Appeal number: EA/2021/0054P
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER
INFORMATION RIGHTS
CHRISTOPHER HASTINGS Appellant
- and -
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER First
Respondent
- and –
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE Second
Respondent
TRIBUNAL PANEL: JUDGE ALEXANDRA MARKS CBE
TRIBUNAL MEMBER SUSAN WOLF
TRIBUNAL MEMBER EMMA YATES
I. Pursuant to Rule 32(1) of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules
and by consent of the parties, this matter was determined on the papers because the
Tribunal is satisfied it can properly determine the issues without a hearing.
II. The papers which the Panel considered are set out in paragraph 27 of this Decision.
III. The outcome of the appeal is stated at both the start and the end of this Decision.
Mr Hastings was unrepresented
The Information Commissioner was represented by Richard Bailey, Solicitor
The Ministry of Justice was represented by Tom Rainsbury, Barrister
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2021
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed.
REASONS
Background to Appeal
1. The Appellant, Mr Hastings made a request on 29 January 2020 to the Ministry of
Justice (the ‘MoJ’) for information - pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000
(‘FOIA’) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (‘EIR’) - about
communications for the period 23 January 2019 until the date of the request (almost
exactly a year later) between the Prince of Wales/Duke of Cornwall and either the
Chief Executive of HM Prisons & Probation Service (HMPPS) or the Director-
General of Prisons about Dartmoor Prison.
2. The full text of the request is set out in Appendix 1 to this decision but in essence
it asked for copies of ‘…correspondence and communications [which] will include
information including but not limited to matters relating to the staffing, management,
funding and redevelopment of the prison as well as matters relating to the running of
the prison and the future use of the prison. It will also include but not be limited to
matters relating to the age of the facility and the conditions for prisoners inside the
facility …’
3. Dartmoor Prison is operated by HMPPS, an executive agency sponsored by the
MoJ. The MoJ responded to Mr Hastings’ request on 21 February 2020, refusing to
confirm or deny that it held the requested information.
4. On 27 February 2020, Mr Hastings asked the MoJ to carry out an internal review
of its decision. He also stated that the communications of the Prince of Wales/Duke of
Cornwall are not exempt from disclosure under the EIR if they relate to the
environment or to matters which have implications for the environment as defined by
the EIR. The text of Mr Hastings’ request for an internal review is set out in Appendix
2 to this decision.
5. The MoJ wrote to Mr Hastings on 20 March 2020 maintaining its original
position with respect to FOIA, and concluding that any information within the scope
of the request would not constitute environmental information.
6. Mr Hastings contacted the Information Commissioner (‘the Commissioner’) on
22 March 2020. He complained about the way the MoJ had handled his request for
information under both FOIA and EIR.
7. On 16 February 2021, the Commissioner issued Decision Notice IC-66214-T0Z8
which set out the Commissioner’s conclusion that the MoJ was entitled to neither
confirm nor deny whether it held such information under FOIA and EIR.
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8. Mr Hastings was dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s decision, and on 19
February 2021, the Tribunal received Mr Hastings’ Notice of Appeal.
Appeal to the Tribunal
9. Mr Hastings’ grounds of appeal are summarised in paragraph 28 below.
10. The Commissioner’s Response dated 22 March 2021 are summarised in
paragraph 29 below, maintaining the analysis set out in the Decision Notice.
11. The MoJ’s Response dated 11 May 2021 makes further observations summarised
in paragraph 30 below, and invites the Tribunal to conclude that the Decision Notice
was in accordance with the law, and to dismiss the appeal.
The Law
Section 1(1) FOIA: general right of access to information held by public authorities
12. Public authorities’ duty to disclose information is set out in s.1(1) FOIA:
‘1 (1) Any person making a request to a public authority is entitled –
(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds
information of the description specified in the request, and
(b) if this is the case, to have that information communicated to him.’
Regulation 5 EIR: access to environmental information held by public authorities
13. Regulation 5 EIR sets out a specific duty by public authorities to make
environmental information available on request.
