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Case No: 6012249/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: Ms M Urbaityte

Respondent: Collection Pot Limited

Heard at: London South (by video) On: 18 to 22 May 2026

Before: Employment Judge Evans

Representation
Claimant: in person
Respondent: Mr Cater, Croner Consultant

JUDGMENT
1. The complaint of unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.

2. The complaint of being subjected to detriments for making protected disclosures
is not well-founded and is dismissed.

REASONS
Preamble

1. These are my full reasons for my reserved judgment.

2. The claimant’s employment with the respondent began on 29 July 2024 and
ended on 20 September 2024, some seven and a half weeks later. The claimant
presented her claim on 19 September 2024. The claim came before me between
18 and 22 May 2026. I did not have time to deliberate and deliver an oral
judgment during the Hearing so I reserved my decision.

3. The parties had agreed a bundle of 470 pages prior to the Hearing to which
additional pages 471 and 472 were added by agreement during the Hearing (“the
Main Bundle”). All references to page numbers are to the pagination of the Main
Bundle unless otherwise stated.

4. I also had before me a supplementary bundle containing 7 pages (“the
Supplementary Bundle”), a bundle containing extracts of legislation provided by
the claimant (“the Authorities Bundle”), a mitigation bundle provided by the
claimant, and a cast list and chronology prepared by the claimant.

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5. The claimant gave oral evidence by reference to a witness statement. So too did:

5.1. Ms I Procino, who had been employed on 15 July 2024 as the respondent’s
Money Laundering Reporting Officer;

5.2. Mr R Haynes, who at the time of the events relevant to the case had been the
respondent’s CEO. By the time of the Hearing he was no longer employed by
the respondent;

5.3. Mr M Smith, who at the time of the events relevant to the case was the
respondent’s Chief Marketing and Product Officer;

5.4. Mr C Miriou, who at the time of the events relevant to the case was the
respondent’s Director of Operations;

5.5. Mr C Dunston, who at the time of the events relevant to the case was the
respondent’s Customer Success Manager.

Applications and matters arising during the hearing

Applications

6. A preliminary hearing for case management purposes had taken place on 13 May
2026, that is to say just 5 days before the beginning of the final hearing. The
Employment Judge who had conducted that preliminary hearing had dealt with
various applications by the claimant. The written record of their decision and the
orders made (“the Orders”) was sent to the parties on 18 May 2026, that is to say
on the first morning of the Hearing.

7. The claimant was dissatisfied with some of the Orders and made an application
for me to vary them. The application was that the Orders be varied so that the
List of Issues would be varied so that the claimant could argue at the Hearing that
she had made two additional protected disclosures and, also, had been subjected
to additional detriments.

8. I refused the application for reasons that I gave orally.

Additional time for cross-examination and submissions

9. A timetable had been set out for the Hearing in the case management orders
sent to the parties on 21 November 2025 which noted that if the parties thought
they needed more time they were required to tell the Tribunal “as soon as
possible” (page 114). In broad terms, the timetable gave the claimant the
afternoon of the second day and the morning of the third day for cross-
examination (less the time required for the Tribunal’s questions, re-examination
etc). The claimant said at the beginning of the Hearing that this would not be
enough time. I did not agree. However, during cross-examination it became clear
that, despite my attempts to assist the claimant in relation to relevance, she was
unable to cut back the many questions she had planned to ask. She seemed

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unable to see the wood for the trees. In the end, having regard to the overriding
objective, and the need so far as practicable to ensure that the parties are on an
equal footing, I allowed the claimant’s cross-examination to continue until the end
of the third day. Even then I had in the end to limit the cross-examination of
several witnesses to the amount of time that had been agreed before the cross-
examination began. Overall, the claimant’s cross-examination of the respondent’s
witnesses lasted six hours and thirty minutes.

10. At the end of the second day the claimant became distressed. I thought that this
might have been because I had intervened on the grounds of relevance on a
number of occasions. I explained that my interventions on the grounds of
relevance were aimed at enabling her to focus in cross-examination on what
mattered to her case and to avoid wasting the time available to her. I said that I
would, however, refrain from making such interventions on the following day so
that she could use the time available for cross-examination as she wished. The
claimant returned to this issue at the beginning of the third day. She said that she
had became upset not because I had intervened but because of the problem of
the time she had available to her (given the number of questions that she had to
ask). She asked me to continue to intervene when I thought her questions were
not relevant and I did so, but only to a limited extent.

11. The claimant also said during the Hearing that she did not believe that she had
sufficient time to prepare submissions after the evidence had finished. The
timetable envisaged submissions immediately after the respondent’s evidence
had finished. In fact, because that happened at the end of day three, the claimant
had overnight to prepare her submissions (although I explained that she was not
required to provide these in written form or, indeed, to make any at all). I also
extended the deadline for the exchange of written submissions on the morning of
the fourth day to give the claimant an extra hour and then delayed the beginning
of oral submissions by an hour. This was after the claimant had written to the
Tribunal at 8.15am saying that she would be unable to exchange at 9am.

The issues

12. The issues arising in this case were set out in a List of Issues appended to the
version of the case management orders sent to the parties at 12.30pm on 18 May
2026. The contents of that List of Issues reflected the decisions made by the
Employment Judge at the preliminary hearing on 13 May 2026.

13. The formatting of the List of Issues had given rise to some difficulties and, in my
view, its numbering meant that it was not a document which could be easily used
during the Hearing. I therefore reformatted the List of Issues and had a copy of
the reformatted document sent to the parties at the beginning of the second day
of the Hearing. At the same time, I suggested to the parties that three minor
amendments should be made to that reformatted List of Issues.

14. The three minor amendments I had suggested to the List of Issues appended to
the version of the case management order sent to the parties at 12.30pm on 18
May 2026 were agreed and are reflected in the List of Issues in Appendix One.
They were:

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14.1. The deletion of issue 6.10;

14.2. The deletion of issue 19;

14.3. “2025” being replaced by “2024” in the unnumbered paragraph under
7.1.3.

15. The claimant’s agreement to the List of Issues was subject to a possible appeal
by her in respect of the case management orders made at the hearing on 13 May
2026.

16. In addition, one further amendment to the List of Issues was agreed in the
discussion of the List of Issues that I had had sent to the parties at the beginning
of the second day of the Hearing: the words “know your customer” were replaced
by the words “treating customers fairly”.

17. Finally, it was agreed that only Liability issues plus Polkey (issues 6.4 and 6.5)
and contribution (issues 6.8 and 6.9) would be dealt with initially. Remedy issues
would be dealt with separately and subsequently if the claimant won all or part of
her claim.

The Law

Unfair dismissal

The right

18. Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) gives an
employee the right not to be unfairly dismissed.

Dismissal

19. In order to bring a claim of unfair dismissal, the employee must show that they
have been dismissed. The circumstances in which an employee is dismissed are
set out in section 95 of the 1996 Act. The burden of proof to show a dismissal has
taken place is on the employee. There is no dispute in this case that the claimant
was dismissed, on one week’s notice, on 13 September 2024.

The burden of proof in relation to the reason for dismissal

20. Section 103A of the 1996 Act provides that an employee who is dismissed shall
be regarded as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or if more than one, the principal
reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. The
meaning of “a protected disclosure” is considered further below.

21. The burden of proof to prove the reason for dismissal is normally on the employer
even when the claimant asserts that the dismissal is unfair because the reason
(or principal reason) for it was that they had made a protected disclosure. (Kuzel
v Roche Products Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 380). However, when the employee does

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not – as in this case – have the necessary qualifying service to bring an ordinary
unfair dismissal claim, the burden of proof is on the employee (Smith v Hayle
Town Council [1978] IRLR 413).

Detriment claims – protected disclosure

The right not to be subjected to detriment for protected disclosure

22. Section 47B(1) of the 1996 Act provides that an employee has the right not to be
subjected to a detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his
employer done on the ground that the worker has made a “protected disclosure”.

