Criminal proceedings against VD and SR

1.

The requests for a preliminary ruling which have been joined in these proceedings are closely related to Cases C‑793/19, SpaceNet, C‑794/19, Telekom Deutschland, and C‑140/20, Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and Others, on which I am also delivering my Opinions today. ( 2 )

2.

In my Opinions in SpaceNet and Telekom Deutschland and in Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, I set out my reasons for suggesting that the Court give the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Germany) and the Supreme Court (Ireland) answers in line with the case-law relating to Directive 2002/58/EC, ( 3 ) as ‘summarised’ in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net. ( 4 )

3.

It is true, however, that the two requests for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) are directly concerned not with Directive 2002/58 but with Directive 2003/6/EC ( 5 ) and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. ( 6 )

4.

Nonetheless, the issue in these two sets of proceedings is, in essence, the same as that in the abovementioned references for a preliminary ruling, namely whether Member States may impose an obligation to retain electronic communications traffic data in a general and indiscriminate manner. ( 7 )

5.

For that reason, although this case has to do with Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014 (which are intended to combat dealings classifiable as market abuse), ( 8 ) I consider the Court’s case-law as condensed in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net to be applicable in this context.

6.

According to Article 1 (‘Scope and aim’):

‘1.   This Directive harmonises the provisions of the Member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy and confidentiality, with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and of electronic communication equipment and services in the [Union].

2.   The provisions of this Directive particularise and complement Directive 95/46/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31)] for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1. Moreover, they provide for protection of the legitimate interests of subscribers who are legal persons.

3.   This Directive shall not apply to activities which fall outside the scope of the [TFEU], such as those covered by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union, and in any case to activities concerning public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the activities relate to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.’

7.

Article 2 (‘Definitions’) provides:

‘Save as otherwise provided, the definitions in Directive 95/46/EC and in Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [(OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33)] shall apply.

The following definitions shall also apply:

…

…’

8.

Article 15(1) states:

‘Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights and obligations provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of this Directive when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. To this end, Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in this paragraph shall be in accordance with the general principles of Community law, including those referred to in Article 6(1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union.’

9.

In accordance with Article 11:

‘Without prejudice to the competences of the judicial authorities, each Member State shall designate a single administrative authority competent to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive are applied.

…’

10.

Article 12 states:

‘1.   The competent authority shall be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of its functions. …

2.   Without prejudice to Article 6(7), the powers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with national law and shall include at least the right to:

…

…’

11.

The regulation contains these recitals:

…

…

…

…’

12.

Article 1 (‘Subject matter’) provides:

‘This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.’

13.

Article 3 (‘Definitions’) states, in point 27 of paragraph 1, that, for the purposes of the regulation, ‘data traffic records’ means ‘records of traffic data as defined in point (b) of the second paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 2002/58/EC …’.

14.

Article 22 (‘Competent authorities’) stipulates:

‘Without prejudice to the competences of the judicial authorities, each Member State shall designate a single administrative competent authority for the purpose of this Regulation. …’

15.

Article 23 (‘Powers of competent authorities’) states:

‘…

2.   In order to fulfil their duties under this Regulation, competent authorities shall have, in accordance with national law, at least the following supervisory and investigatory powers:

…

…

3.   Member States shall ensure that appropriate measures are in place so that competent authorities have all the supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary to fulfil their duties.

…

4.   A person making information available to the competent authority in accordance with this Regulation shall not be considered to be infringing any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, and shall not involve the person notifying in liability of any kind related to such notification.’

16.

In accordance with Article 28 (‘Data protection’):

‘With regard to the processing of personal data within the framework of this Regulation, competent authorities shall carry out their tasks for the purposes of this Regulation in accordance with the national laws, regulations or administrative provisions transposing Directive 95/46/EC. With regard to the processing of personal data by [the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)] within the framework of this Regulation, ESMA shall comply with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1)].

Personal data shall be retained for a maximum period of five years.’

17.

The first paragraph of Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF, in the version in force at the material time, provided:

‘Where necessary for the purposes of investigation or inspection, investigators or inspectors may require the disclosure of any documents on any medium. Investigators may also require data retained and processed by telecommunications operators under Article L. 34‑1 of the Code des postes et des communications électroniques (Post and electronic communications code; ‘the CPCE’) and the service providers referred to in Article 6(I)(1) and (2) of Loi no 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique (Law No 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 on confidence-building in the digital economy; “Law No 2004-575”) and receive a copy thereof. …’

18.

