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APPROVED                                                                                                     [2026] IEHC 77

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THE HIGH COURT

     H.P.2025.0002270

BETWEEN

GERRY BURNS

PLAINTIFF

AND

JOHN J. QUINN & CO. LPP. AND PAULINE BRADY AND MONIKA OSAGIE

DEFENDANTS

 

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Nolan delivered on the 13^th day of February 2026

Introduction

1.                  This is an application to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim pursuant to Order 19 Rule 28 (1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts ("the Rules") or alternatively pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the basis that the case discloses no reasonable cause of action and is bound to fail.

2.                  The second motion before the Court is that of the Plaintiff, in which he seeks various reliefs including inspection of the First and Second Named Defendants ("the Solicitors") files, various injunctions and other reliefs, but it seems to me that that motion is only relevant if the Solicitors are unsuccessful in their application.

 

Background

3.                  The Plaintiff and his wife purchased a property at 15 Bruce Manor, Arva, County Cavan ("the property"), sometime in the early 2000s. For that purpose, he took out a loan with Permanent TSB ("PTSB"). He alleges that on the 1^st of February 2019, PTSB unlawfully securitised and transferred his mortgage to Start Mortgages DAC ("Start"). He says that PTSB failed to obtain his consent to enable the lawful transfer of the loan account and therefore the transfer is unlawful due to breaches of the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"). This, he alleges, gives rise to legal difficulties.

4.                  The consequences, for the purposes of this litigation, relate to his allegation that any processing by any controller of information relating to the loan account (in this case his name, the name of the property and any description of it) is unlawful.

5.                  Start appointed receivers with power of sale over the property (Ken Fennell and James Anderson). On the 31^st of May 2024, Start transferred the mortgage to Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC ("Mars") and by deed of novation re-appointed the same receivers.

6.                  In September 2024, the property was put up for auction online using the Bid X1 platform. Third parties, for whom the Solicitors act, were successful in their bid and the Solicitors carried out enquires and assisted in the contract for sale. They did the normal acts that any solicitor acting for a purchaser of property would do, such as carrying out enquires, assisting in the conclusion of the contract for sale, transferring the purchase monies and ensuring that all Stamp Duty was paid.

7.                  As the conveyance triggered a first registration requirement it was necessary for the purchasers to complete a first registration with Tailte Éireann, which again the Solicitors assisted and indeed are still assisting with.

8.                  The Third Named Defendant is a tenant of the purchasers and is presently residing in the property.

9.                  The Plaintiff says that all this legal activity is in breach of his GDPR rights and consequently is illegal.

 

Associated Proceedings

10.              These are not the only proceedings he has brought, as the affidavits filed show. He also issued another set of proceedings before these, on the 12^th of September 2024, just before the sale by auction online. These proceedings are against everyone involved in the sale of the property, including the receivers, solicitors acting for the receivers, the auction house, as well as Start, Mars and Tailte Éireann. He admits that he has failed to progress those proceedings, focusing instead on these proceedings, notwithstanding that he alleges that these proceedings are all about a breach of his GDPR rights.

 

His Stated Cause of Action

11.              The Plaintiff's case is that Start had no authority to deal with his loan in the first place because PTSB did not obtain his consent to the original transfer. Thereafter, every transaction was tainted with that alleged illegality, mainly because of breaches of the provisions of the GDPR legislation. Therefore, he says the transfer of his loan account was unlawful, as was the subsequent sale. He alleges that the First and Second Named Defendants, as solicitors should have known that. This gives rise to his allegations of money laundering.

12.              While his affidavit deals with various issues relating to how he found out that the property had become rented, a subsequent complaint to an Garda Síochána and his interaction with an Garda Síochána, these matters do not add anything further to his case.

13.              On the 20^th of April 2025, he issued a plenary summons seeking multiple declarations, amounting to 40, relating to breaches of his constitutional, human and fundamental rights as well as breaches of the GDPR legislation. He has also served a Statement of Claim seeking a further 11 reliefs, making a total of 51 reliefs and declarations.