23. A worker also has the right under section 47B(1A) of the 1996 Act not to be
subjected to a detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by a co-
worker done on the ground that the worker has made a “protected disclosure”.
Section 47B(1B) provides that the employer will be vicariously liable for the acts
of the co-worker.

What is a protected disclosure?

24. A “protected disclosure” is defined by section 43A of the 1996 Act as a “qualifying
disclosure” made in accordance with any of sections 43C to H. Section 43C
states that a qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with it if the worker
makes the disclosure to their employer.

25. A “qualifying disclosure” is defined in section 43B of the 1996 Act as follows:

…any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker
making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or
more of the following—

(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely
to be committed,

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal
obligation to which he is subject,

(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be
endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the
preceding paragraphs has been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed.

26. An employee wanting to rely on the whistleblowing protection bears the burden of
proof of establishing the relevant failure referred to in 43B(1)(b). In Boulding v
Land Securities Trillium (Media Services) Ltd UKEAT/0023/06 Judge McMullen
said:

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As to any of the alleged failures, the burden of the proof is upon the Claimant
to establish upon the balance of probabilities any of the following:

(a) there was in fact and as a matter of law, a legal obligation (or other
relevant obligation) on the employer (or other relevant person) in each
of the circumstances relied on.

(b) the information disclosed tends to show that a person has failed, is
failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is
subject.

27. Several communications may when taken together amount to a qualifying
disclosure even though each individual communication itself is not (Simpson v
Cantor Fitzgerald [2020] EWCA Civ 1601.

The approach of the Tribunal to deciding whether there has been a protected
disclosure

28. The approach that a Tribunal should take when deciding whether there has been
a protected disclosure was set out by the EAT in Williams v Michelle Brown AM
UKEAT/00/44/19:

28.1. Is there a disclosure of information?

28.2. Does the worker believe the disclosure to have been made in the
public interest?

28.3. If so, is that belief reasonably held?

28.4. Does the worker believe that the disclosure tends to show one of the
six specified matters in s.43B of the 1996 Act?

28.5. If the worker holds such a belief, is it reasonably held?

29. The Court of Appeal considered when there has been a disclosure of information
in Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 846. It concluded that
there was no “rigid dichotomy” between “information” and an “allegation” (at [32]).
It went on to state at [35]: “In order for a statement or disclosure to be qualifying
disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content
and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in
sub-section [43B](1)”. Then at [36] “Whether an identified statement or disclosure
in any particular case does meet that standard will be a matter for evaluative
judgment by a tribunal in the light of all the facts of the case”.

30. In Chesterton Global v Nurmohamed (PCAW Intervening) [2017] All ER 947 the
Court of Appeal considered the second and third questions. The following
principles were identified:

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30.1. Did the worker believe at the time they made the disclosure that
making it was in the public interest (at [27])?

30.2. If so, was that belief reasonable? The Tribunal is required to recognise
that there may be more than one reasonable view as to whether a particular
disclosure was in the public interest (at [28]);

30.3. The necessary belief is simply that the disclosure is in the public
interest. The particular reasons why the worker believes that to be so are not
of the essence (at [29]);

30.4. While the worker must have a genuine and reasonable belief that the
disclosure is in the public interest, that does not have to be the predominant
motive in making it (at [30]);

30.5. Parliament chose not to define the phrase “in the public interest” and
so the intention was to leave it to employments tribunals to “apply it as a
matter of educated impression”. The essential distinction is between
disclosures which serve the private or personal interest of the worker making
the disclosure and those that serve a wider interest.

31. The EAT considered the fourth and fifth questions posed by Williams in Twist DX
Limited v Armes UKEAT/0030/20/JOJ. It stated that:

31.1. The fourth question is a subjective question to be decided on the
evidence as to the claimant’s beliefs at the time of the alleged disclosure [64].
The belief must be as to what the information “tends to show”, which is a
lower hurdle than having to believe that it “does show” [66].

31.2. The fifth question has both a subjective element and an objective
element. Importing the test from Chesterton Global, the subjective element is
that the worker must believe that the information disclosed tends to show one
of the six matters listed. The objective element is that that belief must be
reasonable”. The worker’s view may be wrong but nevertheless reasonable
([67] to [70] of Twist DX).

31.3. Insider knowledge is relevant to the reasonableness of the belief in
what the disclosure “tends to show” (Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe
[2020] EWCA Civ 1601 and Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University
Local Health Board [2012] IRLR.

32. An employer’s belief that a disclosure is not protected is not relevant to the
assessment of whether it is (Beatt v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2017]
IRLR 748).

Detriment under section 48 – what is a detriment?

33. The 1996 Act does not define “detriment” but “detriment” is a familiar concept in
discrimination law. In Jesudason v Alder Hay Children's NHS Foundation Trust
IRLR 374 the Court of Appeal confirmed that it should be construed in a similar

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fashion in the context of whistleblowing. A detriment will be established if a
reasonable worker would or might take the view that the treatment accorded to
them had in all the circumstances been to their detriment.

Detriment under section 48 – the burden of proof

34. Section 48(2) of the 1996 Act provides that:

On a complaint under subsection …(1) it is for the employer to show the
ground on which any act, or deliberate failure to act, was done.

35. In a claim that a worker has been subject to a detriment in breach of section 47B,
the worker must prove on the balance of probabilities that they made a protected
disclosure and suffered a detriment. Under section 48(2) it is then for the
employer to show the ground on which the detriment was done. If the employer
does not, the Tribunal may (but is not required to) infer that the detriment was on
the ground that the worker made a protected disclosure (Ibekwe v Sussex
Partnership NHS Foundation Trust UKEAT/0072/14/MC the EAT).

Detriment claims - Causation

36. The question of causation requires an analysis of the mental processes
(conscious or unconscious) which caused the employer to act as it did and the
test is not a “but for” test (Harrow London Borough v Knight [2003] IRLR 140
EAT).There will be a breach of section 47B if the protected disclosure materially
influenced (in the sense of being more than a trivial influence) the employer’s
treatment of the whistleblower (NHS Manchester v Fecitt [2012] IRLR CA).

Knowledge of disclosures

37. In Nicol v World Travel and Tourism Council and others [2024] EAT 42 the EAT
considered the question of what level of detail of knowledge is required of a
protected disclosure by person B when the actual disclosure is made to person A.
Is it sufficient that person B merely knows that a disclosure has been made to
person A, or does person B have to know at least some of the content of the
disclosure that has been made? At [82] the EAT concluded that: “For employers
to be fixed with liability, therefore, they ought to know at least something about
the substance of what has been made [sic]: that is, they ought to have some
knowledge of what the employee is complaining or expressing concerns about”. It
is not enough that person B simply knows that the worker has made a disclosure
to person A.

Multiple disclosures

38. If multiple protected disclosures have been made and the Tribunal finds that they
operated cumulatively, the Tribunal should in an unfair dismissal claim consider
whether cumulatively they were the principal reason for the dismissal (El-Megrisi
v Aza University (IR) in Oxford UKEAT/0448/08 at [19]).

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Submissions

39. The respondent produced written submissions running to 18 pages and the
claimant produced written submissions running to 17 pages. The respondent
made oral submissions lasting just under half an hour and the claimant made oral
submissions lasting just under 45 minutes. I have taken careful account of the
written and oral submissions made by each party but I do not set them out or
summarise them here.

Findings of fact

40. These findings of fact do not of necessity refer to all of the evidence that was
before me. As in many cases, the Main Bundle was of excessive length and
contained irrelevant documents. I made plain at the beginning of the Hearing that
I would not necessarily read pages contained in it that were not referred to in the
witness statements or during the course of the Hearing.

General background findings

41. The claimant was employed as the respondent’s Product Manager from 29 July
2024. The “product” of the respondent is an online platform which enables an
individual (a “pot organiser”) to arrange a collection in situations such as when a
colleague is leaving work or a friend has a birthday. The intention is that it makes
such collections easier to set up and administer.

42. The claimant was given one week’s notice of dismissal on 13 September 2024
but was not required to attend work after that date. Her employment ended on 20
September 2024. As such, she performed work for the respondent for around six
and a half weeks.