According to Article L. 621‑10‑2 of the CMF applicable in the present case:

‘For the purposes of investigating market abuse … investigators may require data retained and processed by telecommunications operators, under the conditions and within the limits laid down in Article L. 34‑1 of the [CPCE], and by the providers referred to in Article 6(I)(1) and (2) of [Law No 2004-575].

Conveyance of the data mentioned in the first paragraph of this article shall be the subject of prior authorisation by a connection data requests controller.

…’

19.

According to Article L. 34‑1 of the CPCE in force at the material time:

‘…

II. Electronic communications operators … shall erase or anonymise all traffic data, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph III …

…

III. For the purposes of the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences … operations aimed at erasing or anonymising certain categories of technical data may be deferred for a maximum period of one year. …

…

VI. Data retained and processed under the conditions defined in paragraphs III, IV and V shall relate exclusively to the identification of the users of the services supplied by providers, the technical characteristics of the communications effected by the latter and the location of the terminal equipment.

Such data may not under any circumstances relate to the content of the correspondence exchanged or the information consulted, in whatever form, in the course of those communications.

…’

20.

Article R. 10‑13 of the CPCE provided:

‘I. In accordance with Article L. 34‑1(III), electronic communications operators shall retain, for the purposes of the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences:

II. In the case of telephony activities, the operator shall retain the data referred to in paragraph II and, in addition, any data by which the origin and location of the communication may be identified.

III. The data referred to in this article shall be retained for one year from the date of the registration thereof.

…’

21.

The referring court notes that such connection data consist of data which, having been generated or processed as a result of a communication, relate to the circumstances of that communication and to the users of the service, to the exclusion of any indication as to the content of the messages.

22.

The facts forming the basis of these two references for a preliminary ruling are, in essence, the same.

23.

Further to an application made by the public prosecutor on 22 May 2014, a judicial investigation was launched in respect of acts constituting the offence of insider dealing and concealment.

24.

On 23 and 25 September 2015, the Autorité des marchés financiers (Financial Markets Authority; ‘the AMF’) sent the Public Prosecutor’s Office a report enclosing documents from an investigation, carried out by that authority, that included, in particular, personal data relating to the use of telephone lines.

25.

In order to collect the data relating to the use of those telephone lines, officers from the AMF had relied on Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF.

26.

Following that report, the scope of the judicial investigation was extended, further to three supplementary applications to that effect made on 29 September and 22 December 2015 and 23 November 2016, to include certain securities and related financial instruments, on the grounds of the same offences and the further offences of aiding and abetting, corruption and money laundering.

27.

Having been charged with carrying out acts in connection with those securities that constitute the offences of insider dealing and money laundering, VD and SR made an application for annulment by which they sought to have certain procedural documents excluded for infringement of, inter alia, Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52 of the Charter and Article 15 of Directive 2002/58.

28.

Their claims having been dismissed by judgments of 20 December 2018 and 7 March 2019, respectively, of the chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, 2e section (Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal, Paris, Second Section, France), the defendants appealed those judgments to the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), which has referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

29.

The requests for a preliminary ruling were registered at the Court on 24 July 2020 and 20 August 2020 respectively.

30.

Written observation were lodged by VD, SR, the Spanish, Estonian and French Governments, Ireland, the Polish and Portuguese Governments and the European Commission.

31.

The hearing held on 14 September 2021 was attended by VD, SR, the French, Danish, Estonian and Spanish Governments, Ireland, the European Commission and the European Data Protection Supervisor.

32.

The national legislation relevant to these two sets of proceedings have been the subject of a number of domestic court rulings which warrant mention.

33.

The referring court has noted that the first paragraph of Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF was declared unconstitutional by judgment of the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) of 21 July 2017. ( 9 )

34.

However, the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) postponed the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality until 31 December 2018.

35.

In the meantime, the national legislature introduced into the CMF Article L. 621‑10‑2, which established a system of prior authorisation, to be given by an independent administrative authority, for accessing connection data.

36.

According to the referring court:

37.

On that basis, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) concludes that the ‘only question that arises is whether the consequences of the incompatibility of Article L. 621‑10 of the [CMF] may be postponed’. ( 12 )

38.

The referring court, therefore, is not asking whether Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF is compatible with EU law but, on the basis of its incompatibility with several provisions of the Charter, only whether, as was the case under domestic law with the effects of the declaration as to the unconstitutionality of that provision, the legal effects attendant upon its inconsistency with EU law may also be delayed. This forms the subject of the third question.

39.

Following the submission of these two requests for a preliminary ruling, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) gave judgment, on 21 April 2021, ( 13 ) in the proceedings which had led to the raising of the request for a preliminary ruling culminating in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net.

