSB did not
meet its obligations to determine whether data breaches had occurred in a timely manner
and did not notify the DPC of each of the data breaches without undue delay, and within
72 hours of when its Data Protection Team belatedly became fully aware of them. The DPC
notes that PTSB did not adhere to its own Data Security Breach Procedure in delaying its
consideration of the potential data breach aspects of the incidents and, in one of the
incidents (BN-22-5-459), its Data Protection Team only appear to have become aware of
the incident, and later notified the DPC of same, as the data subject followed up with a
complaint. This illustrates a level of negligence that must be strongly discouraged.
218. While, in BN-22-5-469 and BN-22-5-497, the delay in notification once PTSB was fully aware
of the Breaches is less significant (and has been considered above by the DPC), PTSB did
not proceed with due diligence in determining that the Breaches had occurred and in
notifying the DPC in a timely manner. For example, while PTSB refers to the circumstances
of BN-22-5-497 as indicative of a low level of negligence, it should be recalled that in this
case, the relevant customer confirmed to PTSB that fraudulent transactions had occurred
on 9 May 2022 and an examination of the relevant account revealed that the associated
phone number had been changed, following calls made by a malicious actor between 6 and
7 May, with a fraudulent number associated with the account from 6 May to 10 May 2022.
Transaction holds were placed on the customer's accounts on 9 May 2022 and the
customer's phone number was reverted on the bank's systems. However, despite the
obligation to notify data breaches without undue delay and within 72 hours, PTSB’s Data
Protection Team was not informed of a potential data breach until 24 May 2022 and
notification to the DPC did not occur until 27 May 2022.
219. The DPC considers that the nature of each of the incidents, and subsequent contact with
the affected customers, should clearly have put PTSB on notice that data breaches had
potentially occurred and led to a prompt investigation. Furthermore, in each of the
incidents, despite a delay in determining that data breaches had occurred, there was a
subsequent delay in notification to the DPC once this became clear beyond question. The
DPC is therefore satisfied that, contrary to the submission of PTSB, it has fully considered

the relevant factual background in determining that the infringements were of a negligent
character and that this ought to be afforded moderate weight in determining the level of
the fine to be imposed.

iii. Article 83(2)(c) GDPR: any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate
the damage suffered by data subjects

220. According to the A29WP Fining Guidelines,
“This provision acts as an assessment of the degree of responsibility of the
controller after the infringement has occurred. It may cover cases where the
controller/processor has clearly not taken a reckless/ negligent approach but
where they have done all they can to correct their actions when they became
aware of the infringement.”
221. PTSB put in place various mitigation measures after it discovered the Breaches. These
measures included securing the affected customer accounts, providing a full refund of the
financial loss incurred by the affected accounts, and offering advice to the data subjects on
best practice in protecting their identity now and in the future in light of the potential for
future targeted frauds.115 PTSB additionally performed a specialised “lookback” exercise on
the assurance evaluations completed with respect to the agents involved in the incidents
the subject of the Inquiry. However, it is not always possible to correct a past lack of control
retrospectively, as personal data has already been breached and data subjects suffered
consequential damage as a result. Nonetheless, the actions taken by PTSB did make good
the financial loss suffered as a result of the Breaches and sought to prevent further loss
arising.
222. PTSB additionally made a number of substantial technical and organisational changes as a
result of the Breaches and did so in a timely manner following their occurrence. These
included a detailed review of the training process for new staff/agents, the relevant training
manuals and security journeys, on foot of which a range of improvements were made.
Those improvements included enhanced training for new staff/agents, the removal of the
third security journey, extensive and immediate training for all staff/agents involved in the
incidents around the security process, the introduction of technical enhancements to

115
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p10.

and the reintegration into on-boarding training of a 2020
additional steps guide to be used prior to inputting a mobile telephone
116
number on the PTSB customer database. Furthermore, a review of the process and
procedures between the fraud team and the digital and direct risk team led to the
introduction of a
Those measures were put in place
swiftly after the investigation of the root cause of the Breaches and minimised the risks of
any further breaches of a similar nature to the Breaches at issue, or any similar delay in
notification, which the DPC considers to be of mitigating value. In its submission on the
Issues Paper, PTSB further advised of a range of additional improvements that it has
subsequently put in place. Having regard to the range of actions taken by PTSB in identifying
the root cause of the Breaches, and seeking to very quickly put in place measures to prevent
a reoccurrence, the DPC considers those actions to have a mitigating effect.
223. Overall, in light of the totality of the mitigating actions for the purpose of Article 83(2)(c)
GDPR, the DPC takes the view that the actions were of mitigating value and must be
ascribed moderate weight in the determination of the administrative fine.

iv. Article 83(2)(d) GDPR: the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor
taking into account technical and organisational measures implemented by them
pursuant to Articles 25 and 32;

224. The key question in relation to this provision is whether PTSB ‘‘did what it could be expected
to do” given the nature, the purposes or the size of the processing, seen in light of the
obligations imposed on them by the Regulation.117
225. In its submissions, PTSB outlined the measures that it had in place to prevent any potential
breach of data protection. The DPC has had full regard to those measures in this Decision.
This Decision assesses whether PTSB complied with its obligations under Articles 5(1)(f) and
32(1) GDPR by implementing appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure
appropriate security of the personal data processed in the context of the Open24 Contact
Centre. As stated above, the DPC finds that PTSB infringed those two provisions.
Furthermore, the absence of the implementation of appropriate organisational measures
contributed to the delay in notification to the DPC as the Data Protection Team were not

116
PTSB response to Statement of Issues 24 February 2024 p21.
117
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [77].