43. In fact, the claimant’s application for the role of Product Manager had initially
been rejected on 15 May 2024 (page 174). However, there were then further
discussions, including discussions about salary. This was after Mr Haynes had
sent her a message on 21 June 2024 (page 471), presumably in response to the
claimant asking why she had not been offered the role, saying:

Hi Melita,

Apologies for the delay – we felt the amount of relevant payments experience
you had was not enough, and although we were/are willing to train you – the
salary expectation was not aligned with that.

44. The claimant had replied that “I am still interested in the role”, clearly implying
that she would reduce her salary expectations, and it was after this that her
employment was agreed.

Terms of employment

45. The claimant’s statement of particulars (page 379) provided that her employment
was subject to a probation period of “3 months commencing on your start date”.

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The statement provided that there would be a “probationary review meeting” if the
claimant failed to meet any of certain specified criteria during her probationary
period and “your employment may be terminated”. The relevant clause in the
statement of particulars is set out and considered in more detail below.

The termination of the claimant’s employment

46. The claimant was given oral notice of dismissal in a Teams call at 9am on 13
September 2024 (page 292) by Mr Rowan Ling, her line manager and the
respondent’s Chief Product Officer. Her dismissal was confirmed by an email of
the same date (page 294) from Mr Ling attaching a letter from Mr Haynes, the
CEO. The letter from Mr Haynes did not give any reason for the dismissal. It just
said “following conversations between your manager and myself we have
decided not to continue your employment”.

Findings re claimed protected disclosures.

PD at 7.1.1: 1 August 2024 face-to-face meeting with Mr Ling re data protection (the
“ alleged New Product Feature disclosure”)

47. The respondent accepts that the claimant raised concerns about whether there
were data protection breaches in a potential new product feature allowing users
to invite others (using their email address) to contribute to a collection via the
respondent’s platform (“the New Product Feature”). The New Product Feature
would, if implemented, have resulted in the email addresses of those other
people being invited to contribute being stored on the respondent’s computer
systems.

48. The respondent also accepts that this amounted to a disclosure of information
(grounds of resistance [23], page 45). It does not, however, accept that any of the
other component parts of a qualifying disclosure are made out.

49. The respondent’s position at the Hearing was that the development of the New
Product Feature had not reached an advanced stage but its witnesses’
statement, which were short, contained very little information about the issue. Mr
Dunstan said there had been a conversation “engaging ideas” but provided no
significant details. Ms Procino’s statement was similarly undetailed. Mr Smith
gave a little bit more detail about the New Product Feature itself (paragraphs 7
and 8 of his witness statement). Mr Haynes did not comment at all.

50. Overall, the respondent’s position was that the New Product Feature had never
been implemented: rather there was simply an email template which would open
in a pot organiser’s own email client to enable the pot owner to email others
inviting them to contribute and which would not result in any data relating to those
others being stored on the respondent’s systems.

51. The claimant’s witness statement, by contrast, included a lot more detail about
this issue.

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52. I find that there was a clear proposal to incorporate the New Product Feature into
the respondent’s product which would have resulted in the respondent collecting
and storing the email addresses of individuals identified by the pot organiser as
potential donors to the collection in question. I find that the claimant reasonably
believed in August 2024, when she raised her concerns, that the New Product
Feature was to be launched in the near future.

53. To the extent that these findings require me to prefer the evidence of the claimant
to the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses I do so because her witness
statement dealt precisely and in detail with this matter, cross-referring to various
supporting documents, whereas the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses was
generally less detailed.

PD at 7.1.2: 1 August 2024 conversation with Ms Procino re data protection (again,
the alleged New Product Feature disclosure)

54. The respondent accepts that the claimant raised the same issues with Ms
Procino, the money laundering officer.

55. I find that the claimant disclosed what was to all intents and purposes the same
information to Ms Procino on 1 August 2024 as she had disclosed to Mr Ling.

56. To the extent that these findings require me to prefer the evidence of the claimant
to the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses I do so because her witness
statement dealt precisely and in detail with these issues, cross-referring to
various supportive documents, whereas the evidence of the respondent’s
witnesses was generally less detailed.

PD at 7.1.3: 28 and 29 August 2024, 3 and 10 September 2024 face-to-face
meetings with Ms Procino and Mr Ling

57. I refer to the following alleged disclosures collectively as “the alleged Identity
Document disclosure”.

58. The claimant worked on the respondent’s customer support desk for a week or so
towards the end of August 2024. She noticed that a number of customers were
complaining that they had to produce an identity document when they sought to
withdraw the funds collected in the “pot” they had organised. Some complained
that they had not been told about this earlier.

59. I find that at the time of the events this claim is about a substantial number of the
respondent’s customers had not been given notice of the need to produce an
identity document at the point they had signed up to the respondent’s service.

60. Whether meetings on those dates: the respondent accepts that there were
meetings/conversations on the first three of the specified dates. The respondent
does not accept that there was a face-to-face meeting on 10 September 2024. In
fact the claimant’s case as set out in her witness statement was not really that
there had been a meeting on 10 September 2024 but rather that she had spoken
to Mr Ling on that date (see my findings of fact at [65] below).

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61. What was said at those meetings: the respondent does not accept that the
claimant raised concerns, as she alleges, on the above dates regarding breaches
of the FCA know your customer requirements through a lack of transparency at
an early stage in the customer’s process which did not inform the customer that,
when they wanted to remove money from their account, they would have to show
ID.

62. 28 August 2024: I find that on 28 August 2024 the claimant raised a concern
with Mr Ling, when Ms Procino was present, about a customer, CT, who had said
that they were unable to produce a satisfactory identity document. I find that the
claimant said that it was unfair to require CT to provide one of the limited number
of documents accepted by the respondent when he had not been informed of any
such requirement on sign up. I find that the claimant did not refer at this point to
this being a breach of any FCA principle or any specific law (and nor did she
claim to have done so in her witness statement (paragraphs 61 to 65)).

63. 29 August 2024: I find that on 29 August 2024 the claimant said to Ms Procino in
the presence of Mr Ling that the respondent’s FAQs and its terms and conditions
did not refer to the need to produce a satisfactory identity document before funds
could be removed from an account. I also accept that the claimant showed further
ID notification requirement designs to Mr Ling on that date (paragraph 66 of her
witness statement, but doing so was clearly not a qualifying disclosure and I do
not analyse that aspect of her evidence further.

64. 3 September 2024: I find that on 3 September 2024 the claimant said to Ms
Procino that the respondent’s website did not refer to the need to produce a
satisfactory identity document before funds could be removed from an account.

65. 10 September 2024: I find that on 10 September 2024 the claimant created a
ticket to assist users whose accounts had been marked “fraud” that was in broad
terms similar to that at page 276. I find that the claimant told Mr Ling that she was
working on ID notification transparency and created a ticket in Jira about this. I
find that Mr Ling assigned the tickets. I also find that on that date Ms Procino said
words to the effect of “we need to show the ID notification somewhere on the
website” and Mr Ling said words to the effect of “we need to be careful about
that”.

66. In making the findings set out above in respect of 28 and 29 August and 3
September 2024, I have accepted the evidence of the claimant. I note that Mr
Ling did not appear as a witness. The witness evidence of Ms Procino, including
her oral evidence, was not in any significant way at odds with that of the claimant
in relation to what was said on those dates, although the recollections of Ms
Procino were less precise. She could not be clear about exactly what she had
said or when. However, she accepted that she had indicated that it would be
preferable to communicate ID requirements earlier in the “user journey”.

Findings re claimed detriments

Detriment at 8.1 – Mr Haynes describing a meeting with the claimant as weird in

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message to Mr Ling and asking “is she doing better?”

67. The respondent accepts that such a message was sent. The message was at
page 260.

Detriment at 8.2: 10 September 2024 – Mr Ling discouraging claimant’s point about
ID verification

68. This is a reference to Mr Ling saying, as I have found at [65] above “we need to
be careful about that”.

Detriment at 8.3: 11 September 2024 - whether the respondent secretly removed
the claimant’s access to an internal system which the claimant needed to complete a
task

69. The claimant dealt with this matter at [101] to [106] of her witness statement. I
find that the claimant has failed to prove that her access was “removed”. This is
for the following reasons:

69.1. First, the contemporaneous evidence shows that the claimant herself
had doubts about whether she was using the Retool system correctly (page
306, her messages with Mr Collins, which do not refer to her access having
been “removed”).

69.2. Secondly, her own messages do not suggest that her access was
“removed” but that Retool was not working properly for her (“iam trying to find
this one in retool so i can close it, but i don’t seem to be able to locate it”,
page 286 [lower case spelling and errors reproduced from the original]).

70. In summary, there is no clear and significant evidence that her access was
“removed” and I find that it was not. Overall, I do not accept the claimant’s wider
case that she was being deliberately denied access to systems in order to
undermine her performance.

Detriment at 8.4: 13 September 2024 – complaint of Mr Ling that the claimant had
not provided him with an update when in fact she had via JIRA

71. The respondent accepts that Mr Ling made such a complaint but does not accept
that the claimant submitted a JIRA ticket to Mr Ling on or around 13 September
2024.

72. The string of messages giving rise to this alleged detriment is at page 290. At
08.24 the claimant asks if she can work from home and the following messages
ensue:

Ling: sure – what’s the status of the urgent bug with card redemption?
hello?

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Claimant: thanks, we tested it yesterday around 5pm and the safari frame
bug seemed to be fixed but we did not release due to the lateness, the plan
was to release this morning.

Ling: released?
i asked for that to be released yesterday
I’m disappointed that it wasn’t
also there was no update to say this

73. There is no dispute that Mr Ling wanted the bug relating to card redemptions to
be fixed urgently. At 16.22 on 12 September 2024 the claimant sent the following
message to Mr Collins on teams

Rowan [i.e. Mr Ling] mentioned that he’d like the safari frame fix to go live
asap, and not to wait for the 2fa
he’s left for today

74. There is also no dispute that the claimant had not updated Mr Ling by sending
him a Teams message. I find that she did, however, update the relevant Jira
ticket.

75. Taking the evidence in the round, I find that Mr Ling could have checked the
status of the bug fix by looking at Jira. However, I also find that updating the Jira
ticket did not amount to updating Mr Ling in the circumstances. The
circumstances were that Mr Ling wanted the bug to be fixed urgently: he had, as
the claimant noted at paragraph 111 of her statement, asked her (1) “to tell a
developer to release code urgently” and (2) to “make developer stop working on
another task”.

Detriment at 8.5: 30 August 2024 – complaint that Mr Ling failed to progress the
claimant’s access to customer live data

76. The respondent denies that this happened and states that in any event if the
claimant had wanted access to such data she should have contacted Costa, the
Head of Operations.

77. The claimant’s complaint depends to a significant extent on a particular reading
of the email sent to her on 18 July 2024 by Mr Haynes, after she had accepted
the job offer. In that email Mr Haynes wrote (page 175):

Scott will be in touch with details of the company the does our referencing and
background checks - he will probably start this next week and it takes 2-3
weeks. It is ok to start before this finishes - but you will obviously not be able
to access live customer systems until it is complete

78. The claimant took this to mean that once satisfactory references had been
received and customer background check had been completed she would have
access to all live customer systems. This is not what the email says: rather it
states that there will be no access to live customer systems until that point. It

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does not say what live customer systems she would have access to after that
point.

79. Mr Miriou explained in his oral evidence, which I accepted, that practically no
employee had access to all live customer data. He described himself (in effect)
as a point of contact for tools and organisational matters.

80. Mr Ling provided the claimant with a link to give her access to certain data on 27
August (page 221).

81. Overall, whilst accepting that there were issues with the claimant’s ability to use
Retool as set out above, I find that the claimant has failed to prove that Mr Ling
failed to progress her access to customer live data in the manner alleged.

Detriment at 8.6: alleged failure to arrange any probationary review meetings during
the claimant’s employment, as noted in the contract

82. The claimant’s contract of employment (that is to say her statement of particular
of terms and conditions of employment, page 379) provided as follows in relation
to the claimant’s probationary period:

Your employment with the Company is subject to a probation period of 3
months commencing on your start date with the Company, during which time
you will be required to demonstrate your suitability for the position in which
you are employed. To this end, your progress and conduct will be assessed,
and the Company reserves the right to terminate your employment before or
at the expiry of the probation period.

During or at the end of your probation period your employment may be
terminated with one week’s written notice by the Company.

The Company may extend the probationary period for a further period or
periods as the Company in its sole discretion may determine in order for it to
further monitor your performance and conduct. The probationary period will be
deemed to be continuing and extended unless the fact that you have
successfully completed the probationary period has been confirmed in writing
to you.

The first three months of your employment are probationary, and confirmation
of your employment is dependent on:

Evidence of achievement of any required qualifications for your role
Satisfactory performance
Satisfactory attendance
Satisfactory conduct

The Company’s full disciplinary process doesn’t apply to you when you’re in
probation. If you fail to meet any of the criteria above during probation, you’ll
be invited to a probationary review meeting and your employment contract
may be terminated.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

Should you wish to terminate your employment during your probationary
period you are required to give the Company a minimum of one week’s written
notice.

In the event that your employment terminates during or at the end of your
probationary period, you shall have no entitlement to any payment from the
Company other than with respect to accrued salary and accrued but untaken
holiday entitlement up to the date of termination. For avoidance of doubt
benefits such as Pension, Car Allowance and PMI will cease on date of
termination.

83. The respondent says that it held a probationary review meeting on 13 September
2024 and that the claimant was dismissed at it. This is a reference to the five
minute teams call between the claimant and Mr Ling (page 292).

84. The claimant prepared brief notes of what was said during that meeting (page
293). They suggest that Mr Ling raised issues in relation to (1) her design skills
(2) her communication skills (3) her failure to deliver (4) a comment she had
made to the CEO (5) the tools she used when working on design ideas (6) his
view that she wrote confusing tickets with spelling mistakes.

85. However, I accept the claimant’s evidence that Mr Ling began the meeting by
telling her that she was to be dismissed. I find that he only raised the issues set
out in the previous paragraph when the claimant pressed him for a reason for her
dismissal.

86. Returning to the wording contained in the statement of particulars, the clause
quoted in full above states:

If you fail to meet any of the criteria above during probation, you’ll be invited to
a probationary review meeting and your employment contract may be
terminated.

87. I find that this clause envisages the purpose of a “probationary review meeting”
as being to review a claimant’s performance (because they have not met one or
more relevant criteria) before a decision is taken in relation to whether their
employment will be terminated. I make this finding because:

87.1. It is in implicit in the name given to the meeting;

87.2. There is a suggestion that various outcomes to such a meeting are
possible, not just dismissal (“may be terminated” [emphasis added]).

88. I find that a meeting at which an employee’s employment is terminated with no
prior review of their possible failure to meet the criteria set out in the clause set
out above is not a probationary review meeting.

89. I therefore find that the respondent did not carry out a probationary review
meeting.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

Detriment at 8.6: The CEO failing to respond to the claimant contacting them on 30
September 2024 and asking for a chat

90. The respondent accepts that the claimant messaged Mr Haynes, the
respondent’s CEO, on 13 September 2024 (page 297) asking for a chat and that
the CEO failed to respond.

Findings re the dismissal of the claimant

91. The claimant was dismissed on 13 September 2024 in a Teams meeting with Mr
Ling. I find that, when pressed, the reasons given by Mr Ling for the claimant’s
dismissal were as summarised in [84] above.

92. The dismissal was confirmed the same day by a letter from Mr Haynes sent to
the claimant by an email from Mr Ling (pages 294 & 295). The email and letter
contained no information about the reasons for the claimant’s dismissal. The
letter simply stated:

Your employment with Collection Pot is subject to successfully completing a 3
month probation period, and following conversations between your manager
and myself we have decided not to continue your employment.

93. As such, the respondent said very little indeed (and put nothing in writing) at the
time about its reasons for dismissing the claimant.

94. I make the following findings relevant to the question of the reason (or if more
than one the principal reason) for the claimant’s dismissal:

94.1. The decision to dismiss the claimant was taken by Mr Haynes, after
speaking to Mr Ling.

94.2. Mr Haynes was not aware (that is to say he did not have the
knowledge required by Nicol v World Travel and Tourism Council) of either
the alleged New Product Feature disclosure or the alleged Identity Document
disclosure at the time he made the decision to dismiss. I so find because:

94.2.1. I have not been pointed to any documentary evidence of
significance which directly support the contention of the claimant that he
was so aware;

94.2.2. Mr Haynes was the CEO. I find that neither of the alleged
disclosures was of such significance to the business that one would
expect them to have been automatically escalated to him;

94.2.3. Mr Haynes denied that he was aware of either of the alleged
disclosures. I place some weight on his denial because I found his oral
evidence to be internally consistent, consistent with the documentation,
and consistent with his written witness statement.

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94.2.4. The context for the dismissal of the claimant was that he was
not as CEO invested in her continued employment to any significant
degree: her employment had only lasted a few weeks; she had only been
employed at all after a change in heart; she had little experience in the
respondent’s specific area of activity.

94.3. The factual reasons for Mr Haynes deciding to dismiss the claimant
after discussing the matter with Mr Ling were:

94.3.1. Mr Haynes felt that she had spoken to him inappropriately on 7
August 2024, perhaps particularly given that that was only her second
week of employment. (In making this finding I note that there is a
difference in the recollections of Mr Haynes and the claimant: he
remembers her asking him not to speak at all in a particular part of a
meeting; she remembers asking him to speak last. I do not find it
necessary to decide between these recollections because either would
have been something to which Mr Haynes might take exception);

94.3.2. He took the view that her ticket writing skills were poor;

94.3.3. He had been very unimpressed by her informal presentation to
him on 3 September 2024;

94.3.4. He felt that she had been dismissive of his view after she had
sought it in relation to possible button design options on 11 September
2024;

94.3.5. Mr Ling had felt that the claimant had not communicated
appropriately with him about the urgent bug fix considered at [71] to [75]
above;

94.3.6. Although Mr Ling had been “defensive” of the claimant when
they had discussed her, he had not in the end suggested that her
performance was satisfactory.

95. There were relatively few direct factual conflicts directly relevant to these findings
where I had to decide whether I preferred the evidence of the claimant to that of
Mr Haynes. However, where necessary, I preferred the evidence of Mr Haynes
to that of the claimant for the following reasons:

95.1. I found Mr Haynes to be a credible witness for the reasons set out at
[94.2.3] above;

95.2. By contrast, I found the claimant’s credibility to have been damaged by
her being intent on incorporating every scrap of available evidence into a very
detailed theory of what had happened. This resulted in her mischaracterising
events or evidence. For example:

95.2.1. She complained that, whilst she had been dismissed in part
because of the failure to release the bug fix, the designer who had

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Case No: 6012249/2024

“refused” to release it had suffered no consequences. In fact, to say that
the designer had “refused” to release it was inconsistent with the
contemporaneous documentary evidence in the Teams messages drawn
to my attention. Those messages did not show the claimant saying that
the designer had to release the fix on the relevant day or him refusing to
do so (see, for example, the messages at page 328 to 329);

95.2.2. Mr Dunstan had said in his witness statement that “On one
occasion, [the claimant] asked me to complete a survey she had created.
I found the survey difficult to understand due to how it was worded and
advised her that I was unable to complete it as I did not understand what
was being asked”. The claimant was dismissive of this criticism and said
that in any event Mr Dunstan had not made it. However it is clearly a
reasonable criticism of the survey (page 461) because neither of the
possible responses offered (“Copy and share the link below via any
channel” or “Invite others with a ready-to-go email”) relates on the face of
it to the question: “You are creating a digital pot to collect money from
your colleagues for a special occasion. Where would you click if you
wanted to be able to monitor your potʼs status throughout the pot's
existence?”

95.2.3. The claimant expressed a view that Mr Haynes had decided to
dismiss her by the time he met her on 3 September but had then
changed his mind. This view was supportive of her belief in relation to
when access had been suspended, and why she had been dismissed,
but appeared fanciful when the evidence as a whole was reviewed. In
particular, this is the case given Mr Haynes’ view of her poor
performance on 3 September 2024.

96. In making the findings of fact above I have taken into account all of the evidence
put before me. However, given the complexity of the factual case put forward by
the claimant it is appropriate to make the following additional specific findings:

96.1. The claimant said that at the point she was dismissed on 13
September 2024 she was unaware of the possibility of bringing a claim on the
basis that she had been dismissed for whistleblowing. Assuming that this is
the case, whilst noting that the claimant clear was aware of the possibility of
such a claim by 19 September 2024 when she presented her claim, she
would have nevertheless had the necessary factual information to hand to
conclude – as she did just six days later – that she had been dismissed for
raising concerns. However, her immediate response to her dismissal (her
email of 13 September 2024 at page 298 to Mr Haynes) referred in an
apologetic way to the message she had sent on 11 September 2024 (when
he had felt that she had been dismissive of his view when she had sought it
in relation to possible button design options) and expressly apologised for
what she had said to him on 7 August 2024. The letter suggests that her
immediate reaction was not that it was the raising of concerns that had
caused her dismissal. I find that if she had felt at that time as a result of her
discussion with Mr Ling that the reason for the dismissal was raising
concerns then she would have been unlikely to write in these terms.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

96.2. Similarly, her email to Ms Procino of 13.53 on the same date does not
suggest that her immediate reaction was that she had been dismissed for
raising concerns (“I am fine with their decision”).

96.3. Together these documents point to the respondent’s reasons for
dismissal being those they have put forward, although it is of course possible
that the claimant’s immediate reaction to her dismissal, being just that, was
uninformed by careful reflection on what had happened.

96.4. It is clearly arguable that Mr Haynes was being thin-skinned and self-
important by taking into account, when deciding to dismiss the claimant, her
response to his view on the button design options on 11 September 2024 and
how she had spoken to him on 7 August 2024. However, equally, the reality
is that both these incidents took place within a very short time of her
employment beginning. What a well-regarded long-standing employee can
reasonably say to a CEO without offence being taken is inevitably different to
what an inexperienced employee whose employment has lasted just a few
weeks can say without raising questions about their judgment. Consequently,
I have discounted my initial impression that Mr Haynes’, in taking into
account the events of 7 August 2024 and 11 September 2024 in reaching a
decision to dismiss, was being surprisingly thin-skinned.

96.5. So far as the claimant’s suggestion that being asked to obtain Mr
Haynes’ feedback on button design options was not a “genuine
task/concern”, I do not accept that this is the case. It was only the claimant’s
response to Mr Haynes’ feedback which turned this into a significant factual
matter, and neither his feedback nor her reaction to it could have been
predicted in advance.

96.6. The claimant invited me to draw inferences from the fact that Mr Ling
did not appear to give evidence and I have considered myself what I should
make of the very brief statement provided by Mr Haynes (as noted above it
was the short statement prepared for the interim relief hearing). However, I
have concluded that it would not be appropriate for me to draw adverse
inferences from either of these matters. Neither Mr Ling nor Mr Haynes
remain employees of the respondent. The respondent is represented by
unsophisticated legal advisers. There could be many reasons for the absence
of Mr Ling (for example, an unwillingness to attend voluntarily and an
understandable reluctance to obtain a witness order) and the brevity of Mr
Haynes’ witness statement (for example, a reluctance on his part to commit
significant time to the preparation of a statement, particularly when he now
resides in Australia) and so I decline to conclude that their evidence is non-
existent/limited because, if set out more extensively, it would not have
supported the respondent’s case. Further, I note that Mr Haynes’ oral
evidence, which was more extensive than his very brief witness statement,
was, as I have found at [94.2.3] above, internally consistent, consistent with
the documentation, and consistent with his written witness statement.