14.              I think at this point it is worth commenting upon the pleadings. The plenary summons runs to 41 paragraphs, while the statement of claim runs to 77 paragraphs, before one gets to the reliefs. They read relatively cogently, but in fact say little or nothing of relevance. The pleadings do not set out a factual basis in which to seek the reliefs sought. Instead, they recite the facts as set out above, allege an unlawful sale and plead various breaches of the GDPR, but not how the known facts relate to the alleged breaches.

15.              I will turn to those regulations below, but it is patently clear to me that the Plaintiff did not draft these documents. He admitted as much to me in court. He said he had the assistance of a "GDPR expert". I permitted him the assistance of a McKenzie friend who, in essence, dictated his submissions to court. He sought liberty for the McKenzie friend to address the court, which I refused.

16.              It is not the role of a McKenzie friend to draft documents, legal submissions or purport to act as a legal adviser, since that is prohibited, by criminal sanction, pursuant to both the Solicitors Act 1954 (as amended) and the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (as amended). I would be concerned that litigants such as the Plaintiff may be asked to pay for such advice. That too is a criminal offence. Persons who seek this advice should act very carefully.

 

 

The Application

17.              In her grounding affidavit, the Second Named Defendant sets out the history of the purchase and subsequent sale of the property. There is no dispute between the parties as to the basic facts as set out above.

18.              She notes that at no stage has her firm acted for or against the Plaintiff. They have never corresponded with him other than in this litigation. They did not prepare or publish the legal pack in relation to the auction. She says that this could not amount to a breach of his GDPR rights, but even if there was some use of his personal data, it was proportionate and necessary for the legitimate purpose of the Solicitors and their clients, the purchasers.

19.              She criticises the Plaintiff's claim that she or her firm have engaged in some sort of criminal activity, amounting to money laundry. She calls upon the Plaintiff to withdraw such unsubstantiated and professionally damaging allegations, which he has not done.

20.              In my view she is perfectly correct on this point. The courts have repeatedly criticised the making of unfounded allegations of criminality. (See O'Hara v Ireland & Ors [2023] IEHC 268, O'Moore J. Carthy v Ireland & Ors [2024] IEHC 490, Ulster Bank DAC v McDonagh (No. 3) [2024] IEHC 609 and Mullins v Ireland [2022] IEHC 296).

21.              In this case not only does he make very serious unfounded allegations against the Solicitors, but he also criticises counsel and Mr Justice Cregan, the list judge, for abusing his GDPR rights, in circumstances where Mr Justice Cregan simply assigned the case to this court. On that basis, I asked, if by hearing the application was the Court abusing his GDPR rights, to which strangely he said no.

 

 

 

Art. 5 and Art. 6 of the GPDR

22.              The purpose of the GDPR is to create a strong, consistent, and modern data‑protection framework across the EU. In simple terms, it sets out how organisations must handle personal data and what rights individuals have over their own information. GDPR ensures that people's personal information is processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently, collected only for specific and explicit purposes and limited to what is necessary.

23.              It strengthens individuals' power by giving them certain rights, all of which must be balanced against a legitimate need for that information. To that end, Article 79 allows that a data subject can take legal action where there is evidence that their data rights have been infringed. However, such action must be based upon evidence, not on an impression or a supposition. Mr. Geoghegan BL for the Solicitors says it does not permit an audit of a data controllers files to see if there has been an infringement.  

24.              The two important articles for the purposes of this application are Article 5 and 6. Article 5 defines the ethical and operational standards for data processing, while Article 6 outlines the legal bases that must apply for any processing of personal data to be lawful.

25.              Article 5 states that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner. It should be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and should be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary, in relation to that purpose. It should be accurately kept for no longer than is necessary and kept securely.

26.              Article 6 states that processing is lawful, if at least one of the following applies;

a.       the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;

b.      processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;

c.       processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;

d.      processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;

e.       processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.

f.        processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.

27.              Art 6 (1) b. c. e and f are particularly relevant in this case.

28.              In Case C‑252/21, Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt ("Meta Platforms") established a legitimate interest test, also known as a three-stage test for data controllers to determine if their use of data is lawful.

29.              These are the Purpose Test — is there a legitimate interest? The controller must identify a specific, lawful, real, and clearly defined interest for the processing (e.g., fraud prevention, network security, product improvement).