promptly notified of the potential personal data breaches. Even following their notification,
the Data Protection Team delayed notifying the DPC. PTSB is obliged to ensure that it has
appropriate measures in place to meet its obligations under Article 33(1) GDPR.
226. Against this backdrop, the DPC considers that PTSB holds a high degree of responsibility for
this infringement and that the absence of the implementation of sufficiently robust
technical and organisational measures must be deterred. It is clear that PTSB did not do
‘what it could be expected to do’ in the circumstances assessed in this Decision.
227. However, in circumstances where this factor forms the basis for the finding of the
infringement of Article 32 GDPR against PTSB, this factor cannot be considered aggravating
in respect of the infringements. Therefore, the DPC considers that this factor is neither
aggravating nor mitigating in the circumstances.
228. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB submitted that, “while human error by PTSB
contributed towards the bad actors being able to commit a fraudulent attack on PTSB and
these three customers”, it is relevant within this criterion to note that “the bad actors were
already in possession of and unlawfully processing a significant amount of personal
information relating to the three affected customers which was obtained through prior
successful attacks.”118 As a result of this, PTSB submits that the degree of responsibility of
PTSB should be considered as a mitigating factor.
229. While the DPC accepts that bad actors came into possession of some customer data prior
to contacting PTSB, in the Inquiry, the DPC has examined the technical and organisational
measures in the Open24 Contact Centre and found that they were not appropriate to
respond to the high level of risk. It was the responsibility of PTSB as a data controller to
ensure that appropriate measures were put in place, and the responsibility of PTSB to do
so cannot be lowered due to the occurrence of prior attacks or human error. Had those
measures been appropriate to respond to the level of risk present, no infringement of the
GDPR would have occurred regardless of any prior attacks or human error - as noted above,
a strict liability standard is not imposed by the GDPR and the occurrence of data breaches
does not in itself mean that an infringement of Article 5(1)(f) or 32(1) GDPR has occurred.
Similarly, it was solely the responsibility of PTSB to ensure that it implemented appropriate
measures to meet its obligations under Article 33(1) GDPR and its responsibility to do so is

118
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.15

not lowered where prior attacks on data subjects may have occurred or in circumstances
where human error may play a role in an underlying data breach. The DPC also observes
that the nature of the prior attacks (postal interception and smishing) and human error
(failure to adhere to basic security procedures in the absence of appropriate technical
measures and training) were entirely predictable in this case and form part of the threat
environment in which PTSB operates. The fact that those risks materialised, and exposed
flaws in PTSB’s technical and organisational measures, cannot lower its degree of
responsibility.

v. Article 83(2)(e) GDPR: any relevant previous infringements by the controller or
processor;

230. In line with the EDPB Fining Guidelines, prior infringements are those already established
before the decision (in the sense of Article 60 GDPR) is issued.119 According to the A29WP
Fining Guidelines, ‘[t]his criterion is meant to assess the track record of the entity
committing the infringement.’120
231. In this case, PTSB has not been found to have committed any relevant previous
infringements of the GDPR by the DPC or another supervisory authority.
232. In its submissions of 26 September 2025, PTSB submitted that, where a previous
infringement is likely to constitute an aggravating factor, it follows that the absence of
previous infringement by PTSB should constitute a mitigating factor in this context.121
233. The DPC does not accept this submission. The Article 83(2) GDPR criteria are not binary in
nature such that, when assessed in the context of an infringement, they must be found to
be either a mitigating or aggravating factor. While previous infringements can be
considered aggravating, this must be determined on a case-by-case basis in view of the
frequency and nature of any previous infringement(s), having regard to criteria such as the
subject matter, time-frame and procedure in which the infringement was established.122
The EDPB Fining Guidelines further state that the absence of any previous infringements

119
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [82].
120
A20WP Fining Guidelines p14.
121
PTSB submissions on Draft Decision, 26 September 2025, p.15
122
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [82]-[94].

“cannot be considered a mitigating factor, as compliance with the GDPR is the norm” and
that “if there are no previous infringements, this factor can be regarded as neutral.”123
234. Accordingly, the DPC considers this factor to be neutral in this case.

vi. Article 83(2)(f) GDPR: the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority, in
order to remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the
infringement;

235. The extent to which PTSB has cooperated with the inquiry is relevant to consider under this
heading.124 PTSB submitted breach notification forms in respect of the Breaches to the DPC
and gave updates regarding PTSB’s progress in remediating the Breaches. The DPC
acknowledges PTSB’s cooperation with the DPC during the course of the Inquiry. However,
the DPC notes that PTSB was, in any event, under a duty, in light of Article 31 GDPR, to
cooperate on request with the supervisory authority in the performance of its tasks. In this
regard, the EDPB Fining Guidelines state that “the ordinary duty of cooperation is
mandatory and should therefore be considered neutral (and not a mitigating factor).” 125
236. The DPC notes that PTSB has made a number of substantial technical and organisational
improvements to security as a result of the Breaches, to mitigate the adverse effects and
prevent a recurrence, and has engaged with the DPC in this regard during the Inquiry. PTSB
reiterated those measures, and its ongoing cooperation, in its submissions of 26 September
2025, in submitting that this should constitute a mitigating factor under this criterion.
However, this has separately been taken into account as a mitigating factor under Article
83(2)(c) above.
237. The DPC therefore considers this criterion to be neutral.

vii. Article 83(2)(g) GDPR: the categories of personal data affected by the infringement;

238. By way of example of the categories that may be relevant to consider here, the A29WP
Fining Guidelines suggest considering whether the infringements concern Article 9 or 10

123
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [94].
124
A29WP Fining Guidelines p14.
125
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [96].

GDPR data,126 whether the data are directly or indirectly identifiable, whether the data are
encrypted or whether the processing involves data whose dissemination would cause
immediate damage or distress to the individual.127
239. Due to the absence of the implementation of appropriate technical and organisational
measures the categories of personal data not subject to appropriate security and affected
by the infringements included mobile phone numbers associated with data subjects’ bank
accounts, which were used for two factor authentication, bank balances, recent
transactions the Open24 numbers assigned by the bank and used for logging in to the
Open24 platform. In two cases, this directly led to significant financial loss and put the data
subjects at increased risk of additional theft, fraud and financial loss.
240. These personal data, by their nature, carry a high innate risk with regard to the fundamental
rights and freedoms of data subjects, in particular in relation to identity theft and fraud. In
those circumstances, the DPC considers that the categories of personal data affected by
the infringements are an aggravating factor of high weight.
241. In its submission of 26 September 2025, PTSB submitted that the DPC should have regard
to the fact that the bad actors were in possession of a certain amount of personal data
related to PTSB customers and that this increased the overall risk and impact on the data
subjects impacted. While the DPC does not disagree that the prior attacks on data subjects
had such an effect, this does not disturb the conclusion that the absence of the
implementation of appropriate technical and organisational measures in the Open24
Contact Centre directly led to the disclosure of financial data and data associated with
customer bank accounts (such as the phone number used for two-factor authentication,
address and Open24 number), which carries a high innate risk, and ultimately led to
financial loss in two cases. The DPC is therefore satisfied that it has appropriately afforded
weight to the categories of personal data affected by the infringements under this criterion.