Regulation 12 EIR: exceptions to the duty to disclose environmental information
14. Regulation 12(2) provides that:
‘A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.’
15. Regulation 12(3) provides that:
‘To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which
the applicant [i.e. the requester] is not the data subject, the personal data shall
not be disclosed otherwise than in accordance with regulation 13.’
Regulation 2 EIR: definition of ‘environmental information’
16. ‘Environmental information’ is defined by Regulation 2(1) EIR as any
information on:
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‘(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere,
water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and
marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically
modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including
radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the
environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment
referred to in (a);
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation,
plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely
to affect the elements and factors referred to in (a) and (b) as well as measures
or activities designed to protect those elements;
(d) reports on the implementation of environmental legislation;
(e) cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used with the
framework of the measures and activities referred to in (c); and
(f) the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food
chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built
structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements
of the environment referred to in (a) or, through those elements, by any of the
matters referred to in (b) and (c)’
Section 37 FOIA: communications with Her Majesty etc.
17. Section 37 FOIA provides that:
‘(1) Information is exempt information if it relates to –
(aa) communications with the heir to, or the person who is for the time
being second in line of succession to, the Throne.
…
(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which
is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by
virtue of subsection (1).’
18. Section 37(2) is an absolute exemption and not therefore subject to the public
interest test.
Regulation 13 EIR: personal data
19. Regulation 13 EIR provides that:
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‘(1) To the extent that the information requested includes the personal data of
which the applicant is not the data subject, a public authority must not disclose
the personal data if —
(a) the first condition is satisfied…
…
(2A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a
member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations —
(a) would contravene any of the data protection principles…
…
(5A) For the purposes of this regulation a public authority may respond to
a request by neither confirming nor denying whether such information
exists and is held by the public authority, whether or not it holds such
information to the extent that –
(a) the condition in paragraph (5B)(a) is satisfied…
…
(5B) The conditions mentioned in paragraph (5A) are –
(a) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial –
(i) would (apart from these Regulations) contravene any of the data
protection principles…
…
‘Data protection principles’
20. Section 3(2) DPA provides that ‘personal data’ means any information relating
to an identified or identifiable living individual.
21. Regulation 2(1) defines ‘the data protection principles’ as those set out in Article
5(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), s.34(1) of the Data
Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and s. 85(1) of the DPA.
22. Section 34(1) DPA sets out six data protection principles, those most relevant for
the present case being the first as set out in s.35(1) that ‘processing be lawful and
fair’; and the second as set out in s. 36(1) that ‘the purposes of processing be
specified, explicit and legitimate.’ These principles are again listed in s.85(1) DPA
with sections 86 and 87 making provision to supplement the principle to which it
relates.
23. Article 5(1)(a) GDPR provides that personal data shall be ‘processed lawfully,
fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject’.
24. Article 6(1) GDPR provides that ‘Processing shall be lawful only if and to the
extent that…(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
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pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject
which require protection of personal data...’
The powers of the Tribunal
25. The powers of the Tribunal in determining appeals against the Commissioner’s
decisions are set out in FOIA, as follows:
‘s.57 Appeal against notices…
(a) Where a decision notice has been served, the complainant or the public
authority may appeal to the Tribunal against the notice…
s.58 Determination of appeals
(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers -
(a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance
with the law, or
(b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the
Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently,
the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could
have been served by the Commissioner, and in any other case the Tribunal
shall dismiss the appeal.
(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which
the notice in question was based.’
The burden of proof
26. The burden of proof rests with Mr Hastings in satisfying the Tribunal that the
Commissioner’s decision was wrong in law or involved an inappropriate exercise of
discretion.
Evidence
27. Before the hearing, all parties had submitted written material. This was contained
in an Open Bundle of 98 pages (including an Index). The Panel was also supplied
with a Closed Bundle of 10 pages which was not disclosed to Mr Hastings or the
public. The Panel noted the contents of both bundles.
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Submissions
Mr Hastings’ submissions in his Appeal Notice received 19 February 2021
28. In summary, Mr Hastings’ appeal is on the basis that:
(a) The information he was seeking was likely to be ‘environmental’
information and should therefore have been released under EIR.
(b) The Decision Notice contradicts findings of previous Decision
Notices and Tribunal rulings relating to the Prince of Wales. For example,
the Upper Tribunal case of Evans v Commissioner [2012] UKUT 313
(AAC) states that advocacy correspondence of the Prince of Wales,
particularly relating to the environment, should be disclosed even when
there are implications for his privacy rights, and even when such
correspondence is recent and controversial. A further example is the
Commissioner’s Decision Notice FER0587279 issued on 9 November
2016 in response to Mr Hastings’ own complaint about the Cabinet
Office; and Decision Notice FER0567018 issued on 20 October 2015 in
response to his complaint about the Department of Transport.
(c) If upheld, the Decision Notice in this case will reinforce the
misapprehension that there is a blanket ban on public bodies disclosing
the correspondence and communications of the Prince of Wales.
(d) The Decision Notice’s statements about the Prince of Wales’
expectations of confidentiality, especially as the requested information is
recent, reinforce the idea of a blanket ban.
(e) There is nothing in the EIR to exempt communications of the Prince
of Wales/Duke of Cornwall from disclosure.
(f) The Commissioner has previously ruled that ‘recent’ information can
be revealed.
Submissions on behalf of the Commissioner dated 22 March 2021
29. In summary, the Commissioner’s response is that:
(a) There is no dispute between the parties that, to the extent that the
requested information, if held, has the potential to constitute
environmental information, such information would also constitute the
personal data of the Prince of Wales.
(b) There is also no dispute that there is a legitimate interest in the
requested information, and that confirmation or denial that the
information is held would be reasonably necessary to meet that legitimate
interest.
(c) The area in dispute is whether, on the facts of this case, the privacy
rights of the Prince of Wales outweigh the legitimate interest in the MoJ
confirming or denying whether the requested information is held.
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(d) Mr Hastings refers to the Upper Tribunal decision in Evans but the
conclusion in that case made clear – at paragraph 4 – that the decision was
based on ‘the circumstances of the present case’. Also, in paragraph 7, the
Upper Tribunal set out the meaning of ‘advocacy correspondence’: in the
Evans case, it was public knowledge that the Prince of Wales had strong
views on particular public policy issues and communicated with Ministers
about those (paragraph 22).
(e) In the present case, the Commissioner is not aware of anything in the
public domain about the Prince of Wales taking an interest in, or
advocating anything in relation to, Dartmoor Prison – nor raising with
Ministers anything about Dartmoor Prison.
(f) The request in this case is neither about correspondence with
Ministers, not does it relate to ‘advocacy correspondence’.
(g) The two decision notices Mr Hastings refers to as ‘contradictory’ to
the Decision Notice in the present case relate to very different
circumstances but, in any event, earlier decision notices by the
Commissioner are not binding on the Tribunal which must consider each
case on its facts.
(h) The Commissioner maintains that she was correct to conclude that
Regulation 13(5)(A)(a) EIR is engaged.
MoJ’s submissions dated 11 May 2021
30. In summary, MoJ argues that:
(a) Mr Hastings does not dispute that the requested information falls
plainly within the absolute exemption in s. 37(1)(aa) FOIA.
(b) On the question whether the request nevertheless gave rise to a duty
to confirm or deny under EIR whether the information is held:
(i) As remarked by Judge Wikeley in DfECC v Commissioner
[2015] UKUT 67, at paragraphs 36 and 37, while the
expression ‘environmental information’ ‘…must be read in
a broad and inclusive manner, one must still guard against
an impermissibly and overly expansive reading that sweeps
in information which on no reasonable construction can be
said to fall with the terms of the statutory definition’.
(ii) The information requested is not ‘environmental
information’: the original request did not include (as was
suggested in the grounds of appeal) ‘…any information
relating to prison build, prison expansion, prison
demolition, prison energy supplies …’
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(iii) The information actually requested is not ‘environmental
information’ because that would be construing the term too
widely, which would mean the statutory exemption from
the duty to confirm or deny in s.37(1)(aa) FIOA could be
side-stepped in every case (since all general requests for
‘communications’ might possibly include matters relating
to environmental information); and
(iv) In any event, the exemption in Regulation 13(5A) applies
because the information requested involves personal data.