30.              The Necessity Test — is the processing necessary? The controller must determine whether the processing is essential to achieve the stated purpose. If the same outcome can be achieved with less intrusive means, the processing is not necessary.

31.              Finally, the Balancing Test — do the data subject's rights override the controller's interest? The controller must weigh their interest against the individual's rights and freedoms, reasonable expectations, and potential harm or intrusion. If the individual's rights outweigh the interest, legitimate interests cannot be relied upon. It is for the national courts to determine the issue, not the data subject, in this case, the Plaintiff.

 

The Legal Principles Applicable to Strike Out

32.              The legal principles applicable to an application to strike out pursuant to Order 19 Rule 28 (1) of the Rules are well known. (See Aer Rianta v Ryanair [2004] IESC 23, [2004] 1 IR 506). It is a jurisdiction which should be used sparingly and only in the clearest of cases. It is not there to prevent hardship to a Defendant from defending a case but simply to prevent an abuse of process. The onus is at all times, on the Defendant. The court should be cognisant of the fact that the threshold for a Plaintiff to successfully defend such a motion is not a prima facia case but a statable case. (see Scotchstone Capital Fund Limited v. Ireland [2022] IECA 23, Lopes v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] 2 IR 301). The default position is that the proceedings should go to trial and the motion should only be brought where it is clear there is no real risk of injustice in so doing. Crucially the court must be satisfied that no amendment or discovery could change the outcome of the case and that the case is fundamentally incapable of success.

33.              Two other points of note and that is, if there is no meaningful dispute as to the relevant facts, it is open to a court to dismiss a claim if it simply cannot succeed as a matter of law. Secondly even if there is some tangential or irrelevant dispute this should not stop a court from proceeding to dismiss it.

34.              In this case there is no dispute as to the relevant facts.

 

 

 

Discussion The Duties of a Solicitor

35.              The first port of call in this case relates to the obligations of a solicitor to act for a client in any conveyance. They are employed under a contract of retainer. Pursuant to their obligations they are obliged to carry out certain investigations. These involve investigating the root and chain of title, carrying out searches, dealing with requisitions on title, drafting deeds of conveyance to complete the transaction and much more.

36.              Not only is this a contractual duty, it is a statutory duty, pursuant to Section 58 of the Solicitors Act 1954 and Section 50 of the Legal Regulation Services Act 2015. Naturally in the course of such a conveyance the name of the previous owner, this case the Plaintiff and his wife, will be referred to. It is of note that the contract for sale of the property was in the name of the Plaintiff and his wife, albeit through the receivers appointed.

37.              Pursuant to Section 25 of the Registration of Title Act 1964, it is mandatory to register the ownership of land and pursuant to Section 62 of the Land and Conveyancing Reform Act of 2009, a legal interest in land may only be created or conveyed by deed, which is normally drafted by a solicitor.

38.              As if that were not enough authority, it would be professional negligence for a solicitor not to continue their retainer and in certain circumstances go beyond, in the interests of their client. There is no doubt whatsoever that the role of a solicitor requires the use of a lot of information.

 

Discussion and Decision

39.              Turning to the Plaintiff's case, he alleges that by using his name, the address and description of the property, in circumstances where he is disputing the right of the holder of the mortgage of the property to sell it to a third part, is in some way illegal and on that basis the use of his data is unlawful.

40.              In my view that is an unstable case. The use of his data was and is not unlawful because it falls squarely with the parameters of Article 6(1)(b), in that it is necessary for the performance of a contract which the data subject was party, namely the contract for sale, albeit through the receivers appointed. It falls within Article 6(1)(c), in that it was and is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller (the Solicitors) is subject, namely the duty they owe their clients. It falls within Article 6(1)(e), in that it was necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, such as the registration of title and finally Article 6 (1)(f), in that it was necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interest of the controller, The Solicitors, acting for their clients.

41.              While he (or his McKenzie friend) argues that the case is all about alleged breaches of data, it is clear that is not the case. It is in fact about an alternative purpose, namely, to prevent the conclusion of the sale of the property. Why otherwise would he have joined the Third Named Defendant, namely the tenant residing in the property. She is neither a data controller nor somebody who has had any access to his data, to any significant degree. She was joined to the proceedings because he is trying to interfere with the conclusion of the sale.