126
Article 9 GDPR prohibits the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for
the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s
sex life. Article 10 GDPR provides that “Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or
related security measures based on Article 6(1) shall be carried out only under the control of official authority or
when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights
and freedoms of data subjects”.
127
A29WP Fining Guidelines p14.

viii. Article 83(2)(h) GDPR: the manner in which the infringement became known to the
supervisory authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the controller
or processor notified the infringement;

242. According to the A29WP Fining Guidelines, this section can be used to consider whether
the DPC became aware of the infringement ‘as a result of investigation, complaints, articles
in the press, anonymous tips or notification by the data controller.’128
243. The A29WP Fining Guidelines also note that:
“The controller has an obligation according to the Regulation to notify the supervisory
authority about personal data breaches. Where the controller merely fulfils this
obligation, compliance with the obligation cannot be interpreted as an attenuating/
mitigating factor. Similarly, a data controller/processor who acted carelessly without
notifying, or at least not notifying all of the details of the infringement due to a failure
to adequately assess the extent of the infringement may also be considered by the
supervisory authority to merit a more serious penalty i.e. it is unlikely to be classified
as a minor infringement.”129
244. In this case, the DPC received notifications of three personal data breaches from PTSB on
26 and 27 May 2022. This was found to be an undue delay and therefore an infringement
of Article 33(1) GDPR. However, as this forms the basis for the finding of infringement, the
DPC considers this factor neutral in this respect.

ix. Article 83(2)(i) GDPR: where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously
been ordered against the controller or processor concerned with regard to the same
subject-matter, compliance with those measures;

245. The A29WP Fining Guidelines state

“As opposed to the criteria in (e), this assessment criteria only seeks to remind
supervisory authorities to refer to measures that they themselves have previously

128
A29WP Fining Guidelines p15.
129
A29WP Fining Guidelines p15.

issued to the same controller or processors ‘with regard to the same subject
matter’”.130

246. Corrective powers have not previously been ordered against PTSB with regard to the
subject‐matter of this Decision. As such, the DPC considers this factor to be neutral.

x. Article 83(2)(j) GDPR: adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article
40 or approved certification mechanisms pursuant to Article 42

247. Such considerations do not arise in this case.

xi. Article 83(2)(k) GDPR: any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the
circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided,
directly or indirectly, from the infringement.

248. The DPC is of the view that there are no other aggravating or mitigating factors in respect
of the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) or 33(1) GDPR.
249. In its submissions on the Draft Decision of 26 September 2025, PTSB summarised a range
of factors which it considered mitigating. In so doing, it repeated certain submissions
already made and which have been taken into account elsewhere in this Decision. For
example, PTSB repeated its earlier positions on the steps taken to secure customer
accounts following the Breaches, the refund of funds to the two data subjects that suffered
financial loss, the prevention of further malicious activity in relation to the relevant
accounts and the improvements to technical and organisational measures following the
Breaches. Those factors have already been considered in respect of Article 83(2)(c) GDPR
above. PTSB also notes that despite the failing in implementing appropriate technical and
organisational measures in the Open24 Contact Centre, only three data subjects were
concretely affected and suffered damage. The DPC has considered the number of data
subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them in respect of Article 83(2)(a)
GDPR.
250. Finally, PTSB’s submissions additionally refer to the nature of the Breaches, which involved
malicious actors obtaining customer information prior to contacting PTSB and repeated
agent error when dealing with those malicious actors. The particular nature of the Breaches

130
A29WP Fining Guidelines p15.

has been considered by the DPC throughout the Decision and, as noted in the DPC’s
consideration of Article 83(2)(d) GDPR above, those factors do not limit the responsibility
of PTSB to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the
security of processing or report data breaches under Article 33(1) GDPR. While the
background to the particular Breaches is relevant, the DPC does not consider those factors
to be mitigating with regard to the specific infringements detailed in this Decision.

Decisions on whether to impose administrative fines

251. The decision to impose an administrative fine ‘needs to be taken on a case-by-case basis,
in light of the circumstances of each individual case.’131
252. Taking into account the assessment of the criteria at (a) to (k) above, the DPC has decided
to impose administrative fines. The infringements were considered above to be of a
moderate seriousness by reference to their nature, gravity and duration in line with Article
83(2)(a) GDPR. This is an aggravating factor, which indicates that a fine should be imposed.
Under Article 83(2)(b) GDPR the DPC found that PTSB was negligent to a medium degree
with respect to the infringements. In addition, under Article 83(2)(g) GDPR, the
infringements affected personal data that, by their nature, carry a high risk with regard to
the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects, in particular in relation to financial
fraud. This is an aggravating factor of a high weight indicating that a fine should be imposed.
The DPC considers that the measures adopted by PTSB under Article 83(2)(c) to mitigate
the damage to data subjects are mitigating to a moderate degree, but this factor does not
negate the need for administrative fines in this Inquiry. The DPC considers that the factors
assessed in relation to Articles 83(2)(e), (f), (h), (i), (j) and (k) are neither mitigating nor
aggravating.
253. In order to ensure compliance with the GDPR, it is necessary to dissuade non-compliance.
Depending on the circumstances of each individual case, dissuading non-compliance can
entail dissuading the entity concerned with the corrective measures, or dissuading other
entities carrying out similar processing operations, or both. Where a serious infringement
of the GDPR occurs, a reprimand may not be sufficient to deter future non-compliance. In
this regard, by imposing financial penalties, administrative fines are effective in dissuading
non-compliance. This is recognised by the requirement in Article 83(1) GDPR for a fine,
when imposed, to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Recital 148 GDPR

131
EDPB, Binding Decision 1/2023.

acknowledges that, depending on the circumstances of each individual case, administrative
fines may be appropriate in addition to, or instead of, reprimands and other corrective
powers:

“In order to strengthen the enforcement of the rules of this Regulation, penalties,
including administrative fines should be imposed for any infringement of this
Regulation, in addition to, or instead of appropriate measures imposed by the
supervisory authority pursuant to this Regulation. In a case of a minor infringement
or if the fine likely to be imposed would constitute a disproportionate burden to a
natural person, a reprimand may be issued instead of a fine.”