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96.7. The claimant also invited me to draw inferences from the fact that
certain documents had not been provided, particularly certain Jira tickets.
However, I am not satisfied that the missing material really goes to the heart
of the claimant’s case and I decline to draw inferences from the fact that it
has not been provided.

96.8. The claimant alleged that on 3 September 2024 when she had met with
Mr Haynes he had said that he had dismissed the Head of Compliance
because he “found many things not possible legally, while Imma found them
“possible”, or words to that effect” (paragraph 78 of her witness statement).
Mr Haynes denied in cross-examination that he had made this comment and
I prefer his evidence in this respect for the following reasons:

96.8.1. First, I found him to be a more credible witness than the
claimant for the reasons I have given above.

96.8.2. Secondly, I find it improbable that Mr Haynes would have made
such a comment to a significantly more junior employee in the first few
weeks of her employment, and by whom he had not been impressed.

96.9. The claimant submitted that the two protected disclosures contained
matters which were of great significance to the respondent, and that is why
they dismissed her. I do not accept that that was or is the case.

Conclusions

Protected disclosure

1. Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in
section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:

1.1. What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant
says they made disclosures on these occasions:

1.1.1. [alleged New Product Feature disclosure] On 1 Aug 2024, during a
face to face meeting with her line manager, Mr Ling, the claimant
raised concerns about whether there were data protection breaches
in a new product feature allowing users to invite others (using their
email addresses) via the platform. The respondent accepts that this
conversation took place.

1.1.2. [alleged New Product Feature disclosure] On 1 Aug 2024, the
claimant raised the same issue with Ms Procino, the money
laundering officer. The respondent accepts that this conversation
took place.

97. In light of my findings of fact above, and the respondent’s admissions, I conclude
that these conversations took place as set out in the List of Issues.

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1.1.3. [alleged Identity Document disclosure] On 28 and 29 Aug 2024
and on 3 & 10 Sep 2024, the claimant during face to face meetings
with Ms Procino and Mr Ling raised concerns regarding breaches of
the FCA treating customers fairly requirement, through a lack of
transparency at an early stage in the customer’s process which did
not inform the customer that, when they wanted to remove money
from their account, they would have to show ID.

98. In light of my findings of fact above, I conclude that:

98.1. On 28 August 2024 the claimant raised concerns with Ms Procino and
Mr Ling that it was unfair to a customer, CT, to require him to provide one of
the limited number of identity documents accepted by the respondent when
he had not been informed of any such requirement on sign up.

98.2. On 29 August 2024 the claimant said to Ms Procino in the presence of
Mr Ling that the respondent’s FAQs and its terms and conditions did not refer
to the need to produce a satisfactory identify document before funds could be
removed from an account;

98.3. On 3 September 2024 the claimant said to Ms Procino that the
respondent’s website did not refer to the need to produce a satisfactory
identity document before funds could be removed from an account;

98.4. On 10 September 2024 the claimant told Mr Ling that she was working
on ID notification transparency.

1.2. Did they disclose information?

99. [alleged New Product Feature disclosure]: the respondent accepted that there
was a disclosure of information to Mr Ling on 1 August 2024. I conclude, in light
of my findings of fact above and this concession, that there was also a disclosure
of information to Ms Procino on 1 August 2024.

100. [alleged Identity Document disclosure]: in light of my conclusions above, I
find that there was a disclosure of information on 28 August 2024, 29 August
2024, 3 September 2024 and 10 September 2024. On the first date this
concerned in particular the position of CT. On 29 August and 3 September 2024
they related to the respondent’s website. On 10 September it was about the work
the claimant was doing on that day.

1.3. Did they believe the disclosure of information was made in the public
interest?
1.4. Was that belief reasonable?

101. [alleged New Product Feature disclosure]: I conclude that the claimant did
believe the disclosure was in the public interest and I also conclude that such
belief was reasonable.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

102. This is because (1) she reasonably believed at the time she made the two
disclosures on 1 August 2024 that the New Product Feature would be released in
the near future and would result in data relating to many people being stored on
the respondent’s system without their consent, and so the data protection rights
of a potentially large group of people being infringed. To disclose such a matter is
self-evidently in the public interest having regard to the factors identified in
Chesterton Global; (2) because such disclosure was self-evidently in the public
interest it was reasonable for her to believe it was in the public interest.

103. [alleged Identity Document disclosure]: I conclude that the disclosures
made by the claimant on 28 August, 29 August and 3 September 2024 were
believed by her to be in the public interest and that it was reasonable for her to
believe that. Those disclosures were all about her concern that customers had
been and were being signed up to the respondent’s service without being told at
the sign up stage that they would need, in most cases, to produce an identity
document before funds could be removed from their account. The claimant
believed this was unfair because some clients (for example, CT) would have
chosen not to sign up to the respondent’s service if they had been notified of this
at the outset.

104. I conclude she believed that it was in the public interest to make those
disclosures because it drew the respondent’s attention to an unfairness which
potentially affected a large group of people (both actual and potential customers).
I conclude it was obviously reasonable for her to have that belief given the
number of customers potentially involved and the unfairness identified. I conclude
that she did not believe the disclosure made on 10 September 2024 was in the
public interest, given that was simply about the work she was doing on that day.

1.5. Did they believe it tended to show that a person had failed, was failing
or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation. The legal
obligations relating to the disclosures relied on are as follows:

1.5.1. 1st August 2024: GDPR articles 5(1), 6, 7; and 14, Data
Protection Act 2018 section 170.

1.5.2. 28th, 29th August 2024 and 3rd and 10th September 2024:
Consumer Protection Act 2015 sections 62, 64 and 68; FCA
Consumer Duty: Principle 12: Outcome 3; GDPR articles 5(1A), 6
and 13

1.6. Was that belief reasonable?

105. [alleged New Product Feature disclosure]: The claimant was clearly raising
the New Product Feature disclosure as a breach of data protection law at the
time. I conclude that she did believe that the New Product Feature would result in
a breach of data protection law and so the respondent was likely to fail to comply
with a legal obligation. I find that it was reasonable for her to believe this because
an email address is personal data, to hold an email address is to process
personal data, and it would have been highly arguable that none of the possible

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conditions for lawful processing contained in Article 6 of the GDPR would have
been satisfied.

106. [alleged Identity Document disclosure]: The most realistic way to view the
alleged identity document disclosure is to take the disclosures of 28 and 29
August and 3 September 2024 together (which is permissible – Simpson v Cantor
Fitzgerald). I conclude that the claimant did believe at the time the respondent
had failed to comply with a legal obligation by failing to disclose the identity
document requirement earlier than it did because she considered that the
respondent was not treating customers fairly. It is clear that the claimant was
alive to FCA related obligations at the point in time she made the disclosures
(see the training materials of 26 July 2024 at page 179).

107. I make these findings despite my finding at [62] that the claimant did not when
speaking to the respondent refer to there being a breach of any FCA principle or
any specific law.

108. Specifically, the claimant relies on principle 12 (“A firm must act to deliver
good outcomes for retail customers” (page 1 of the Authorities Bundle) outcome 3
(“consumer understanding”). Consumer understanding is explained as follows by
the FCA (pages 3 and 4 of the Authorities Bundle):

Outcome we want
We want consumers to understand the information they are given and make
timely and informed decisions. To do this, information should be clear, timely,
and accessible – without jargon or misleading terms.

What we expect
We see harm occur when consumers do not understand the information they
are given, or are not provided with it at the right time to make an informed
decision. Firms should support their customers by giving them the information
they need, at the right time, and presented in a way they can understand. This
includes tailoring communications to their customer’s level of financial literacy.
This ought to be coupled with testing, to ensure consumers have understood
key information.

109. I conclude that principle 12 was a legal obligation to which the respondent
was subject. I conclude that it was reasonable for the claimant to believe that the
respondent was failing to comply with legal obligations in light of principle 12
outcome 3 when she reasonably believed that clients had not been given the
information about the need to produce an identity document at the right time –
when they initially signed up.

110. If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected
disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer.

111. Overall, therefore, I conclude that:

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111.1. The alleged New Product Feature disclosures set out at issue 7.1.1
and 7.1.2 was a protected disclosure made on two occasions on 1 August
2024 (to Mr Ling and then to Ms Procino);

111.2. The alleged Identity Document disclosure at issue 7.1.3 was a
protected disclosure made to Mr Ling and Ms Procino cumulatively on 28 and
29 August 2024 and 3 September 2024.

Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48)

2. Did the respondent do the following things:

2.1. On 3 Sep 2024, the CEO, Mr Haynes, sent a message to Mr Ling
describing a meeting with the claimant as ‘weird’ and asking Mr Ling of
the claimant ‘Is she doing better’?

112. The respondent agrees this message was sent. The factual allegation is
therefore made out.

2.2. On 10 Sep 2024, Mr Ling was discouraging of the claimant’s point
regarding ID verification, by standing up and saying ‘we need to be
careful when doing that’ or words to that effect.

113. In light of my findings of fact above, in particular those at [65] above, I
conclude that Mr Ling said the words attributed to him in response to Ms
Procino’s comments that the ID notification requirement should be shown on the
website which was itself a response to the claimant saying that she was working
on a ticket concerning this matter in Jira.

114. However, I conclude that to say this was not to be “discouraging” of the
claimant’s point. Indicating that a careful approach was necessary was sensible,
not discouraging. It was obviously the case that the respondent would wish to
approach the issue carefully to avoid addressing it in a way that would
unnecessarily discourage potential customers from signing up.

115. The factual allegation is not therefore made out.

2.3. On 11 Sep 2024, it secretly removed the claimant’s access to an internal
system which the claimant needed to complete a task.

116. In light of my findings of fact above, I conclude that the claimant has failed to
prove that this occurred. The factual allegation is not therefore made out.

2.4. On 13 Sep 2024, the claimant’s manager, Mr Ling, complained to the
claimant that he had not received an update from her, when she had in
fact provided it by the usual method IE ‘JIRA’, a shared online ticketing
board.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

117. In light of my findings of fact above, I conclude that the factual allegation is not
made out because updating the relevant Jira ticket did not in the circumstances
amount to updating Mr Ling.

2.5. On 30 Aug 2024, Mr Ling failed to progress the claimant’s access to
customer live data, saying that he would help the following week (when
the claimant knew he would be working remotely) or that she could get
help from a colleague in Romania.

118. In light of my findings of fact above, I conclude that the claimant has failed to
prove that this occurred. The factual allegation is not therefore made out.

2.6. The respondent failed to arrange any probationary review meetings
during the claimant’s employment, as noted in the contract.

119. In light of my findings of fact above, I find that the respondent should have
organised a single probationary review meeting and did not do so. The factual
allegation is therefore made out.

2.7. After the claimant’s dismissal, the claimant contacted the CEO on 30
Sep 2024 asking for a chat and the CEO failed to respond.

120. The reference to 30 September 2024 is a clear and obvious error: the parties
have proceeded on the basis that the date in question was 13 September 2024
and I have approached the issue on this basis.

121. There is no dispute that the CEO did not respond. The factual allegation is
therefore made out.

3. By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment?

122. I consider this and the following issues only in relation to the factual
allegations which were made out:

122.1. Describing meeting as weird and asking Mr Ling of the claimant
‘is she doing better?’ For the CEO of an organisation to write to the
manager of an employee in this way is clearly to subject the employee to a
detriment.

122.2. Failing to arrange any probationary review meeting: the claimant’s
terms and conditions entitled her to a probationary review meeting before she
was dismissed. If such a meeting had been held, it would have given the
claimant an opportunity to put forward a case for why she should not be
dismissed half-way through her probationary period. To fail to arrange any
probationary review meeting was therefore clearly to subject the claimant to a
detriment.

122.3. The failure of the CEO to respond when the claimant contacted
him: this failure took place throughout the last week of the claimant’s

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employment (13 to 20 September 2024). The claimant had been dismissed
without the CEO having given her any reason in his dismissal letter. She had
only received an explanation from Mr Ling when she had pressed for one. In
these circumstances, the failure of Mr Haynes to respond to the claimant was
clearly to subject her to a detriment.

4. If so, was it done on the ground that they made a protected disclosure /
other prohibited reason?

123. The claimant has proved that she made protected disclosures and that she
was subjected to three detriments. The burden of proof has therefore passed to
the respondent to demonstrate that the reason for the detriments was not the
protected disclosures. I conclude:

123.1. Describing meeting as weird and asking Mr Ling of the claimant
‘is she doing better?’ I conclude that the reason Mr Haynes, the CEO,
wrote the message containing these words to Mr Ling was that they reflected
his experience of the claimant. I conclude that it was not on the ground that
she had made a protected disclosure, not least because I have found at
[94.2] that Mr Haynes was not aware that she had done so.

123.2. Failing to arrange any probationary review meeting: I conclude that
the reason Mr Haynes told Mr Ling to dismiss the claimant without holding
any probationary review meeting was that he had made a definite decision to
dismiss her in light of his experience of her performance, and what Mr Ling
had said. I conclude that it was not on the ground that she had made a
protected disclosure, not least because I have found at [94.2] that Mr Haynes
was not aware that she had done so.

123.3. The failure of the CEO to respond when the claimant contacted
him: I conclude that because Mr Haynes had made his mind up about the
claimant’s employment, he simply did not wish to have a follow-up
conversation with her. I conclude that it was not on the ground that she had
made a protected disclosure, not least because I have found at [94.2] that Mr
Haynes was not aware that she had done so.

Automatic Unfair Dismissal

5. Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a
protected disclosure?

124. In light of my conclusions above about the factual reason for the dismissal, I
conclude that the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was not
that she made a protected disclosure (or more than one protected disclosures, if
the protected disclosures I have dealt with are considered cumulatively). I find the
respondent has proved the reason for dismissal was as set out at [94] above.

125. Given this conclusion, I have not dealt with issues 6.4 and 6.5 (Polkey) and
6.8 and 6.9 (contribution) because it is not necessary to do so.

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126. However, notwithstanding the fact that the claimant’s claim has failed, I
observe that there is no doubt that the respondent treated her shoddily in
dismissing her as it did before the end of her probationary period and without
giving her any structured opportunity to improve her performance.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

APPENDIX ONE – LIST OF ISSUES

Automatic Unfair Dismissal

6. Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a
protected disclosure?

6.1. The respondent says that the reason for the dismissal was concern over the
claimant’s performance, conduct and suitability for her role.

6.2. The respondent denies that the claimant made a protected disclosure.

Remedy for unfair dismissal

7. The claimant wishes to be re-instated to her previous employment or re-engaged
in comparable employment or other suitable employment by the respondent. The
claimant’s preference is for a part-time and remote role with the respondent.

8. Should the Tribunal order reinstatement? The Tribunal will consider in particular
whether reinstatement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed to
dismissal, whether it would be just.

9. Should the Tribunal order re-engagement? The Tribunal will consider in particular
whether re-engagement is practicable and, if the claimant caused or contributed
to dismissal, whether it would be just.

10. What should the terms of the re-engagement order be?

11. If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will
decide:

11.1. What financial losses has the dismissal caused the claimant?

11.2. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings,
for example by looking for another job?

11.3. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

11.4. Is there a chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed
anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?
(See the following cases: Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] UKHL 8;
paragraph 54 of Software 2000 Ltd v Andrews [2007] ICR 825; W Devis &
Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] 3 All ER 40; Crédit Agricole Corporate and
Investment Bank v Wardle [2011] IRLR 604). The respondent says yes
because despite Mr Ling’s attempts to identify areas the claimant may excel
in, her performance did not improve.

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11.5. If so, should the claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much?

11.6. Did the respondent unreasonably fail to comply with the ACAS Code of
Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures by not following the
below parts of the Code:

11.6.1. Establish the facts of each case?

11.6.2. Inform the employee of the problem?

11.6.3. Allow the employee to be accompanied at the meeting?

11.6.4. Decide on appropriate action?

11.6.5. Provide employees with an opportunity to appeal?

The respondent says it established the claimant’s poor performance through
her work and communication. The respondent says Mr Ling gave the claimant
feedback as to how to improve her communication, and sought to find areas
where the claimant could excel but her performance did not improve. The
respondent accepts the claimant wasn’t accompanied during the call
terminating her employment, and did not provide her an opportunity to appeal,
as it was terminating her employment within the probationary period.

11.7. If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable
to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?

11.8. If the claimant was unfairly dismissed, did they cause or contribute to
dismissal by blameworthy conduct?

11.9. If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s
compensatory award? By what proportion?

Protected disclosure

12. Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section
43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:

12.1. What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant
says they made disclosures on these occasions:

12.1.1. On 1 Aug 2024, during a face to face meeting with her line
manager, Mr Ling, the claimant raised concerns about whether there
were data protection breaches in a new product feature allowing users to
invite others (using their email addresses) via the platform. The
respondent accepts that this conversation took place.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

12.1.2. On 1 Aug 2024, the claimant raised the same issue with Ms
Procino, the money laundering officer. The respondent accepts that this
conversation took place.

12.1.3. On 28 and 29 Aug 2024 and on 3 & 10 Sep 2024, the claimant
during face to face meetings with Ms Procino and Mr Ling raised
concerns regarding breaches of the FCA treating customers fairly
requirement, through a lack of transparency at an early stage in the
customer’s process which did not inform the customer that, when they
wanted to remove money from their account, they would have to show
ID.

The respondent accepts conversations took place on 28, & 29 Aug and 3
Sep 2024. However, the Respondent denies that they happened as
described by the Claimant and that it was the Respondent discussing
concerns about compliance. The Respondent denies the 10 Sep 2024
conversation took place and has no record of this.

12.2. Did they disclose information?

12.3. Did they believe the disclosure of information was made in the public
interest?

12.4. Was that belief reasonable?

12.5. Did they believe it tended to show that a person had failed, was failing
or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation. The legal obligations
relating to the disclosures relied on are as follows:

12.5.1. 1st August 2024: GDPR articles 5(1), 6, 7; and 14, Data
Protection Act 2018 section 170.

12.5.2. 28th, 29th August 2024 and 3rd and 10th September 2024:
Consumer Protection Act 2015 sections 62, 64 and 68; FCA Consumer
Duty: Principle 12: Outcome 3; GDPR articles 5(1A), 6 and 13

12.6. Was that belief reasonable?

12.7. If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected
disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer.

Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48)

13. Did the respondent do the following things:

13.1. On 3 Sep 2024, the CEO, Mr Haynes, sent a message to Mr Ling
describing a meeting with the claimant as ‘weird’ and asking Mr Ling of
the claimant ‘Is she doing better’?

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Case No: 6012249/2024

13.1.1. The respondent agrees this message was sent.

13.1.2. The respondent says the reference to the conversation being
“weird” was regarding a 1:1 conversation where the claimant did not
handle herself very well and appeared unable to communicate her ideas
and the basis behind them. The conversation was not a professional one
and was as such “weird”.

13.1.3. The respondent says the reference to the question “is she doing
better” was because the Claimant’s performance in her role as a product
manager was in question as she did not seem to have the basic skills
required to drive the product direction and it had previously been
reported to Robert Haynes that she was not doing well in her position. Mr
Haynes’ question “is she doing better” was asking if that situation had
improved.

13.1.4. The Respondent says this does not amount to a detriment and
instead appears to be something the Claimant is simply aggrieved about
or didn’t like.

13.2. On 10 Sep 2024, Mr Ling was discouraging of the claimant’s point
regarding ID verification, by standing up and saying ‘we need to be
careful when doing that’ or words to that effect.

13.2.1. The respondent agrees Mr Ling said this however says this was
because the Claimant was pushing the Respondent to accept an
adoption certificate, which was not compliant in their practice, following
which came Mr Ling’s comment.

13.2.2. The respondent says this does not amount to a detriment
because there is no consequence suffered by the Claimant.

13.3. On 11 Sep 2024, it secretly removed the claimant’s access to an
internal system which the claimant needed to complete a task.

13.3.1. The respondent denies this.

13.3.2. In the event the Tribunal found the respondent did this, it
accepts it would likely be considered a detriment because it would likely
find the removal of the Claimant’s access meant she was unable to
complete work.

13.4. On 13 Sep 2024, the claimant’s manager, Mr Ling, complained to
the claimant that he had not received an update from her, when she had
in fact provided it by the usual method IE ‘JIRA’, a shared online
ticketing board.

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Case No: 6012249/2024

13.4.1. The respondent accepts that Mr Ling considered he had not
received an update from the claimant and accepts that Mr Ling informed
the claimant of this.

13.4.2. The respondent denies that the claimant submitted a JIRA
ticket on or around 13 September 2024 to Mr Ling and says this would
therefore be why Mr Ling would have asked the claimant for an update.

13.4.3. The respondent says this does not amount to a detriment, it is
merely the respondent enquiring as to an update.

13.5. On 30 Aug 2024, Mr Ling failed to progress the claimant’s access
to customer live data, saying that he would help the following week
(when the claimant knew he would be working remotely) or that she
could get help from a colleague in Romania.

13.5.1. The respondent denies this. It says its operations regarding this
are (and were at the relevant time) done remotely. An employee, Costa,
is Head of Operations, and remotely based in Romania. Costa was the
appropriate person to speak to about the access to the customer live
data.

13.5.2. The respondent says this does not amount to a detriment, this
was the solution to her query and if anything, helpful to her.

13.6. The respondent failed to arrange any probationary review
meetings during the claimant’s employment, as noted in the contract.

13.6.1. The respondent denies this and says the Claimant had a
probationary review meeting and at that meeting, was dismissed due to
performance issues.

13.6.2. In the event the Tribunal found the respondent failed to arrange
any probationary review meetings during the claimant’s employment, it
accepts it would likely be considered a detriment in that such
conversations allow employer and employee to discuss employment
matters that could change the way an employee’s employment
progresses.

13.7. After the claimant’s dismissal, the claimant contacted the CEO on
30 Sep 2024 asking for a chat and the CEO failed to respond.

13.7.1. The respondent denies the Claimant messaged the CEO on 30
September 2024, but says the CEO had a message on 13 th September
2024.

13.7.2. The respondent says the CEO ignored the request to catch up
sent on 13th September 2024 because he had nothing to add to the

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Case No: 6012249/2024

conversation than Mr Ling had conveyed to the Claimant. The CEO was
not her line manager and Mr Ling had taken the responsibility to
terminate the Claimant’s employment. At the time the CEO was
particularly busy.

13.7.3. The respondent says this does not amount to a detriment
because the Claimant’s employment had ended, she knew the
Respondent didn’t have a reason to engage with her any longer about
her employment, and is more of a mere grievance on the Claimant’s part.

14. By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment?

15. If so, was it done on the ground that they made a protected disclosure / other
prohibited reason?

Remedy for Protected Disclosure Detriment

16. What financial losses has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant?

17. What injury to feelings has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant and
how much compensation should be awarded for that?

18. Has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant personal injury and how much
compensation should be awarded for that? At the time of providing the amended
list of issues, the respondent is not in receipt of any evidence to support, and
therefore denies, any injury to the claimant’s feelings or personal injury caused
by the respondent’s alleged protected disclosure detriments.

19. Is it just and equitable to award the claimant other compensation?

20. Did the claimant cause or contribute to the detrimental treatment by their own
actions and if so would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s
compensation? By what proportion?

21. Was the protected disclosure made in good faith?

22. If not, is it just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation?

23. By what proportion, up to 25%?

Approved by:
Employment Judge Evans
Date: 26 May 2026

Sent to the parties on:
Date: 4 June 2026

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