40.

In that judgment, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to disapply Article L. 34‑1 of the CPCE and to order the government to repeal Article R. 10‑13 of the CPCE within six months, on the ground that those provisions do not properly limit the purposes of the obligation to retain traffic and location data on a general and indiscriminate basis. ( 14 )

41.

The Conseil d’État (Council of State) referred to the consistency of the national provisions at issue here with Directive 2002/58. In its view, the answer given by the Court in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net supports the inference that they should either be disapplied (écarter) in the main proceedings (namely, Article L. 34‑1 of the CPCE), ( 15 ) or repealed (namely, Article R. 10‑13 of the CPCE). ( 16 )

42.

The relevance of the judgment in La Quadrature du Net to the answer to be given to the first question raised in these references is particularly acute given that that judgment had already taken into account, among other provisions, Article R. 10‑13 of the CPCE, ( 17 ) which, together with Article L. 34‑I of the CPCE, is key to the application of Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF.

43.

I would recall that, in order to collect data relating to the use of the telephone lines used by the persons suspected of having committed the breaches forming the subject of the investigation into possible market abuse, the officials from the administrative authority relied specifically on Article L. 621‑10 of the CMF.

44.

As I have already said, the referring court wishes to ascertain whether the national legislation at issue is compatible with Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014, in so far as both of those texts may provide a specific basis for the obligation to retain data that is separate from that contained in Directive 2002/58.

45.

If that is the case, it is my view that the requests for a preliminary ruling have not become devoid of purpose, notwithstanding the impact which the judgments of the French courts mentioned above might have on that national legislation:

46.

Thus, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) does not confine itself to imposing on the government an obligation to repeal Article R. 10‑13 of the CPCE within a period of six months, but explicitly requires it to ‘limit the purposes pursued by these articles and to adapt the regulatory framework relating to the retention of connection data’. ( 19 )

47.

Consequently, the Court’s ruling on the merits may be of use to the referring court, since:

48.

The first question concerns Article 12(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2003/6 and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation No 596/2014.

49.

Those provisions allow competent administrative authorities to require electronic communications undertakings (and, where appropriate, investment firms, credit institutions or financial institutions) to provide existing data traffic and telephone data records ( 20 ) where there is a reasonable suspicion that an infringement constituting market abuse has been committed and those records may be relevant to their investigation.

50.

The premiss from which the referring court starts is that access to those records presupposes that ‘the national legislature … require[s] electronic communications operators to retain connection data on a temporary but general basis in order to enable the administrative authority … to require the operator to surrender existing records of traffic data …, to the extent, in particular, that they offer a means of tracing the contacts established by the persons concerned before the suspicions emerged’.

51.

Now, as regards the obligation to retain connection data on a general and indiscriminate basis in fields other than national security (for the purposes of this case, in the field of combating market abuse), the Court’s case-law as summarised in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net is fully valid.

52.

It is true that the case-law in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net was established in relation to Directive 2002/58, whereas the provisions referred to by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) are Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014.

53.

However, Directive 2002/58 is the provision of reference in matters relating, as its title states, to ‘the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector’.

54.

Both Directive 2003/6 (which is specifically concerned with insider dealing and market manipulation) and Regulation No 596/2014 (which deals with market abuse) include provisions which, like those listed in the first question raised in these references, relate to the processing of data traffic records.

55.

They are, therefore, provisions which, in that particular regard, and purely by virtue of their purpose and subject matter, must be interpreted within the context of the regime established by Directive 2002/58.

56.

This follows, in my opinion, from Article 12(2)(d) of Directive 2003/6 and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation No 596/2014:

57.

To my mind, none of those provisions grants specific powers – separate from those provided for in Directive 2002/58 – to retain data. They are confined to authorising competent authorities to access (existing) retained data in accordance with the legislation that generally governs the processing of such personal data in the electronic communications sector, that is to say, Directive 2002/58.

58.

Neither could Article 28 of Regulation No 596/2014 (an interpretation of which, moreover, the referring court does not ask for) be claimed to be an independent legal basis for imposing an obligation to retain data in this field.

59.

That provision, under the heading ‘Data protection’ and in connection once again with the ‘processing of personal data’:

60.

The fact that Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014 are silent on the matter of the data retention requirement imposed on electronic communications operators is understandable given their proximity in time to Directive 2002/58. The European legislature already had the latter directive as an exhaustive reference framework for outlining the features of (and exceptions to) that obligation and there was therefore no need to create a retention regime specifically aimed at combating market abuse.

61.