254. In light of the seriousness of the infringements, the DPC considers that administrative fines
are proportionate to dissuade PTSB and other entities from non-compliance with the
infringed provisions. The DPC finds that administrative fines are necessary to deter other
future serious non-compliance on the part of PTSB and other controllers or processors
carrying out similar processing operations. The reasons for this finding include:
a. Each infringement is moderate in nature and gravity as set out pursuant to Article
83(2)(a) GDPR. Infringements of this nature and gravity must be strongly
dissuaded both in respect of the individual controller and in respect of other
entities carrying out similar processing.
b. Regarding the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, the DPC considers
that PTSB’s non-compliance with its obligations under these Articles must be
strongly dissuaded. PTSB’s failure to implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures was a critical factor contributing to the loss of control of
users’ personal data and exposure of the data subjects to the risks of theft, fraud
or financial loss. Given that such activities constituted a high risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons the DPC considers that an administrative fine is
appropriate and necessary in order to dissuade non-compliance. Such dissuasive
effect is crucial for protecting the rights and freedoms of those data subjects by
implementing appropriate measures. The DPC also considers an infringement of
the ‘integrity and confidentiality’ principle under Article 5(1)(f) to be particularly
serious and this is reflected by the higher fine threshold under Article 83(5) GDPR.

c. Considering the nature of PTSB’s infringements of Articles 33(1) GDPR, and the
repetitive nature of those infringements, the DPC considers that imposing an
administrative fine for these infringements is necessary to dissuade future non-

compliance on PTSB’s part. The reporting and notification requirements under the
GDPR do not only serve to protect data subjects’ right but also facilitate the
efficient exercise of supervisory authorities’ investigative and regulatory
functions. The exercise of such functions supports the GDPR’s aims of protecting
data subjects’ fundamental rights and the DPC considers it necessary to impose
an administrative fine to deter future non-compliance with this provision.

Therefore, the DPC considers that administrative fines are appropriate and necessary in
order to dissuade non-compliance.

255. Having regard to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringements, the DPC also
considers that administrative fines are proportionate for ensuring compliance. PTSB’s
infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR were a primary cause of the Breaches. In
light of this damage, the DPC considers that administrative fines are proportionate in
response to PTSB’s infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR with a view to
ensuring future compliance. The DPC considers that the administrative fines imposed do
not exceed what is necessary to enforce compliance in respect of the infringements
identified in this Decision.
256. The DPC considers that the negligent character of PTSB’s infringements of Articles 5(1)(f),
32(1) and 33(1) GDPR carries weight when considering whether to impose administrative
fines, and if so, the amount of those fines. This negligence suggests that administrative
fines are necessary to ensure that PTSB directs sufficient attention to its obligations under
Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR in the future.
257. The DPC considers that administrative fines would help to ensure that PTSB and other
similar controllers take the necessary action to ensure the utmost care is taken to avoid
infringements of the GDPR in respect of users’ data.
258. The DPC has had regard to the lack of previous relevant infringements by PTSB and has also
had regard to the actions taken by PTSB as a result of the Breaches. However, in light of the
factors outlined above, the DPC considers that dissuasive administrative fines are necessary
in the circumstances to ensure future compliance.
b) Decision on the amount of the administrative fines
259. Above, it was determined that it was necessary to impose administrative fines. This section
calculates the amount of those fines, taking into account the methodology required to be
applied by the EDPB Fining Guidelines, based on the assessments of the individual Article
83(2) GDPR criteria that are recorded above.

i) Article 83(3) GDPR

260. In accordance with Article 83(3) GDPR:

“If a controller or processor intentionally or negligently, for the same or linked
processing operations, infringes several provisions of this Regulation, the total
amount of the administrative fine shall not exceed the amount specified for the
gravest infringement.”

261. As outlined previously, the infringements identified herein all relate to the processing
concerned, i.e. all of the processing operations that PTSB carries out on personal data in
the context of its Open24 Contact Centre.
262. In respect of the interpretation of Article 83(3) GDPR, the DPC is mindful of its obligations
of cooperation and consistency in, inter alia, Articles 60(1) and 63 GDPR. Accordingly, it is
necessary to follow the EDPB’s interpretation of Article 83(3) GDPR which was set out in
the EDPB’s binding decision 1/2021, which was made in relation to an inquiry conducted
by the DPC.132 In summary, the view of the EDPB is that the correct approach to the
interpretation of Article 83(3) GDPR requires that:

“326. Although the fine itself may not exceed the legal maximum of the highest
fining tier, the offender shall still be explicitly found guilty of having infringed
several provisions and these infringements have to be taken into account when
assessing the amount of the final fine that is to be imposed. Therefore, while the
legal maximum of the fine is set by the gravest infringement with regard to Articles
83(4) and (5) GDPR, other infringements cannot be discarded but have to be taken
into account when calculating the fine.”

263. The impact of this interpretation is that administrative fines are imposed cumulatively, as
opposed to imposing only the fine for the gravest infringement. Under this interpretation,
the only applicable limit for the total fine imposed is the overall ‘cap’. By way of example,
in a case of multiple infringements, if the gravest infringement was one that carried a
maximum administrative fine of 2% of the turnover of the undertaking, the cumulative fine
imposed could also not exceed 2% of the turnover of the undertaking.

