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UKFTT-GRC 2026 1103 [2026] UKFTT 1103 (GRC) InformationRights 1.11.0 b0826bb293544828f002c714b6a484c762544551d3dc836c2f2151aa34f36a15 7.4.0
NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01103 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/EA/2026/0110/GDPR
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Decision given on: 30 July 2026
Before
JUDGE HEALD
Between
James KeLsall
Applicant
and
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
Decision: The Application is struck out by rule 8(3)(c) The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.
REASONS
1.
The Applicant complained about Greater Manchester Police to the Respondent. By this Application, made by section 166(2) Data Protection Act 2018 , the Tribunal was asked to order the Respondent to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint. The Respondent says that the Applicant's complaint is manifestly unfounded or excessive as provided for (by what was at the time) Article 57(4) UK General Data Protection Regulation. The Respondent says that, as a result of this, his obligations in section 165 Data Protection Act 2018 are suspended, he cannot have failed to comply with section 166(1) , the Application has no reasonable prospect of success and should be struck out by rule 8(3)(c) The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.
Definitions
2.
In this decision the following definitions are used: -
Data Protection Act 2018
DPA18
UK General Data Protection Regulation
UK GDPR
The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009
2009 Rules
The Respondent
the IC
Greater Manchester Police
GMP
the IC's Unreasonably Persistent and Unacceptable Behaviour Policy
the Policy
Letter of 14 October 2024
the October 24 Letter
Letter of 3 June 2025
the June 25 Letter
Department for Science Innovation and Technology
DSIT
Matters considered
3.
I have had regard to the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, the Applicant's status as a litigant in person and the reasonable adjustments section of the GRC3 and I have seen the Applicant's form GRC3, the Response and the supporting evidence provided. I have also noted the various applications made and Directions given and seen the correspondence sent to the Tribunal.
4.
In a GRC5 form of 8 May 2026 the Applicant asked that part of that form and its continuation sheet be temporarily withheld from the IC. He said, in box 4.3: -
"The continuation sheets and the section of this box below the line should be TEMPORARILY withheld from the respondent until after the appellant has submitted his full response to the respondent's GRC 5 application for strike out"
5.
CMD were given on 17 July 2026 (sent by email on 20 July 2026) to clarify whether the withheld parts were intended by the Applicant to be relevant to the strike out application and/or whether they had by then been provided to the IC or not. No response has been received to these CMD which said: -
"1.
by 4pm on 27 July 2026 the Applicant shall indicate by email to the Tribunal and the Respondent (a) whether or not the redacted content of the GRC5 of 8 May 2026 is intended to be relevant for the Tribunal when deciding the strike out and (b) if it is intended to be relevant then whether it has been shown or is now to be disclosed to the Respondent.
2.
if it is the Applicant's position that the redacted content of the GRC5 of 8 May 2026 is intended to be relevant for the Tribunal when deciding the strike out but disclosure of it to the Respondent should be prohibited then the Applicant must, by 4pm on 27 July 2026, file an application in form GRC5 seeking a specific Direction to that effect in which the Applicant's grounds for such a Direction are explained. "
6.
The May 2012 Practice Note on Closed Material in Information Rights cases at para 1 states "1. It is a general principle of tribunal practice that hearings are in public with all parties entitled to be present throughout; and that the documents provided to the tribunal by any party are seen also by all the other parties."
7.
In this case the material in question was provided to the Tribunal in early May 2026 and was to be withheld from the IC temporarily . Nearly 3 months later this position appears to be unchanged and therefore the IC has not seen it, not been able to respond to it or make submissions on it. In addition, there has been no application made, notwithstanding para 2 of the CMD of 27 July 2026, and therefore this material is withheld from the IC outside the ambit of a rule 14 2009 Direction (if one were to be granted).
DPA18 and UK GDPR
8.
Aspects of DPA18 have now been impacted by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 but for this matter the relevant parts of section 165 DPA18 provided as follows: -
(1)
Articles 57(1)(f) and (2) and 77 of the GDPR (data subject's right to lodge a complaint) confer rights on data subjects to complain to the Commissioner if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of the GDPR.