It follows that the Court’s interpretation of Directive 2002/58 must naturally be extended to the data retention tools which, although in the possession of electronic communications operators, may be used by investigating authorities in the course of combating market abuse.

62.

The ‘existing records’ referred to in Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014 can only be ‘lawfully existing records’, that is to say those compiled in accordance with Directive 2002/58. It is that directive which, in EU law, ‘provides, inter alia, for the harmonisation of the national provisions required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy and confidentiality, with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector’. ( 26 )

63.

The ‘existing records’ can be shown to be lawful only where their existence is covered by the provisions of Directive 2002/58.

64.

The French Government is opposed to that proposition. It submits that the Court’s reply must be confined to an interpretation of Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014. In its contention, both of those texts implicitly authorise Member States to lay down an obligation of general and indiscriminate retention. Their effectiveness would otherwise be seriously undermined.

65.

I do not share the French Government’s views but, even if I were to accept them, the fact remains that the alleged ‘implicit authorisation’ would still be subject to the conditions which, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, apply to Member States when they take up the option to impose an obligation of general and indiscriminate data retention under Directive 2002/58.

66.

In other words, if it were to be accepted, hypothetically, that Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014 provide an independent basis for data retention (quod non), such retention would be subject to the same conditions as would necessarily apply if it were based on any other EU legislative provision.

67.

The reason for this is that those conditions derive ultimately from the need to safeguard the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, respect for which is referred to in Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014. Those are the very rights which the Court invoked in the case-law in La Quadrature du Net.

68.

Not even the French Government – or indeed any of the other parties that have intervened in these proceedings – was able to avoid making reference to the case-law contained in that judgment. Some parties (such as the Portuguese Government and the Commission) have emphasised that that case-law serves as a guide for answering the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in this case; others (such as, in particular, Ireland) have explicitly requested that it be revised.

69.

The debate prompted by these proceedings has therefore focused on whether to endorse or revise the Court’s case-law on the lawfulness of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in the field of electronic communications.

70.

As I argued in my Opinions in Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and in SpaceNet and Telekom Deutschland, delivered today, I do not consider it appropriate to revise the Court’s case-law on Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58.

71.

In that context, the essential components of the answer to be given to the referring court flow directly, in my view, from the Court’s case-law as summarised in the judgment in La Quadrature du Net.

72.

I should therefore begin by recalling the case-law established by the Court in that judgment, paragraph 168 of which sums it up as follows:

‘Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, for the purposes laid down in Article 15(1), provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. By contrast, Article 15(1), read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, does not preclude legislative measures that:

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.’

73.

At the heart of the Court’s case-law in relation to Directive 2002/58 is the idea that users of electronic communications systems are entitled to expect that, in principle, their communications and data relating to them will remain anonymous and may not be recorded, unless they have agreed otherwise. ( 27 )

74.

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 permits exceptions to the obligation to guarantee confidentiality. The judgment in La Quadrature du Net examines at length how those exceptions can be reconciled with the fundamental rights the exercise of which may be affected. ( 28 )

75.

According to the Court, the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data could be justified only by the objective of safeguarding national security, the importance of which ‘goes beyond that of the other objectives referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58’. ( 29 )

76.

In that case (national security), the Court held that that provision, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, ‘does not, in principle, preclude a legislative measure which permits the competent authorities to order providers of electronic communications services to retain traffic and location data of all users of electronic communications systems for a limited period of time, as long as there are sufficiently solid grounds for considering that the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat … which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable’. ( 30 )

77.

In particular, the Court takes the view that the ‘objective of safeguarding national security’‘encompasses the prevention and punishment of activities capable of seriously destabilising the fundamental constitutional, political, economic or social structures of a country and, in particular, of directly threatening society, the population or the State itself’. ( 31 )

78.

However, the sense of the judgment in La Quadrature du Net would not be respected if its findings on national security could be extrapolated to criminal offences, even serious ones, which affect not national security but public security or other legally protected interests.

79.

It is for this reason that the Court carefully distinguished between national legislative measures which provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data for the purposes of protecting national security (paragraphs 134 to 139 of the judgment in La Quadrature du Net) and those which concern the combating of crime and the safeguarding of public security (paragraphs 140 to 151 of the same judgment). Those two types of measure cannot have the same scope, as that distinction would otherwise be rendered meaningless.

80.

Traffic and location data retention measures aimed at combating serious crime are set out, as I have said, in paragraphs 140 to 151 of the judgment in La Quadrature du Net. To those must be added measures, serving the same purpose, which authorise the preventive retention of IP addresses and data relating to the civil identity of an individual (paragraphs 152 to 159 of that judgment), and the ‘expedited retention’ of traffic and location data (paragraphs 160 to 166 of the aforementioned judgment).