132
Inquiry IN-18-12-2.

264. In this case, infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR were identified. The
gravest infringement is that of Article 5(1)(f), as it is an infringement of a core principle of
the GDPR. The associated maximum possible fine for this infringement under Article 83(5)
GDPR is €20,000,000, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide
annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.

ii) Categorisation of the infringements

265. Articles 83(4)-(6) GDPR set out the caps that apply under the GDPR. The EDPB Fining
Guidelines say that the categorisation of infringements under Article 83(4)-(6) GDPR can be
used to determine the starting point for further calculation. Those Guidelines note that

“With this distinction, the legislator provided a first indication of the seriousness of
the infringement in an abstract sense. The more serious the infringement, the higher
the fine is likely to be.”

266. Infringements of Articles 32(1) and 33(1) are subject to a cap under the GDPR of
€10,000,000 or 2% of an undertaking’s annual turnover, whichever is higher, under Article
83(4) GDPR. However, an infringement of Article 5(1)(f) is subject to a cap of €20,000,000
or 4% of an undertaking’s annual turnover, whichever is higher, under Article 83(5) GDPR.
267. The categorisation of the infringements under Articles 83(4) or (5) is a relevant
consideration in assessing the seriousness of the infringements in this case.

iii) Seriousness of the infringements pursuant to Articles 83(2)(a), (b) and (g) GDPR

268. The EDPB Guidelines state that the factors assessed in relation to Articles 83(2)(a), (b) and
(g) GDPR indicate the seriousness of the infringement.133 These factors were assessed in
paragraphs 178 to 219 and 238 to 241 above. The guidelines also state that
“This assessment is no mathematical calculation in which the abovementioned
factors are considered individually, but rather a thorough evaluation of the
concrete circumstances of the case, in which all of the abovementioned factors are

133
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [51].

interlinked. Therefore, in reviewing the seriousness of the infringement, regard
should be given to the infringement as a whole.”134
269. Having regard to these factors as a whole, the infringements are of a medium level of
seriousness. Under Article 83(2)(a) GDPR the infringements were found to be of a moderate
nature and gravity. The infringements of Article 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR were also found to
have been of considerable duration. The infringements affected personal data which, by
their nature, carry a high risk with regard to the fundamental rights and freedoms of data
subjects, as assessed under Article 83(2)(g) GDPR. PTSB was also negligent to a medium
degree with respect to the infringements, as assessed under Article 83(2)(b) GDPR.
Therefore, balancing these factors, the DPC considers that the infringements were of
medium seriousness.
270. As the infringements are of a medium level of seriousness the starting point for calculation
is between 10 and 20% of the applicable maximums identified above at paragraph 264.

iv) Turnover of the undertaking with a view to imposing an effective, dissuasive and
proportionate fine

271. Citing binding decision 1/2021, the EDPB Fining Guidelines state that the EDPB ‘considers
that it is fair to reflect a distinction of the size of the undertaking in the starting points
identified below and therefore takes into account its turnover.’135 This view is rooted in
Article 83(1) GDPR, which requires a fine to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive in
each individual case. As the guidelines also state that this does not ‘dismiss a supervisory
authority from the responsibility to carry out a review of the effectiveness, dissuasiveness
and proportionality at the end of the calculation.’136 Article 83(1) will be considered again
at the end of this calculation.
272. The EDPB Fining Guidelines state that the supervisory authority may adjust the starting
amount corresponding to the seriousness of the infringement by reference to the turnover
of the undertaking.137

• For undertakings with an annual turnover of ≤ €2m, supervisory authorities may

134
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [59].
135
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [64].
136
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [64].
137
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [64]-[66].

consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 0.2% and 0.4% of the
identified starting amount.138
• For undertakings with an annual turnover of €2m up until €10m, supervisory
authorities may consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 0.3%
and 2% of the identified starting amount.139
• For undertakings with an annual turnover of €10m up until €50m, supervisory
authorities may consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 1.5%
and 10% of the identified starting amount.140
• For undertakings with an annual turnover of €50m up until €100m, supervisory
authorities may consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 8% and
20% of the identified starting amount.141
• For undertakings with an annual turnover of €100m up until €250m, supervisory
authorities may consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 15%
and 50 % of the identified starting amount.142
• For undertakings with an annual turnover of €250m up until €500m, supervisory
authorities may consider to proceed calculations on the basis of a sum between 40%
and 100% of the identified starting amount.143
• For undertakings with an annual turnover above €500m, supervisory authorities may
consider to proceed without an adjustment of the identified starting amount. Indeed,
such undertakings will exceed the static legal maximum and, thus, the size of the
undertaking is already reflected in the dynamic legal maximum used to determine the
starting amount for further calculation based on the evaluation of the seriousness of
the infringement.144

273. As noted in section (vi) below, according to the PTSB Annual Report for 2024 (the most
recent published at the time of this Decision), the total income of Permanent TSB Group

138
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [65].
139
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [65].
140
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [65].
141
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [66].
142
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [66].
143
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [66].
144
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [66].

Holdings plc in that year was approximately €672,000,000.145 No adjustment to the starting
point is therefore necessary.
274. As noted in the EDPB Fining Guidelines,
“[I]t should be reiterated that the starting points for further calculation are not
fixed amounts (price tags) for infringements of provisions of the GDPR. The
supervisory authority has the discretion to utilise the full fining range from any
amount until the legal maximum, ensuring that the fine is tailored to the
circumstances of the case.”146
v) Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

275. Articles 83(2)(a), (b) and (g) GDPR were considered above in relation to the starting point
for the calculation of the fine. In line with the approach suggested in the EDPB Fining
Guidelines,147 this section considers the aggravating or mitigating impact of the remaining
criteria in Article 83(2) GDPR.
276. In relation to Article 83(2)(c) GDPR, it was noted that PTSB had adopted significant
measures to mitigate the damage to data subjects. PTSB promptly made a number of
substantial technical and organisational changes as a result of the Breaches and also
reimbursed the data subjects who suffered financial loss. This is considered to be a
mitigating factor of moderate weight.
277. In relation to Article 83(2)(d) GDPR, it was noted that PTSB did not do ‘what it could be
expected to do’ in the circumstances assessed in this Decision. However, in circumstances
where this factor forms the basis for the finding of the infringement of Article 32 GDPR
against PTSB, this factor cannot be considered aggravating in respect of the infringements.
Therefore, the DPC considers that this factor is neither aggravating nor mitigating in the
circumstances.