(c) It is wrong to suggest there is nothing in EIR to exempt
communications with the Prince of Wales: there are numerous exceptions
to the requirement to disclose environmental information.
(d) It is wrong to suggest that upholding the Decision Notice in this case
will reinforce the misapprehension that there is a ‘blanket ban’ on public
bodies disclosing communications with the heir to the Throne. If the
requested information includes personal data of which the applicant is not
the subject, the public authority must consider the detailed framework in
Regulation 13.
(e) There is a long-standing principle that communications between
senior members of the Royal Family and public authorities are
confidential and private. This is reflected in s.37(1)(aa) FOIA.
(f) The requested information did not involve communications with
government.
(g) The requested information was not for ‘advocacy correspondence’.
Discussion
31. In considering the evidence and submissions before it, the Panel asked itself the
following questions:
(a) Does the request for information comprise (or at least include) a
request for ‘environmental information’?
(b) Does the requested information comprise (or at least include) a third
party’s personal data?
(c) If yes to (a) and (b), is Regulation 13(5A) EIR engaged?
(d) If yes, to (c), would disclosure of personal data breach GDPR
principles?
32. Taking each of these questions in turn:
Does the request for information comprise (or at least include) a request for
‘environmental information’?
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33. The Panel has carefully considered whether the information sought by Mr
Hastings satisfies the definition of ‘environmental information’ as defined in
Regulation 2(1) EIR.
34. In his email to the Commissioner dated 28 September 2010, Mr Hastings
suggested that ‘…information relevant to this request is likely to have implications for
the state of human health and safety and the conditions of human life…[and] that
issues relating to things like prison expansion can have implications for the
environment…’.
35. The Panel noted that Mr Hastings’ information request was about ‘…the staffing,
management, funding, and redevelopment of the prison…as well as …the running of
the prison and the future use of the prison’ and ‘…matters relating to the age of the
facility and the conditions for prisoners inside the facility…’. Mr Hastings has not
explained why this information is about the state of the elements of the environment
or about factors that affect or likely to affect the environment. Nor has he explained
why this information is about measures and activities that affect or are likely to affect
either the elements or the factors.
36. We note that the Commissioner’s Decision Notice states that ‘…the requested
information, if held, has the potential to constitute environmental information…’
while the MOJ submits that ‘…the information requested is not ‘environmental
information’ because that would be construing the term too widely…’
37. The Panel has borne in the mind the Upper Tribunal’s decision in DfECC (cited
in paragraph 30(b)(i) above), which is binding on this Tribunal, that the definition of
environmental information should not be read too expansively.
38. The Panel is also doubtful that inclusion of a ‘trigger’ word such as
‘redevelopment’ in a request for information on otherwise non-environmental matters
would of itself be sufficient to bring the requested information within the EIR regime
rather than the more restrictive FOIA regime.
39. The Panel recognises the conundrum of considering this issue in the context of a
‘neither confirm nor deny’ response which is designed not to give away the nature of
any information, if held. The consequence is that assessment of the correct regime
(given that FOIA and EIR are mutually exclusive) will to some extent depend on the
framing of the request rather than the information itself.
40. Overall, the Panel is unpersuaded that the request in the present case – noting
that Mr Hastings’ request principally concerns operational matters such as staffing,
management and the running of the prison – falls to be considered under the EIR
regime rather than the FOIA framework.
41. However, in case we are wrong about that, we have gone on to consider whether,
if the EIR regime does apply in the present case, the Decision Notice contains any
errors of law, or whether the Commissioner should have exercised her discretion
differently, when applying the EIR regime.
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42. In upholding the MoJ’s ‘neither confirm nor deny’ response, the Decision Notice
applied the EIR exemption relating to information about personal data of someone
other than the requester.
Does the requested information comprise (or at least include) a third party’s
personal data?
43. The Commissioner stated [in para. 43 of the Decision Notice] that ‘information
will relate to a person if it is about them, is linked to them, has biological significance
for them, is used to inform decisions affecting them or has them as its main focus.’
44. In correspondence with the Commissioner, the MoJ said, ‘to reveal whether
information is held would reveal The Prince of Wales’ personal data given it would
reveal whether he had entered into with, or received correspondence from, HMPPS
senior officials.’
45. Taking this into account, the Commissioner said in her Decision Notice [at
paragraph 45] that she was satisfied that confirming in response to Mr Hastings’
request whether or not environmental information is held would reveal something of
consequence about the Prince of Wales.
46. Mr Hastings has not challenged the Commissioner’s conclusion in this regard.
We have no difficulty in concluding that it was correct in law for the Decision Notice
to state that responding to the request would disclose personal data.
Is Regulation 13(5A) EIR engaged?
47. As set out in paragraph 19 above, Regulation 13(5) contains a ‘neither confirm
nor deny’ provision when responding to information requests relating to personal
data.
48. In considering whether Regulation 13(5) is engaged in this case, the Panel takes
account of the Commissioner’s guidance on ‘Neither confirm nor deny in relation to
personal data’. The overview to that guidance states:
EIR provide exemptions from the duty to confirm or deny whether requested
information is held if to do so would disclose personal data.
This exemption is not about the content of the requested information, but
concerns the disclosure of personal data by confirming or denying whether
or not the requested information is held.
…
You are not obliged to confirm or deny if you hold another person’s
personal data if:
o it would breach the UK GDPR data protection principles;
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o it would contravene an objection to processing; or
o the information would be exempt from a subject access request.
In circumstances where confirmation or denial would breach the principles,
there is no public interest test.’
49. It is not suggested in this case that disclosing personal data would contravene an
objection to processing, or that the information would be exempt from a subject
access request. However, the Decision Notice states that such disclosure would breach
the UK GDPR data protection principles.
Would disclosure of personal data breach GDPR principles?
50. When considering this issue, the Panel paid particular attention to the Decision
Notice’s approach to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (set out in paragraph 16 above) since that
was the basis on which the Commissioner made her decision.
51. In the Decision Notice, the Commissioner considered the application of Article
6(1)(f) GDPR in the context of a request for information under EIR under a three part
test:
(a) Legitimate interest test: whether a legitimate interest is being
pursued in the request for information;
(b) Necessity test: whether confirmation as to whether the requested
information is held (or not) is necessary to meet the legitimate interest in
question; and
(c) Balancing test: whether the above interests override the legitimate
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.
52. The Commissioner concluded that the first two tests were satisfied but when
applying the ‘balancing test’ found that ‘…the interests and rights of the Prince of
Wales override the legitimate interests in confirming or denying whether information
is held…’ (paragraph 65 of the Decision Notice.)
53. The Commissioner’s reasoning was that:
(a) It is a long standing principle that communications between the heir
to the Throne and public authorities are confidential and private. This
includes correspondence in his role as Duchy of Cornwall with senior
officials at HMPPS (paragraph 61 of the Decision Notice).
(b) Accordingly, the Commissioner accepted the MoJ’s submission that
the Prince of Wales would have a very clear and reasonable expectation
that details of any such correspondence would not be disclosed (paragraph
62).
(c) As the information requested relates to the 12 month period prior to
the date of the request, the newness of any such correspondence would
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add to the expectation that no details would be disclosed by way of
confirmation or denial (paragraph 63).
(d) The Commissioner accepts that there is a legitimate interest in
allowing the public to know of correspondence involving the Prince of
Wales and senior HMPPS officials, particularly given the subject matter
of the request in this case (paragraph 64).
(e) Despite the legitimate interest in allowing the public to know of
correspondence involving the Prince of Wales and senior HMPPS
officials, the rights and interests of the Prince of Wales overrides this
given the expectation of confidentiality on his part of the Prince of Wales;
the fact that the information sought is very recent; and the consequences
of disclosure (paragraph 65).
54. In considering whether the Commissioner made an error of law or applied her
discretion inappropriately, the Panel takes account of the explicit presumption in EIR
in favour of disclosure of environmental information – and the legitimate interest this
creates in favour of a third party requesting such information. We note too the
objectives of the EIR, and that there is a public interest in disclosing the
environmental activities of public authorities.
55. However, the Panel acknowledges and agrees with the Commissioner’s view that
an individual’s privacy of their personal data is protected by data protection
principles.
56. The Panel also notes the arguments raised by the MoJ, which the Commissioner
accepted, that even to confirm or deny whether the information was held would reveal
personal information about the Prince of Wales as the data subject.
57. Mr Hastings appears not to dispute that confirming or denying that the
information requested was held would involve disclosing personal data about the
Prince of Wales. His objection is that a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ response
effectively creates a ‘blanket ban’ in disclosing the Prince of Wales’ correspondence.
Moreover, he argues that there is no explicit exemption or exception provided by the
EIR (unlike FOIA) which protects communications with the heir to the Throne, nor is
a ‘neither confirm nor deny response’ consistent with Evans, disclosures by other
public authorities, or previous decisions of the Commissioner herself in other cases.
58. On the basis of the evidence and submissions before us, we do not accept Mr
Hastings’ argument that the Commissioner’s approach amounts to - or could even
properly reinforce the ‘misapprehension’ that there is - a ‘blanket ban’ on disclosure
of correspondence with the Prince of Wales, even in the context of environmental
information for which there is an explicit presumption in favour of disclosure.
59. Our reasoning is that it is clear from the Decision Notice that, far from applying
a ‘blanket ban’ to disclosure of correspondence by the Prince of Wales under EIR, in
this case the Commissioner carefully analysed and applied the correct legal tests in
the context of this particular request, and then took account of various facts and
features of the present case to balance the legitimate interests in disclosure of
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information pursuant to EIR, and protecting an individual’s personal data under the
relevant exemption in EIR.
60. Moreover, it is clear from cases such as Evans and the Decision Notices from
which Mr Hastings quotes that in certain circumstances the Prince of Wales’
correspondence can be disclosed in response to requests for environmental
information, for example if it comprises correspondence with Ministers, or other
‘advocacy’ correspondence. The way in which the request is framed in this case
means that no such features exist here.
61. Overall, we consider that Mr Hastings has not fully appreciated the significance
of the specific facts and features of each particular case in influencing the way in
which the Commissioner properly can and does apply her jurisdiction, and exercises
her discretion when weighing up the relevant factors in reaching her decisions. In this
case, the Commissioner had to decide whether Regulation 13(5A) applies and, if so,
whether the legitimate interests in confirming or denying whether the requested
information is held are - or are not - overridden by the interests or fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data.
62. Overall, Mr Hastings has not satisfied the Panel that in the present case the
Commissioner’s decision was wrong in law or involved an inappropriate exercise of
discretion in deciding that it would breach data protection principles were the MoJ
either to confirm or deny that the information requested was held. On the contrary, the
Panel is satisfied that the Commissioner was entitled to decide that Regulation 13(5A
applies) and that, balancing the factors applicable under data protection principles, the
MoJ was permitted to respond to the request by neither confirming or denying that the
information was held.
Conclusion
63. For the above reasons, we uphold the Commissioner’s Decision Notice and
dismiss the appeal.
(Signed)
ALEXANDRA MARKS CBE DATE: 15 October 2021
Promulgation Date: 21 October 2021
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Appendix 1
Original request for information sent via email by Mr Hastings on 29 January
2020 to MoJ ([email protected])
Dear FOI Team
I would like to request the following information under the Freedom of Information
Act and Environmental Information Regulations and I would be grateful if you could
forward onto the most appropriate person.
I understand that my request will take 20 working days to process but I would be
grateful if you could acknowledge receipt via [my email address].
Please note that I am only interested in information generated between 23 January
2019 and the present day.
Please note that the reference to written correspondence and communications in all
the questions below should include traditional forms of correspondence such as letters
and faxed, all emails irrespective of whether they were sent through private of official
accounts and any messages sent through encrypted messaging services.
Please note that the reference to the Prince of Wales in the questions below should
include the Prince himself, his Principal Private Secretary(ies) and any member of
staff in his private office able to write and received correspondence and
communications on his behalf.
Please note that the reference to the Duke of Cornwall in the questions below should
include the Duke himself, his principal private secretary(ies) and any member of staff
in his private office able to write and received correspondence and communications
on his behalf.
Please note that the reference to the Chief Executive and Director General in the
questions below should include anyone who occupies or has occupied those positions
during the relevant period. It should also include staff in their private offices who are
able to write and received correspondence and communications on their behalf.
1. During the aforementioned period did the Prince of Wales write to or communicate
in writing with either the Chief Executive of the HM Prison and Probation Service of
the Director General of Prisons about Dartmoor Prison.
This correspondence and communications will include but not be limited to matters
relating to the staffing, management, funding and redevelopment of the prison as well
as matters relating to the running of the prison and the future use of the prison. It will
also include but not be limited to matters relating to the age of the facility and the
conditions for prisoners inside the facility.
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2. If the answer to question one is yes can you please provide copies of this
correspondence and communication including any emails.
3. During the aforementioned period did either the Chief Executive of the HM Prison
and Probation Service and or the Director General of Prisons write to the Prince of
Wales about Dartmoor Prison. This correspondence and communication will include
but not be limited to matters relating to the staffing, management, funding and
redevelopment of the prison as well as matters relating to the running of the prison
and its future use. It will also include but not be limited to matters relating to the age
of the facility and the conditions for prisoners inside the facility.
4. If the answer to question three is yes can you please provide copies of this
correspondence and communication including any emails.
5. During the aforementioned period did the Duke of Cornwall write to the (sic) either
the Chief Executive of the HM Prison and Probation Service and or the Director
General of Prisons about Dartmoor Prison. This correspondence and communication
will include but not be limited to matters relating to the staffing, management,
funding and redevelopment of the prison as well as matters relating to the running of
the prison and its future use. It will also include but not be limited to matters relating
to the age of the facility and the conditions for prisoners inside the facility.
6. If the answer to question five is yes can you please provide copies of this
correspondence and communications.
7. During the aforementioned period did the Chief Executive of HM Prison and
Probation Service and or the Director General of Prisons write to the Duke of
Cornwall about Dartmoor Prison. This correspondence and communication will
include but not be limited to matters relating to the staffing, management, funding and
redevelopment of the prison as well as matters relating to the running of the prison
and its future use. It will also include but not be limited to matters relating to the age
of the facility and the conditions for prisoners inside the facility.
8. If the answer to question seven is yes can you please provide copies of this
correspondence and communication.
9. If information relevant to the request has been destroyed can you please provide the
following information:
a. What documentation was destroyed? When was it destroyed and why?
b. In the case of written correspondence and communications which have been
destroyed can you please provide details of the author, recipients and the dates
generated/sent. In the case of each destroyed piece of correspondence and
communications can you please provide a brief outline of its contents.
c. In the case of all destroyed documentation which continues to be held in another
form can you please provide copies of that destroyed documentation?
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Thank you for dealing with my request.
All good wishes
Appendix 2
Request for internal review of response to original request for information sent
via email on 27 February 2020 by Mr Hastings to MoJ
([email protected])
Dear FOI Team
Thank you for your reply to my request for information – Your reference 200129020.
I would now like to request an internal review into the handling of the request and I
would be grateful if you could pass on this request for a review onto the most
appropriate person within the organisation.
I would be grateful if the reviewer could look at the request again in its entirety and
also take on board the following points.
1. The communications of the Prince of Wales are not exempt from disclosure under
the Environmental Information Regulations if they relate to the environment or to
matters which have implications for the environment as defined by the EIRS.
2. The communications of the Duke of Cornwall are not exempt from either the
Freedom of Information Act or the Environmental Information Regulations.
Thank you for dealing with my request and I look forward to hearing from you within
twenty working days.
All good wishes
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