42.              The courts will not allow proceedings which have an alternative purpose or improper purpose to continue. Such proceedings are an abuse of process.

43.              In Sean Quinn Group Ltd v an Bord Pleanála [2001] 1 IR 505, Quirke J. found that Judicial review proceedings brought challenging a planning permission had an alternative purpose. His words ring true in this case.

44.              He said: -

"In the instant case I am satisfied on the evidence that the proceedings herein have been commenced by the plaintiff in a cynical, calculated and unscrupulous fashion for the sole purpose of seeking a commercial advantage over its competitor Lagan. I am further satisfied that the purpose for which these proceedings have been instituted has not been to redress a wrong or a grievance, to right an injustice, to ensure compliance by Lagan and by other potential developers with provisions of national or international legislation, to ensure the proper and lawful planning and development of any particular area or for any other commendable, environmental or civic spirited reason. I am quite satisfied that the sole purpose of the proceedings is to inflict damage upon its competitor Lagan and I am satisfied that that is an improper purpose for the commencement of proceedings and an improper use of the process of the Courts." (emphasis added)

45.              In this case, the fact the Plaintiff confirmed that he had put his other proceedings on hold till these proceedings were progressed, proves the point. If he were able to achieve his real purpose through this case, he would have no need to progress those proceedings, which challenge the powers of sale of the mortgage and the property. Thus, these proceedings have an alternative and, in my view, an improper purpose and as such, on that ground alone I will dismiss them.

46.              However, his whole case is a made-up fiction, as anyone with a true knowledge of the law would know. The fact the Plaintiff is a litigant in person is no excuse. It is clear he has taken advice and, in my opinion, bad advice. I sincerely hope he has not paid for it, because if I did, it was a waste of money. As O'Moore J. said in O'Hara referred to above: -

"It is a matter of some regret that the persons who are peddling this form of claim (to litigants who do not have the benefit of professional representation) have not yet themselves been made accountable for the pointless legal costs and expenses which their activities have generated.".

 

Conclusion and Final Order

47.              Therefore, I find that any processing of the Plaintiff's data, occurred in order to complete the sale and was clearly incidental and necessary for complying with the obligations of the Solicitors' contract of retainer, the sale and their contractual and statutory obligations. In those circumstances it was not illegal.

48.              The Plaintiff's arguments are based on an allegation, as yet unproved, that the transfer of the PTSB loan to Start was somehow illegal. That issue no doubt will be the subject of further applications in the other set proceedings. However, for the purposes of this case, is clear the court must accept the transfer on its face. To do otherwise would be to allow any litigant to prevent any convenience, in any circumstances that was not to their liking. That would give rise to an intolerable pressure on commercial life and the legal system.

49.              The Solicitors had a legitimate reason for utilising the information. Any argument that the purpose is related to money laundering is both abusive and nonsense. They are doing no such thing.

50.              The processing was necessary for the work of a solicitor working in the conveyance. The balancing test flows from the necessity. There is no harm to the Plaintiff from these steps.

51.              The Plaintiff's argument that somehow or other his rights under Article 5 and 6 of the GDPR have been breached are misplaced at best and mischievous at worst. I am satisfied that there is no real risk of injustice by striking out the proceedings and that they cannot be saved by an amendment.

52.              I am also satisfied that they are a collateral attack by the Plaintiff on the sale of the property to the purchasers. That is clear from the proceedings themselves, but also the second motion before the Court in which he has sought orders for disclosure and proprietary type injunctions. It is an improper use of procedure. In my view, for all those reasons, the case is bound to fail and accordingly I shall dismiss it.

53.              As to legal costs, my provisional view is that the First and Second Named Defendants, having been successful in these proceedings, would be entitled to recover their costs against the Plaintiff in accordance with the default position under Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. However, if the Plaintiff wishes to argue for an alternative order, he may apply within seven days to have the matter listed for a short hearing on costs. If, however, a hearing on costs is requested and if, having heard the parties, the Court makes the order it has, provisionally indicated, then the Plaintiff may be at risk of having to pay the additional costs incurred as a result of the hearing.