145
PTSB Annual Report 2024. Net Interest Income of €612M + Net Fees and Commissions Income of €55M + Net
Other Income of €5M = a total of €672M. The DPC further notes that this figure corresponds to the turnover figure
disclosed by PTSB pursuant to its country-by-country reporting requirements, as per the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD IV), as transposed into Irish legislation by Regulation 77 of Statutory Instrument 158 of 2014. As
detailed in the latest of those disclosures (2023), the turnover figure comprises “net interest income, net fees and
commission income, net trading income, net other operating income.”
146
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [69].
147
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [70].

278. In relation to Article 83(2)(e) GDPR, it was noted that PTSB did not have any previous
relevant infringements. This factor is considered to be neither mitigating nor aggravating.
279. In relation to Article 83(2)(f) GDPR, it was noted that PTSB had cooperated with the DPC.
As PTSB has a general obligation to cooperate under Article 31 GDPR, this factor is
considered to be neither mitigating nor aggravating.
280. In relation to Article 83(2)(h) GDPR, it was noted that the manner in which the infringement
became known to the DPC was via notification of personal data breaches from PTSB. The
DPC considers that this factor is neither aggravating nor mitigating in the circumstances.
281. In relation to Article 83(2)(i) GDPR, it was noted that orders had not been previously
ordered by the DPC148 with regard to the same subject matter. This factor is considered to
be neither mitigating nor aggravating.
282. In relation to Article 83(2)(j) GDPR, it was found that there were no relevant approved
codes of conduct or approved certification mechanisms for consideration. This factor is
neither mitigating nor aggravating.
283. In relation to Article 83(2)(k) GDPR, it was noted that there were no additional aggravating
or mitigating factors for consideration.
284. Taking into account all of the matters arising for consideration as part of the individual
assessments required to be carried out pursuant to Article 83(2) GDPR together with the
requirements of the Fining Guidelines, as detailed above, the DPC imposes, in respect of
PTSB’s infringement of Article 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, a fine of €250,000.
285. In respect of PTSB’s infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, the DPC imposes a fine of €27,500.
286. These fines, totalling €277,500, are substantially lower than the total maximum fine of
€385,000 proposed in the Draft Decision. The final fines reflect the mitigation occasioned
by PTSB in acknowledging flaws in its technical and organisations measures, indicating its
commitment to compliance and protecting data protection rights and promptly making
significant improvements in order to reduce the likelihood of similar breaches occurring in
the future.

148
Paragraph 101 of the EDPB Fining Guidelines says ‘as opposed to Article 83(2)(e) GDPR, this assessment only
refers to measures that supervisory authorities themselves have previously issued to the same controller or
processor with regard to the same subject matter.’

vi) The relevant legal maximums for the different processing operations

The relevant undertaking for the purposes of the fine calculation

287. In order to ensure that the fine does not exceed the fining cap and to identify the turnover
for the purposes of section (iv) it is first necessary to consider whether or not the fine is to
be imposed on “an undertaking.” Recital 150 clarifies, in this regard, that:

“Where administrative fines are imposed on an undertaking, an undertaking should
be understood to be an undertaking in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU for
those purposes.”

288. Accordingly, when considering a respondent’s status as an undertaking, the GDPR requires
the DPC to do so by reference to the concept of “undertaking,” as that term is understood
in a competition law context. In this regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the
‘CJEU’) has established that “an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an
economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is
financed”.149
289. The CJEU has held that a number of different enterprises could together comprise a single
economic unit where one of those enterprises is able to exercise decisive influence over
the behaviour of the others on the market. Such decisive influence may arise, for example,
in the context of a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary. Where an entity (such
as a subsidiary) does not independently decide upon its own conduct on the market, but
carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by another entity (such as a
parent), this means that both entities constitute a single economic unit and a single
undertaking for the purpose of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The ability, on the part of the
parent company, to exercise decisive influence over the subsidiary’s behaviour on the
market means that the conduct of the subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company,
without having to establish the personal involvement of the parent company in the
infringement.150
290. In the context of Article 83 GDPR, the concept of “undertaking” means that, where there is
another entity that is in a position to exercise decisive influence over the
controller/processor’s behaviour on the market, then they will together constitute a single

149
Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH, Judgment of 23 April 1991, [21].
150
Case c-97/08P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, Judgment of 10 September 2009, [58 – 60].

economic entity and a single undertaking. Accordingly, the relevant fining cap will be
calculated by reference to the turnover of the undertaking as a whole, rather than the
turnover of the controller or processor concerned.
291. In order to ascertain whether a subsidiary determines its conduct on the market
independently, account must be taken of all the relevant factors relating to the economic,
organisational and legal links which tie the subsidiary to the parent company, which may
vary from case to case.151
292. The CJEU has established that,152 where a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a
subsidiary, it follows that the parent company is able to exercise decisive influence over
the conduct of the subsidiary and a rebuttable presumption arises that the parent company
does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary. The CJEU also
established that, in a case where a company holds all or almost all of the capital of an
intermediate company which, in turn, holds all or almost all of the capital of a subsidiary of
its group, there is also a rebuttable presumption that that company exercises a decisive
influence over the conduct of the intermediate company and indirectly, via that company,
also over the conduct of that subsidiary.153
293. The General Court has further held that, in effect, the presumption may be applied in any
case where the parent company is in a similar situation to that of a sole owner as regards
its power to exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary.154 This reflects
the position that:
“…the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence is based, in essence, on
the premise that the fact that a parent company holds all or virtually all the share
capital of its subsidiary enables the Commission to conclude, without supporting
evidence, that that parent company has the power to exercise a decisive influence
over the subsidiary without there being any need to take into account the interests
of other shareholders when adopting strategic decisions or in the day-to-day

151
C-490/15 P Ori Martin and SLM v Commission (14 September 2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:678, [60].
152
Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission (10 September 2009) EU:C:2009:536.
153
Case C-508/11 P Eni v Commission (8 May 2013) EU:C:2013:289, at para. 48.
154
T-206/06 Total and Elf Aquitaine v Commission (7 June 2011) EU:T:2011:250, at para. 56; T-562/08 Repsol
Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission (12 December 2014) EU:T:2014:1078, at para. 42; T-413/10
and T-414/10 Socitrel and Companhia Previdente v Commission (15 July 2015) EU:T:2015:500, at para. 204.

business of that subsidiary, which does not determine its own market conduct
independently, but in accordance with the wishes of that parent company…”155

294. Where the presumption of decisive influence has been raised, it may be rebutted by the
production of sufficient evidence that shows, by reference to the economic, organisational
and legal links between the two entities, that the subsidiary acts independently on the
market. It is important to note that “decisive influence”, in this context, refers to the ability
of a parent company to influence, directly or indirectly, the way in which its subsidiary
organises its affairs, in a corporate sense, for example, in relation to its day-to-day business
or the adoption of strategic decisions. While this could include, for example, the ability to
direct a subsidiary to comply with all applicable laws, including the GDPR, in a general
sense, it does not require the parent to have the ability to determine the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data by its subsidiary.
295. In Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc’s Annual Report of 2024,156 it is stated that
“Permanent TSB plc (PTSB), a 100% owned subsidiary of the Company, is the main trading
entity of the Group which is involved in retail banking.”
296. Therefore, as the “ultimate parent company” it is assumed that Permanent TSB Group
Holdings plc is in a similar situation to that of a sole owner as regards its power to (directly
or indirectly) exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of PTSB. Accordingly, a
rebuttable presumption arises to the effect that Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc does
in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of PTSB on the market. If this
presumption is not rebutted, it would mean that PTSB and Permanent TSB Group Holdings
plc constitute a single economic unit and therefore form a single undertaking within the
meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Consequently, the relevant cap for the purpose of Articles
83(5) GDPR would fall to be determined by reference to the total turnover of all of the
component companies in the undertaking, namely PTSB and Permanent TSB Group
Holdings plc. According to the PTSB Annual Report for 2024 (the most recent published at

155
Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission EU:C:2009:262 (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott), at
para. 73 cited in Case T-419/14 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v European Commission (12 July 2018)
ECLI:EU:T:2018:445, at para. 51.
156
Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc, Annual Report 2024, (Permanent TSB Group, 3 March 2025) <
https://www.permanenttsbgroup.ie/~/media/Files/P/Ptsb-CORP/documents/result-centre/annual-
interim/2024/ptsbgh-annual-report-2024.pdf >, last accessed: 12 May 2025.

the time of this Decision), the amount of that turnover in this year was approximately
€672,000,000.157
297. On 1 August 2025, the DPC wrote to PTSB setting out the concept of undertaking and how
it applies in the context of the GDPR and detailing the DPC’s understanding of the relevant
factors, as they appear to apply to PTSB.
298. On 14 August 2025, PTSB responded to the DPC and confirmed that Permanent TSB Group
Holdings plc and PTSB constitute a single economic unit and therefore form a single
undertaking within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. PTSB further confirmed that it had
brought the contents of the DPC’s letter dated 1 August 2025 to the attention of the
relevant members of Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc who had no further observations
to make arising out of the DPC’s letter.
299. As the presumption was not rebutted, but rather confirmed by PTSB, it means that PTSB
plc and Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc constitute a single economic unit and therefore
form a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Consequently, the
relevant cap for the purpose of Articles 83(4) and (5) GDPR, falls to be determined by
reference to the combined turnover of PTSB and Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc.
300. According to the EDPB Fining Guidelines:

“Turnover is taken from the annual accounts of an undertaking, which are drawn up
with reference to its business year and provide an overview of the past financial year
of a company or of a group of companies (consolidated accounts). Turnover is defined
as the sum of all goods and services sold. Net turnover means the amount derived
from the sale of products and the provision of services after deducting sales rebates

157
PTSB Annual Report 2024. Net Interest Income of €612M + Net Fees and Commissions Income of €55M +Net
Other Income of €5M = a total of €672M. The DPC further notes that this figure corresponds to the turnover figure
disclosed by PTSB pursuant to its country-by-country reporting requirements, as per the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD IV), as transposed into Irish legislation by Regulation 77 of Statutory Instrument 158 of 2014. As
detailed in the latest of those disclosures (2023), the turnover figure comprises “net interest income, net fees and
commission income, net trading income, net other operating income.”

and value added tax (VAT) and other taxes directly linked to turnover.158

Turnover is taken from the presentation of the profit and loss account.159 Net turnover
includes revenue from the sale, rental and leasing of products and revenue from the
sale of services less sales deductions (e.g. rebates, discounts) and VAT.”160

301. The relevant turnover for the purposes of Article 83(4)-(6) GDPR is the turnover for the
preceding financial year. The EDPB Fining Guidelines State:

“As to the question of which event the term “preceding” relates to, the CJEU case law
in competition law is also to be applied for GDPR fines so that the relevant event is
the fining decision issued by the supervisory authority and neither the time of
infringement nor the court decision.”161

302. With regard to the relevant year for the calculation of turnover, in its correspondence of
14 August 2025, PTSB stated that it was of the view that “consideration should be given to
using the financial year 2021 as the relevant financial year (i.e. the year preceding the
incidents which gave rise of the alleged data breaches the subject of the Inquiry), rather
than 2024, in circumstances where the Inquiry has been ongoing for nearly three years”.
However, as noted by the EDPB in Binding Decision 1/2021, the date of the final decision
taken by the Lead Supervisory Authority is the event from which the preceding financial
year should be considered.162 Although Binding Decision 1/2021 referred to an inquiry
where cross-border data processing was at issue, the DPC does not consider that there is
any reason to depart from the view of the EDPB in relation to an inquiry where domestic

158
Footnote from EDPB Fining Guidelines: See e.g., Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related
reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (hereinafter “Directive 2013/34/EU”), which is
applicable to companies with limited liability, or similar applicable legislation and Article 5(1) of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter “EC Merger Regulation”).
159
Footnote from EDPB Fining Guidelines: See e.g., Annexes V or VI to Article 13(1) of Directive 2013/34/EU under
the heading “net turnover”, or similar applicable legislation.
160
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [128]-[129].
161
EDPB Fining Guidelines, [131]. This paragraph of the EDPB Fining Guidelines has the following footnote: Regional
Court LG Bonn, case 29 OWi 1/20, 11 November 2020, paragraph95, referencing case C-637/13 P, Badezimmerkartell
Laufen Austria, para. 49 and case C-408/12 P, YKK et al, para. 90.
162
Binding decision 1/2021 on the dispute arisen on the Draft Decision of the Irish Supervisory Authority regarding
WhatsApp Ireland under Article 65(1)(a) GDPR, adopted on 28 July 2021.

data processing is at issue. The DPC therefore uses the best available and most up to date
financial information in making this calculation.
303. Above, it was determined that the infringement of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR was the gravest
infringement. Therefore, the cap for the fines in this decision is 4% of the undertaking’s
total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year. The DPC notes that the
imposed fines are cumulatively less than 4% of Permanent TSB Group Holdings plc
worldwide annual turnover from the most recently published annual accounts.

vii) Article 83(1) GDPR: Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness
Effectiveness

304. It is the DPC’s view that for a fine to be effective, it must be large enough to have a
significant effect on the controller or processor such that GDPR compliance, motivated by
avoiding such fines in the future, becomes a factor in the entity’s governance and
management decision-making at the highest level. Furthermore, a sufficiently large fine is
necessary to ensure that the fine is not a mere insignificant expense for the controller or
processor concerned, and to ensure that the entity does not enjoy an unfair advantage by
its ability to absorb even large fines for its infringements of the GDPR. The infringements
concern personal data including data subject identity, contact details, and economic or
financial data. These personal data, by their nature, carry a high risk with regard to the
fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects, in particular in relation to financial
fraud. In that context, the DPC considers that the level of the imposed fines is sufficient to
ensure compliance and no further adjustment is required.

Dissuasiveness

305. In order for a fine to be ‘dissuasive’, it must dissuade both the controller or processor
concerned as well as other controllers or processors carrying out similar processing
operations from repeating the conduct concerned. The DPC considers that the imposed
ranges are dissuasive for both. The DPC considers the monetary value of the imposed fines
to be sufficient to have such a deterrent effect.
306. Each infringement is moderate in nature and gravity as set out pursuant to Article 83(2)(a)
GDPR. Infringements that are of a moderate nature and gravity must be strongly dissuaded
both in respect of the individual controller and in respect of other entities carrying out
similar processing. Regarding the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR,
the DPC considers that PTSB’s non-compliance with its obligations under these Articles

must be strongly dissuaded. Such dissuasive effect is crucial for protecting the rights and
freedoms of those data subjects by implementing appropriate measures. Therefore, the
DPC considers that the imposed administrative fines are appropriate and necessary in order
to dissuade non-compliance.
307. The DPC considers that the negligent character of PTSB’s infringements of Articles 5(1)(f),
32(1) and 33(1) GDPR carries weight when considering the amount of those fines. This
negligence suggests that the imposed administrative fines are necessary to ensure that
PTSB directs sufficient attention to its obligations under Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1)
GDPR in the future.
308. The DPC considers that the imposed amounts of the administrative fines would help to
ensure that PTSB and other similar controllers take the necessary action to ensure the
utmost care is taken to avoid infringements of the GDPR in respect of users’ data.
309. The DPC has had regard to actions taken by PTSB as a result of the Breaches. In light of the
negligent character of the infringements, and PTSB’s failure to comply with its obligations
with regard to data protection, the DPC considers that dissuasive administrative fines to
the extent imposed are necessary in the circumstances to ensure future compliance.

Proportionality

310. Proportionality is a principle of EU law that requires a measure to pursue a legitimate
objective, be appropriate to attain that objective, and not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objective. The objectives of the administrative fines in this case are to both re-
establish compliance with the rules, and to sanction PTSB’s infringements. As regards the
requirement for any fine to be necessary to these objectives, this requires the DPC to
adjust the quantum of any imposed fines to the minimum amount necessary to achieve
the objectives pursued by the GDPR.
311. Having regard to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringements, the DPC considers
that the imposed administrative fines are proportionate in the circumstances in view of
ensuring compliance. In particular, PTSB’s infringements of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR
were a primary cause of the Breaches, which led to financial loss and loss of control over
personal data for data subjects, who were put at increased risk of additional theft, fraud,
or financial loss. The lack of appropriate technical and organisational measures additionally
meant other PTSB customers were vulnerable to similar damage occurring. In light of this
damage, the DPC considers that the imposed administrative fines are proportionate to
respond to PTSB’s infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1) and 33(1) GDPR with a view to

ensuring future compliance. The DPC considers that administrative fines do not exceed
what is necessary to enforce compliance in respect of the infringements identified in this
Decision.
M. Summary of Envisaged Action
312. In summary, the corrective powers that the DPC imposes to address the infringements in
the particular circumstances are:
• A Reprimand to PTSB pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR regarding the infringements
identified in this Decision;
• One imposed administrative fine for infringement of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR
in the amount of €250,000; and
• One imposed administrative fine for the infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR in the
amount of €27,500.
N. Right of Appeal
313. The Final Decision is issued in accordance with section 111 of the 2018 Act. Pursuant to
section 150(5) of the 2018 Act, PTSB has the right to appeal against the Final Decision within
28 days from the date on which notice of the Final Decision is received by it. Furthermore,
pursuant to section 142 of the 2018 Act, as the Final Decision includes a Decision to impose
an administrative fine, PTSB also has the right to appeal against that Decision within 28
days from the date on which notice of the Final Decision is given to it.

This Decision is addressed to:
Permanent TSB plc,
56-59 Stephen’s Green,
Dublin 2,
D02 5489

Decision-Makers for the Data Protection Commission:

_________________________ _________________________
Dr. Des Hogan Dale Sunderland
Commissioner for Data Protection Commissioner for Data Protection
Chairperson

APPENDIX 1

Inquiry into Permanent TSB (PTSB)

Karar metni