(2)
A data subject may make a complaint to the Commissioner if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of Part 3 or 4 of this Act .
(4)
If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must
(a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,
(b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint,
(c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and
(d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.
(5)
The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes—
(a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and
(b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.
9.
Section 166(2) DPA18 includes that if, after a data subject makes a complaint, the IC fails to take appropriate steps to respond then the Tribunal may order appropriate steps to be taken.
10.
Article 57(1)(f) UK GDPR provides that each supervisory authority shall: -
"handle complaints lodged by a data subject, or by a body, organisation or association in accordance with Article 80, and investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint..."
11.
Article 57(4) UK GDPR provides as follows: -
"Where requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the supervisory authority may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs or refuse to act on the request. The supervisory authority shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request."
12.
Court of Justice decisions have also said that: -
(a)
the right to lodge complaints, where the objective is to ensure a high level of protection of personal data, is an important right;
(b)
when faced with excessive requests the supervisory authority can choose between charging a reasonable fee or refusing to act on the request, but that decision must be reasoned taking into account all relevant circumstances and satisfying itself the option chosen is "appropriate necessary and proportionate"; and
(c)
a large number of requests might be an indication of requests being excessive "where they are not objectively justified by considerations relating to the protection of the data subjects rights under the GDPR" but the number alone is insufficient and a supervisory authority must establish " having regard to all the relevant circumstances of each case, that there has been an abusive intention on the part of the person in questi on" .
Strike out
13.
Rule 8(3)(c) 2009 Rules provides that "The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if (c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant's case, or part of it, succeeding." By a form GRC5 dated 14 April 2026 the IC has applied for the strike out of the Application based on the content of his Response.
14.
Rule 8(4) provides that "(4) The Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraph (2) or (3)(b) or (c) without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out." In my view the Applicant has had that opportunity because: -
(a)
on 17 April 2026 the Registrar gave Directions by which the Applicant was invited to respond to the strike out by no later than 5pm on 8 May 2026 ;
(b)
on 8 May 2026 the Applicant applied for more time to respond to the strike out to 22 May 2026;
(c)
on 25 May 2026 the Applicant asked for an extension of time to respond to 29 May 2026 because of a short period of illness;
(d)
on 31 May 2026 the Applicant asked for further time to respond to the application to strike out and suggested a " final deadline of the 15th June 2026." The grounds included reference to additional information that was giving cause for concern and said, "the appellant affirms that this will be the final such extension he will apply for-if this new proposed deadline is reached and the appellant has been unable to complete his response he will submit whatever partial response he has been able to finish.."
(e)
on 5 June 2026 Judge Harris dealt with all 3 applications and ordered that the Applicant's time to respond was extended to 15 June 2026;
(f)
on 15 June 2026 the Applicant sent an email and said that he intended to submit an application later that day but that it was not for a further extension;
(g)
Directions were given on 24 June 2026 which allowed the Applicant further time to make representations to 4pm on 2 July 2026 and the Reasons said " 19... it is not likely, on what is currently known, that the Applicant would be granted any further time."
(h)
on 2 July 2026 the Applicant emailed and said "Sorry for the further delay in providing a response. I am unable to meet the 4PM deadline, but am on track to submit my response and additional applications by the end of the day today. "
(i)
on 3 July 2026 the Applicant emailed and said: -
"This has caused a slight further delay. I am working rapidly to adjust the response to take account of DSIT's stance, and intend to submit it to the tribunal later today... I realistically need a short period to consider the response before making submissions to the tribunal."
15.
As far as I am aware, as of the date of this decision, notwithstanding the above nothing further has been received from the Applicant who has accordingly not responded in a material way to the IC's request that the Application be struck out or provided the application or submissions referred to in his correspondence.
Issues
16.
The following questions have been considered: -
(a)
should more time be allowed for the Applicant to respond;
(b)
is it appropriate that this decision is made without a hearing;
(c)
if the IC discharges the burden of showing that the complaint is m anifestly unfounded or excessive, does it follow that (i) the IC does not therefore have the obligations set out in section 165(4) DPA18 and (ii) the IC cannot have failed for the purposes of section 166(1) DPA18 and (iii) it would therefore be inappropriate for the Tribunal to make any order by section 166(2) DPA18;
(d)
has the IC, in the context of a strike out application, discharged the burden of showing that the complaint was m anifestly unfounded or excessive and if so was it appropriate necessary and proportionate to refuse to act; and
(e)
i f yes, then should the discretionary remedy of a strike out be granted.
Further time
17.
About 4 weeks has elapsed since 3 July 2026. No application has been made for more time, and it would not be appropriate to allow more time before dealing with the strike out because: -
(a)
the request for it was issued on 14 April 2026;
(b)
the Registrar's initial Directions gave the Applicant until 8 May 2026 to respond;
(c)
the Applicant's period of illness was described by him on 25 May 2026 as being short;
(d)
the request of 31 May 2026 for time to 15 June 2026 was described by the Applicant as being a final extension;
(e)
the Applicant explained that if he could not meet the new deadline of 15 June 2026, he would submit whatever he had been able to finish but this has not been received;
(f)
in his email of 15 June 2026, the Applicant indicated he was not going to be making a request for a further extension but would be submitting a "relevant application" but this has not been received;
(g)
the CMD of 24 June 2026 gave further time to 4pm on 2 July 2026 but also gave a warning that it was not likely that the Applicant would be granted any further time;
(h)
para 19 of the Reasons for the 24 June 2026 CMD made it clear that, if needed, the Applicant could provide a partial response to reflect that on 31 May 2026 he had said he would submit whatever he had been able to finish by 15 June;
(i)
the Applicant, in the email of 2 July 2026, said that he was on track to submit his response and additional applications by the end of that day, but these have not been received;
(j)
the email from the Applicant of 3 July 2026 said " I am working rapidly to adjust the response to take account of DSIT's stance, and intend to submit it to the tribunal later today" but this has not been received; and
(k)
the email from the Applicant of 3 July 2026 referred to the need for "a short period to consider the response before making submissions to the tribunal" but as at the date of this decision, nothing further has been received.
Rule 32(3) 2009 Rules
18.
This provides that " The Tribunal may in any event dispose of proceedings without a hearing under rule 8 (striking out a party's case)." In considering whether to deal with the strike out application on the papers or at a hearing I have had regard to the overriding objective of the 2009 Rules and I have also considered the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Warner -v- The Information Commissioner [2026] UKUT 109 (ACC). I have concluded that it is fair and just (and in the interests of justice) to deal with this matter without a hearing because: -
(a)
the Applicant has not asked that the strike out be dealt with at a hearing although I note that in the GRC3 he asked for the Application itself to be decided with a hearing;
(b)
there has been no response to the CMD of 17 July;
(c)
while noting the existence of the withheld submissions the Applicant has not provided substantive representations as regards the strike out application; and
(d)
in the absence of representations having a hearing would be unnecessary and disproportionate to the issues to be decided.
Sections 165 and 166 DPA18 and Article 57(4) UK GDPR
19.
I am satisfied that where the IC has relied, lawfully, on Article 57(4) UK GDPR the obligations in section 165(4) DPA18 do not arise (or are suspended), the IC cannot have failed for the purposes of section 166(1) DPA18 and so the remedies in section 166(2) DPA18 are not engaged.
Has the IC, in the context of a strike out application, discharged the burden of showing that the complaint was m anifestly unfounded or excessive?
The IC's case
20.
The basis of the IC's submission, that the complaint is manifestly unfounded and excessive, is set out from para 17 of his Response as seen in the context of the Policy and content of the October 24 and June 25 Letters (the latter being exhibited to the Response). These say that: -
(a)
between September 2024 and 29 May 2025, the Applicant made 22 complaints regarding the handling of his personal data by two data controllers and in parallel the Applicant made 5 separate complaints concerning the handling of certain requests made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 . Of these 16 resulted in no further action, 2 were closed because they were duplicates and six resulted in informal action being taken by the IC;
(b)
the Applicant has made complaints about the way in which the IC has handled his complaints, and this has involved 10 manager reviews, 7 service reviews and one assurance review; and
(c)
the October 24 Letter referred to the Policy and said that the Applicant's conduct met the criteria for "unreasonably persistent behaviour" because in the IC's view he was “displaying unreasonable or unacceptable behaviour which can distress our staff or strain our resources with persistent and unrealistic demands". It also said: -
"Your correspondence to us are often lengthy and of repeated substance, whilst making allegations that are clearly unsubstantiated leading to additional work. In addition, I consider that your repeated efforts to block a case review for this case are a deliberate attempt to prolong the process of our handling of this matter and to remove the ICOs autonomy and control over how we provide our services.
The ICO is committed to providing excellent customer service to everyone who contacts us in a respectful, courteous and polite manner. We also have a duty to safeguard the health and wellbeing of our staff. The ICO does not expect our staff to deal with someone who, because of the frequency of their contact, places a strain on time and resources and causes undue stress for staff."
and
"... further displays of unreasonably persistent behaviour or pursuit of matters of no substance will result in a formal restriction to our services".
21.
The IC says that that following this warning between October 2024 and May 2025 the Applicant sent a further 315 emails to the IC sometimes on multiple occasions in a day.
22.
The IC wrote again to the Applicant on 3 June 2025. In this letter the IC raised concerns about the "tone and language" of the Applicant's correspondence which "has a negative impact upon our staff , some of whom you specifically identify ". The IC said: -
" 11 Everyone is entitled to be treated respectfully, courteously and in a polite manner, including our staff, and, as an employer, we have a duty to safeguard their health and wellbeing. The ICO does not expect its staff to tolerate abusive, threatening, demeaning or offensive behaviour either verbally or in writing, nor do we expect our staff to deal with someone who, because of the frequency of their contact, places a strain on time and resources and causes undue stress."
"12.
Whilst we appreciate that you may not agree with the outcome of your complaints, that does not justify the unreasonably persistent and unacceptable behaviour you have displayed towards the ICO and its staff after the outcome of your complaints have been communicated to you..."
23.
In support of this the IC cited examples of things communicated by the Applicant and on occasions posted on social media. These examples: -
(a)
make allegations of corruption, dishonesty and other criminality against named individuals working for the IC;
(b)
show the use of intemperate language directed at times at named individuals; and
(c)
show the writer being at times rude and abusive.
24.
The IC, from para 15 of this letter, also addressed the question of whether there was abusive intent behind the complaints and concerns raised by the Applicant. In the IC's view there was because: -
"15.1
Your complaints about DWP and KMP are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character. They concern the same issue and often follow direct correspondence you have with DWP and KMP, and we suspect that you may therefore be using data protection legislation and our service as a tactic against DWP and KMP in your correspondence with them. You do not accept the outcomes of your complaints as communicated to you by the ICO, and you therefore often proceed immediately to the escalation and review process and/or make a new complaint;
15.2.You appear to be weaponising the ICO's escalation process in a deliberate attempt to keep the ICO and its staff locked in engagement when concerns you have raised in line with our Service Complaint Policy have already been investigated and the outcome communicated to you, for example, by continuously requesting repetitive service reviews when you are dissatisfied with the ICO's response and/or the person who has been assigned to investigate your concerns."
25.
The June 25 Letter also referred to the option contained in Article 57(4) UK GDPR to charge a reasonable fee or refuse to act. The IC reported his decision to: -
"21... restrict any future correspondence with you unless such contact is made by a third party advocate instructed on your behalf. A third party advocate is a person or organisation who you choose to advocate on your behalf. However, we will only acknowledge further correspondence through your third party advocate where we consider new and pertinent information is presented and has not previously been considered in relation to this matter or if it relates to a new information rights complaint which is unrelated to your complaint regarding KMP sharing your personal data with DWP which resulted in your benefits being reduced."
26.
Other measures put in place and reported to the Applicant included that: -
(a)
they would treat any new information rights complaints on their own merits but that future correspondence would be restricted by using a 3rd party advocate;
(b)
the IC would communicate directly with the Applicant, if necessary, in Tribunal proceedings but otherwise in such proceedings correspondence should continue to take place via the IC's solicitors;
(c)
the contact restrictions could be appealed to a senior manager for a review; and
(d)
there would be a review after a year.
27.
The IC says that despite the contact restrictions put in place the complaint, relevant to this Application, was sent without using a 3rd party advocate. The IC also referred in its Response to other Tribunal cases struck out in 2025.
28.
In conclusion the IC says: -
"31.
The Commissioner’s statutory obligation under art 57(1)(f) and s165 to process the Applicant’s complaint and provide him with an outcome is suspended by virtue of art 57(4) (and, from 5 February 2026 onwards, s135 Data Protection Act 2018 ). The Commissioner was therefore not required to provide the Applicant with an outcome, or to demonstrate that the complaint was not valid. In this instance, the Tribunal need only be satisfied that the exception under art 57(4) is engaged, and the restriction is appropriate, necessary and proportionate."
The Applicant's case
29.
The Applicant says the strike out is opposed but has not provided representations or the partial response or the application mentioned. From what has been provided the Applicant's position, as regards the IC strike out request, appears to consist of the assertion that the complaint is not unfounded or excessive (see GRC5 8 May 2026) and a concern that a secondary data breach has occurred which would "unequivocally prove that this complaint is neither unfounded nor excessive" (see GRC5 31 May 2026).
30.
In addition, on 3 July 2026 the Applicant emailed the Tribunal and said: -
"Approximately one minute after sending my previous email, I received a relevant item of correspondence from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) about possible investigations into offences committed by the Information Commissioner.
This has caused a slight further delay. I am working rapidly to adjust the response to take account of DSIT's stance and intend to submit it to the tribunal later today.
I have attached evidence of the email from DSIT. The opening portion of the response is visible in the thumbnail and clearly shows that the matter is relevant to these proceedings (because the Information Commissioner has previously insisted that my complaints against him are unfounded, yet DSIT has deemed them well-founded enough to justify a considered response).
DSIT's response does not suggest in any way that any of the allegations have been deemed unfounded or excessive (although DSIT notes that some of the allegations are outside of its remit).
I am hesitant to provide a copy of DSIT's response at this stage (particularly as it is only a provisional response in relation to the central matter of complaint), however it is noteworthy that DSIT summarises that central matter of complaint as an allegation "that the Information Commissioner arranged for the forgery of evidence submitted to the First-tier Tribunal". The complaint is so clearly relevant to these proceedings that I realistically need a short period to consider the response before making submissions to the tribunal."
31.
Copied to this email was a screenshot of an email of 2 July 2026 from DSIT to the Applicant which said: -
"Thank you for your further correspondence of 13 and 14 June, following your earlier complaint under reference TQ2024/12472, regarding your concerns about the conduct of the Information Commissioner. I am responding as a member of the [DSIT] Complaints Team.
We recognise the seriousness of the issues you have raised, and the strength of feeling reflected in your correspondence. We have considered your complaint carefully in light of your" [extract ends]
32.
Finally, there is the content of part of the GRC5 of 8 May 2026 and its continuation sheet which I have seen but has not been provided to the IC and is referred to at para 7 above.
Review
33.
Ignoring the withheld submissions in my view it is noteworthy that: -
(a)
the Applicant has not provided representations in response to the strike out request;
(b)
the Applicant could, if appropriate, have challenged the allegation as to the number of complaints he was said to have made;
(c)
there is no evidence to indicate that the Applicant responded to the October 24 Letter with a rebuttal of or challenge to its content;
(d)
there is no evidence to indicate that the Applicant responded to the June 25 Letter with a rebuttal of or challenge to its content;
(e)
it does not appear that the Applicant has, at any stage, denied being the sender of the correspondence complained about in the June 25 Letter;
(f)
if the Applicant wished to and was able to challenge his authorship of the communications cited and/or their intended meaning and the purpose ascribed to them by the IC or if he wished to put them in some context he could have done so, on receipt of the June 25 letter or at any time thereafter;
(g)
as regards "intent" it would have been straightforward for the Applicant, if he chose to do so, to indicate his disagreement with that allegation at the time or subsequently; and
(h)
despite para 26 of the June 25 letter indicating that the Applicant could appeal the decision to restrict his contact with the IC it does not appear from the evidence that he did so.
34.
As regards the DSIT correspondence: -
(a)
the Applicant could have, but did not, provide the Tribunal with a full copy of DSIT's letter of 2 July 2026;
(b)
there did not appear to be any basis for the Applicant's hesitancy to provide a full copy of DSIT's letter other than because he says it was a provisional response;
(c)
the Applicant could have, but did not, provide the Tribunal with the correspondence which led to DSIT's reply;
(d)
the Applicant could have, but did not, put forward representations against a strike out based on whatever DSIT said; and
(e)
despite the assertions made what has been provided from DSIT refers to an allegation about the IC's conduct but it does not say that it involves an allegation that the IC " arranged for the forgery of evidence submitted to the First-tier Tribunal"
35.
As regards the withheld submissions in the GRC5 of 8 May 2026 referred to at para 7 above they are unsupported by other evidence, they have not been put to the IC as part of a response to the IC's position and there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the Applicant wished to withhold this material from the IC. In addition, despite the CMD no application has been made seeking a Direction that the Tribunal is to have regard to what is said but the material is to be withheld from the IC and the Applicant has not confirmed, as required, whether the material is considered to be relevant to the strike out question. In light of this I have not had regard to what is said in this withheld part of the GRC5 in reaching this decision.
36.
As a result of the above I have concluded that: -
(a)
the Applicant sent the number of complaints referred to in the Response;
(b)
the October 24 Letter was sent to the Applicant because of the IC's concern that the Applicant's conduct met the criteria set out in the Policy for unreasonably persistent behaviour;
(c)
despite the content of the October 24 Letter the Applicant continued to send an "excessive number" of emails to the IC;
(d)
the communications quoted in the June 25 Letter were authored by the Applicant and included offensive and abusive content;
(e)
the IC was right to conclude that there was abusive intent behind the complaints and concerns raised;
(f)
the Applicant had not provided evidence (even for the purposes of opposing a strike out) that went to indicate " that the Information Commissioner arranged for the forgery of evidence submitted to the First-tier Tribunal" as alleged; and
(g)
the IC has discharged the burden of demonstrating that the Applicant's requests had become manifestly unfounded and/or excessive because of their repetitive character and for the other reasons set out above in particular regarding the tone and content of some of the communication from the Applicant.
37.
I have considered, in the apparent absence of there being any domestic or Court of Justice authorities on the point, whether by Article 57(4) GDPR the IC is limited only to the two options of ceasing to act or a reasonable fee or whether a lesser restrictive variation than ceasing to act is an available option. I accept the IC's submissions at paragraph 12 of his Response that it is "reasonably implicit that art 57(4) authorises the possibility of the Commissioner adopting less restrictive measures in order to preserve an individual’s right to complain, while balancing it out against the need for the Commissioner to ensure a high level of protection of personal data in the face of manifestly unfounded or excessive requests." If wrong on this point it would also have been my view, based upon the steps that the IC took and his consideration of all relevant issues (as seen in the evidence) that refusing to act would have been the "appropriate necessary and proportionate" option.
38.
On the basis of the above and having considered legal authorities such as HMRC -v- Fairford Group (in liquidation) and Fairford Partnership Group (in liquidation) [2014] UKUT 0329 [para 41] I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding.
Discretionary remedy
39.
Rule 8(3)(c) 2009 Rules provides that where there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding the Tribunal may strike it out. The right to lodge complaints, where the objective is to ensure a high level of protection of personal data, is an important right. However, in light of the findings above, I am satisfied that striking out the complaint is proportionate, fair and just.
Decision
40.
The Application is struck out by rule 8(3)(c) 2009 Rules.
Signed Judge Heald Date: 29 July 2026