81.

There is no doubt that market abuse is reprehensible, since it harms ‘the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities [and] derivatives’. By the same token, such abuse may, depending on the case, constitute a punishable breach or, in the worst scenario, a serious criminal offence. ( 32 )

82.

Accordingly, when referring to mutual cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States or a common interest protected by a Union policy, Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 ( 33 ) encompasses within that concept, along with other punishable conduct, ‘insider dealing and financial market manipulation’.

83.

However, its nature as a criminal offence, even a serious one in some cases, is no different from the potential criminal nature of many other breaches contrary to important public interests and EU policies. Annex I to Regulation 2016/794 lists, among other examples of serious crime, drug trafficking; money-laundering activities; immigrant smuggling; trafficking in human beings; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; crime against the financial interests of the European Union; counterfeiting and product piracy; computer crime; corruption; and environmental crime, including ship-source pollution.

84.

The public interests protected through the criminalisation of some of the aforementioned behaviours may be as important as, or more important than, those protected through the punishment of market abuse. This does not mean, however, that such conduct entails a threat to national security within the meaning of the judgment in La Quadrature du Net. ( 34 )

85.

As the Commission maintained at the hearing, the objectives pursued by Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014 are geared towards achieving an internal market (in particular, in the financial markets sector) but not towards preserving national security. ( 35 )

86.

Extending the concept of a ‘threat to national security’ to market abuse offences would open the door to the same approach being taken to many other infringements of public interests which are no less important but which a criminal court would struggle to bring within that far more restrictive concept. If the Court were to agree to open that door, the careful balance underlying the judgment in La Quadrature du Net would have been futile.

87.

In short, the ‘existing’ records/recordings referred to in Article 12(2)(d) of Directive 2003/6 and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation No 596/2014 must necessarily be those which Directive 2002/58, as interpreted by the Court, allows to be retained for the purposes of combating serious crime and safeguarding public security. Under no circumstances can they be considered to be the same as those retained on a preventive, general and indiscriminate basis for the purposes of safeguarding national security.

88.

By the second question, the referring court wishes to ascertain whether, in the event that the French legislation on the retention of connection data is not compatible with EU law, its effects can be temporarily maintained.

89.

Given the date of its references, the referring court could not have taken into account that the answer to its question is to be found in the judgment (of 6 October 2020) in La Quadrature du Net (in particular, in paragraphs 213 to 228 thereof), which has adhered to the traditional case-law in this regard.

90.

According to the Court, once an infringement of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, has been established, ‘the referring court cannot apply a provision of national law empowering it to limit the temporal effects of a declaration of illegality which it is bound to make under that law in respect of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings’. ( 36 )

91.

The reason is that ‘only the Court may, in exceptional cases, on the basis of overriding considerations of legal certainty, allow the temporary suspension of the ousting effect of a rule of EU law with respect to national law that is contrary thereto’. ( 37 ) ‘Such a restriction on the temporal effects of the interpretation of that law, made by the Court, may be granted only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation requested’, ( 38 ) which was not the case in the judgment of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Others. ( 39 )

92.

Consequently, if the Court did not consider it appropriate to limit the temporal effects of its interpretation of Directive 2002/58, the referring court cannot decide to extend the effects of national legislation which is incompatible with provisions of EU law which, as in the case of Directive 2003/6 and Regulation No 596/2014, must be interpreted in the light of the former directive.

93.

In the same vein as the previous question, the third question referred by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) is intended to ascertain whether a national court may temporarily maintain the effects of legislation ‘enabling the officials of an independent administrative authority responsible for investigating market abuse to obtain access to obtain connection data without prior review by a court or another independent administrative authority’.

94.

The premiss for this question is, once again, that that legislation is intrinsically incompatible with EU law. ( 40 ) Moreover, it was found to be so by the referring court itself, which stated that, even though the AMF is an independent administrative authority, ‘the power conferred on its investigators to obtain connection data without prior review by a court or another independent administrative authority was not consistent with the requirements laid down in Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter … as interpreted by the [Court of Justice]’. ( 41 )

95.

The same outcome is arrived at in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2021, Prokuratuur (Conditions of access to data relating to electronic communications), ( 42 ) paragraph 51 et seq. of which emphasise that access by the competent national authorities to retained data must be made subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative authority, which must be a third party in relation to the authority which requests access to those data.

96.

In those circumstances, the answer to the third question must be identical to the answer to the second.

97.

In the light of the foregoing, I suggest that the Court’s answer to the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) should be as follows: