UKFTT-GRC 2025 1263 [2025] UKFTT 1263 (GRC) InformationRights 0.27.1 277898e2be54c30d6f53d8330b6e8182a9afea128ce720d281fc0f3a1088e3da 7.4.0
Neutral citation number: [2025] UKFTT 01263 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0195
FT/EA/2024/0233
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Decision given on: 24 October 2025
Before
JUDGE SAWARD
MEMBER COSGRAVE
MEMBER MURPHY
Between
ganesh sittampalam
Appellant
and
(1) INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
(2) OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Respondents
Decisions: The appeals are allowed in part.
Substituted Decision Notices:
Organisation: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
Complainant: Ganesh Sittampalam
The Substitute Decisions - IC-281994-M0Y0 and - IC-274273- P0V2
For the reasons set out below:
(1) The public authority was not entitled to rely on sections 31, 41, 43(2) or 44 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to withhold some of the requested information.
(2) The public authority was not entitled to rely on section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to withhold the names and job titles of the individuals identified in paragraph 3 of the Closed Annex.
(3) The public authority was entitled to rely on section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to withhold: (a) the contact details of all individuals (b) the names and job titles of individuals identified in paragraph 4 of the Closed Annex, and (c) the details of third parties copied into communications.
(4) Subject to redaction of the details referenced in (3) above, the public authority must disclose the withheld information within the documents listed below to the Appellant within 35 days of the date from when this decision is sent to them.
• Documents 1-6 (excluding 6A being RDA2/030 of the closed bundle)
• Documents 9-16
• Document 18
• Document 20
• Documents 21-25
• Documents 30-32
• Document 36
• Documents 42.1 – 42.7
• Documents 42.12 - 42.13
Document numbers are those identified in the revised table for Exhibit RDA2 to the witness statement of Robert Dominic Alexander.
(5) The public authority was entitled to rely on sections 31, 41, 43(2) or 44 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for the remainder of the withheld information.
(6) Any failure to abide by the terms of the Tribunal’s substituted decision notice may amount to contempt which may, on application, be certified to the Upper Tribunal.
REASONS
Introduction
1.
The Appellant submitted appeals against two decisions of the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”). Both appeals concern the same request for information from the Second Respondent (“Ofgem”), but for different months. The requests were made to Ofgem under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”).
2.
The Commissioner relied upon the same reasons in both decision notices. A single combined open bundle for both appeals has been submitted, as well as a single closed bundle. Following case management directions of 2 August 2024, the appeals have been heard together. As there are separate decision notices, the appeals have not been consolidated under a single case number. Nevertheless, the appeals are linked and so this decision addresses both appeals.
3.
The appeal under Case no. FT/EA/2024/0195 is against a decision of the Commissioner dated 15 May 2024 referenced IC-281994-M0Y0 (“the First Decision Notice”).
4.
The appeal under Case no. FT/EA/2024/0233 is against a decision of the Commissioner dated 10 June 2024 referenced IC-274273-P0V2 (“the Second Decision Notice”).
Procedural Matters
5.
The parties opted for a determination of the appeal on the papers. Following the receipt of revised bundles (see below), the Tribunal is satisfied that it can properly determine the issues without a hearing in accordance with Rule 32 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“2009 Rules”).
6.
The Tribunal panel convened on 23 June 2025 to make the paper determination. The documentary evidence before the Tribunal comprised an open and closed bundle and closed submissions. The closed bundle contained the withheld information. It emerged that the closed bundle was lacking in clarity in material respects necessitating the Tribunal to issue further case management directions on 23 June 2025. Therefore, the case was adjourned part-heard pending the receipt of further information.
7.
In particular, the Tribunal noted that Ofgem had suggested that two other exemptions under FOIA applied besides sections 31, 40 and 44 on which no submissions had been made. There was disparity between the index in the closed bundle and the Table annexed to the witness statement of Robert Alexander. This made it difficult to establish which exemptions were claimed to apply to the content of each withheld document. No gist of the closed bundle had been provided to the Appellant, which appeared as though it might be incomplete in any event. In addition, it appeared to the Tribunal that Ofgem may not have fully reviewed whether some information could be released with redactions if necessary.
8.
In response, an updated closed bundle was provided plus a supplemental witness statement from Mr Alexander with open redacted version. Ofgem did not consider that any material could be moved into the open bundle. However, it reissued a revised version of the open witness statement of Mr Alexander with fewer redactions. Ofgem removed some information from the closed bundle that was out of range of the Requests. It added other information identified as being within scope, which had not been before the Commissioner. A gist of the closed bundle was supplied to the other parties along with open written submissions from Counsel for Ofgem (dated 16 June 2025, revised 14 July 2025).
9.
Ofgem confirmed that aside from sections 31, 44 and 40(2) of FOIA, it additionally seeks to rely upon sections 41 and 43(2) FOIA. Its reliance on section 21 FOIA had already been withdrawn. Neither section 41 nor section 43(2) were argued at the time of the Commissioner’s decisions.
10.
The Appellant and Commissioner were afforded opportunity to comment on all open revised or new material, including additional exemptions relied upon, and the gist. The Appellant provided written submissions in reply on 15 July 2025. The Commissioner did not respond.
11.
The original and revised closed bundles for both appeals are held under Rule 14(6) in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions made on 19 May 2025 and 17 July 2025. Updated Annex 1 to the further open witness statement of Robert Alexander contains the table of withheld documents with only the description of the documents redacted. References hereafter to document numbers are to the numbered exhibits of RDA2 within the first column of that table. There is one exception; document 6 included an undated page (at CB page RDA2/030) that is unconnected to other pages within that document. The Tribunal refers to this page as document 6A.
12.
The Tribunal panel resumed its considerations on 11 September 2025 in light of the revised and supplementary documentation.
13.
It is sufficient for the Tribunal to provide all our reasons for our decisions in a single, open decision. A confidential Closed Annex has been provided to identify the names of persons to be redacted from the information to be released and aspects of our reasoning which refer to closed material. If no appeal is made against our decision, or if any appeal is unsuccessful, then paragraphs 5-11 of that reasoning need not remain confidential.
The Requests
14.
On 17 November 2023, the Appellant sent to Ofgem a request (“the November Request”) for the following information:
“Please can I have a copy of all correspondence you have exchanged with the Times newspaper in February 2023? This should include any notes you have made of verbal conversations.
You will be aware I have previously requested this information. I am requesting it again on the advice of the ICO.”
15.
The Decision Notice of 15 May 2024 records that the context for the request, as provided by Ofgem, was that: “ In February 2023, The Times newspaper published allegations into British Gas’ conduct of imposing forced prepayment meter installations on vulnerable customers. Ofgem opened an investigation into British Gas on 2 February 2023, and formally published the terms of reference of its investigation into British Gas Trading Ltd’s compliance with its licence conditions on 21 February 2023.”
16.
On 8 October 2023, the Appellant sent a request (“the October Request”) to Ofgem as below:
“Please can I have a copy of all correspondence you have exchanged with the Times newspaper in March 2023? This should include any notes you have made of verbal conversations.”
Refusal of the Requests
17.
Ofgem responded on 3 November 2023 to the October Request disclosing some redacted emails and citing sections 31(1)(g) with 31(2), 40(2) and 44(1)(a) FOIA as its basis for refusing to provide the remaining information. That decision was upheld by Ofgem upon an internal review communicated by letter of 4 December 2023.
18.
On 14 December 2023, Ofgem provided some information to the Appellant to the November Request and refused the remainder on the basis that the information was exempt from disclosure under sections 21, 31, 40 and 44 of FOIA. Ofgem subsequently withdrew reliance upon section 21 and the Commissioner’s investigation focussed on sections 31, 40 and 44 of FOIA.
19.
Following the Appellant’s request of 16 December 2023, Ofgem conducted an internal review on 17 January 2024 and maintained its position.
The Decision Notices
20.
The Appellant’s complaints to the Commissioner were made on 4 December 2023 and 13 January 2024 concerning the October and November Requests, respectively.
21.
For the same reasons in both Decision Notices, the Commissioner decided that Ofgem correctly cited section 31(1)(g) with subsection 31(2)(c) of FOIA to refuse to disclose the withheld information and that the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption. He has also decided that section 44(1)(a) FOIA was correctly cited. Whilst not mentioned in the decision for the Second Decision Notice, the Commissioner additionally found in the First Decision Notice that Ofgem correctly relied upon section 40(2). The Commissioner did not require any further steps in either case.
22.
In reaching those decisions the Commissioner:
22.1
Was satisfied that the exemption at section 31(1)(g) provides grounds for refusing to disclose the withheld information as to do so would be likely to prejudice Ofgem’s functions when it is investigating whether it should take action under its regulatory powers under the Gas Act 1986 or the Electricity Act 1989 .
22.2
Having gone on to consider whether the public interest lies in disclosure, the Commissioner decided that Ofgem’s arguments in favour of withholding the information were more persuasive.
22.3
Ofgem was entitled to rely on section 44(1)(a) of FOIA to withhold the requested information. Section 105(1) of the Utilities Act 2000 prohibits Ofgem from disclosing it, and there is no lawful gateway to disclosure.
22.4
There is no Article 6 basis for processing and so the disclosure of the information would not be lawful. Ofgem is entitled to withhold the information under section 40(2), by way of section 40(3A)(a).
The Appeal
23.
The grounds of appeal are the same in both appeals:
23.1
The Commissioner does not appear to have considered whether the exemptions actually apply to all the withheld information e.g. the Appellant cannot see how section 44 FOIA could apply to emails that Ofgem sent to The Times.
23.2
There was a particularly strong public interest in release of any material relating to the threats that Ofgem reportedly used to try to force The Times to release journalistic information. The relevant emails, appropriately redacted, should be released.
23.3
The same applies to any informal requests for information prior to the formal threats.
23.4
One reason Ofgem claims section 31 applies is: "If correspondence between Ofgem and third parties relating to an investigation was to be made public, it would discourage parties from communicating with us in and open and transparent manner”. This seems very generic and not really applicable where they have tried to force The Times to provide information against its will.
23.5
Two separate requests were made due to the section 12 costs limit.
The Commissioner’s Response
24.
The Commissioner opposes the appeal and invites the Tribunal to examine the withheld information within the closed bundle. He does not consider that the public interest argument raises anything new, not previously addressed. Reliance is placed upon the reasons within the Decision Notices.
The Appellant’s Reply to the Commissioner’s Response
25.
It is agreed that the key facts are those set out in paragraphs 4 to 7 and 11 of the First Decision Notice, as summarised above.
Ofgem’s Response
26.
In summary, Ofgem says as follows below.
27.
The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (the “Authority”) regulates the gas and electricity markets in Great Britain. Ofgem carries out the Authority’s day-to-day work and investigates matters on its behalf.
28.
The Requests are focused on Ofgem’s exercise of its general functions under the Gas Act 1986 (the “1986 Act”) to collect information with respect to exercising its functions in considering whether a licenced gas provider was complying with its licence obligations, and further, whether there was evidence to prompt Ofgem opening an enforcement investigation.
29.
The Authority’s principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and future energy consumers. To do so, it exercises powers under the Electricity Act 1989 (the “1989 Act”) and the 1986 Act which give the Authority the function to investigate and take law enforcement against regulated parties in the electricity industry.
30.
Ofgem submits that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given in the Decision Notices, the Commissioner’s Response and Ofgem’s Response.
31.
The withheld information comprises emails between employees of The Times and Ofgem obtained by Ofgem in exercise of its general functions under the 1986 Act . Ofgem obtained information with respect to considering whether a licenced gas provider was complying with its licence obligations, and further whether there was evidence to prompt Ofgem opening an enforcement investigation.
32.
Regarding section 31 FOIA, Ofgem says:
32.1
Disclosure would prejudice Ofgem’s current and ongoing investigation into British Gas’ compliance. British Gas would be on notice of the areas likely to be the focus of investigation. It could impact the process of ongoing and future evidence collection and information gathering.
32.2
These concerns apply equally to disclosure to parties who could be the subject of a future investigation. It would impact the investigation of other providers of the degree to which they did, or did not, comply with their Standards of Conduct, and broader licence obligations. These obligations are ongoing. Future investigations into compliance with Standards of Conduct will likely involve consideration of historical compliance data.
32.3
Ofgem relies on establishing and maintaining good relationships with third parties, including whistleblowers, to secure high-quality information and reporting. Disclosure of the withheld information would discourage third parties, or providers, from responding in an open and transparent way. Disclosure would prejudice the ability to gather facts and/or evidence. This applies to both current and future investigations.
32.4
Importantly, there is a concern that disclosure would reveal information about the threshold level at which Ofgem would initiate enforcement action with impact on compliance with licence obligations. Revealing such information would encourage providers to do the “bare minimum” needed to avoid enforcement action. Disclosure would impact more widely across Ofgem’s enforcement portfolio.
32.5
Importantly, there are already set pathways for disclosure, both to providers and
to the wider public, as part of Ofgem’s enforcement process. To circumvent that
regime would prejudice that process.
32.6
There is risk that disclosure of material which represents the initial thinking of Ofgem caseworkers could undermine the confidence of providers; it risks giving the impression that the outcome of the investigation is predetermined, undermining confidence in an independent process. As a result, providers may be less likely to engage openly with Ofgem. This, in turn, could impact on Ofgem’s ability to discharge its statutory functions.
32.7
Disclosure would undermine the basis on which Ofgem was able to select matters for enforcement investigation. It would impact not only investigation of compliance into British Gas, but also Ofgem enforcement investigations, and decision-making, more broadly.
32.8
It would undermine public confidence in Ofgem’s processes for enforcement of licence conditions, and in such inquiries being undertaken appropriately and with due regard to the rights and expectations of involved parties.
32.9
Disclosure would impact current and future investigations and enforcement actions.
33.
In terms of the public interest test, Ofgem says the balance favours maintaining the exception:
33.1
Ofgem accepts there is a public interest in transparency in its approach to obtaining information in considering whether to open an enforcement investigation. That interest is addressed through disclosure by Ofgem as outlined in Enforcement Guidelines.
33.2
Decisions to open, and close, investigations are published on Ofgem’s website. The basis on which the decision was taken to open an investigation is set out in that notice. If enforcement action is taken, the nature of that action will be published on Ofgem’s website.
33.3
The withheld information will not significantly advance the public interest in transparency. Communications with third parties which relate to a decision to open an investigation represent an information gathering stage and may not yet be determinative. While internally that information can be handled with the appropriate caveats, public disclosure would, effectively, treat the information as it if were complete and conclusive.
33.4
Any public interest of the Appellant in understanding more about how Ofgem approaches its information gathering, particularly with third parties, while considering whether to exercise any of its enforcement functions (specifically in considering the evidential thresholds regarding opening an enforcement action) is an interest that is substantially outweighed by the public interest in ensuring that Ofgem can undertake its enforcement investigations, effectively, fairly, promptly and lawfully.
Ofgem’s supplemental response
34.
As the withheld information consists of correspondence with The Times newspaper, Ofgem consulted The Times on 17 April 2025. Its letter of reply of 24 April 2025 is provided with The Times’ consent. Having provided The Times with copies of the Requests and the material identified for possible release, The Times was of the clear view that three exemptions applied. Firstly, section 40(2) as the information revealed personal data about their journalists. This went beyond names and included “jigsaw identification” based on their future publications. The Times also identified sections 41 and 43(2) FOIA based broadly on the confidentiality of newsgathering activity. This included what The Times was, and was not, prepared to publish. The Times also highlighted the confidential nature of information and referred to a number of published articles.
35.
In the normal course of events communications between journalists and Ofgem’s media were treated as confidential. It is submitted that each piece of correspondence in one way or another forms part of The Times’ newsgathering activity and plans for unpublished articles. Examples are provided to demonstrate the point.
36.
Having reviewed, the closed bundle and having consulted The Times, Ofgem agreed to the Rule 14(6) order being lifted for paragraph 93 of Mr Alexander’s first witness statement and to paragraph 7 of its submissions of 16 June 2025 dealing with the additional exemptions claimed. These paragraphs are unredacted in the resubmitted versions.
The Appellant’s Reply to Ofgem’s Responses
37.
Ofgem have not explained how they “obtained” emails that they themselves sent.
38.
None of Ofgem’s responses address correspondence about threats The Times claims Ofgem made to force them to reveal journalistic material and their subsequent withdrawal.
39.
Any “chilling effect” under section 31 has already happened based on reporting in The Times – other journalists considering investigating energy suppliers will already be aware of what happened.
40.
Redaction would allow the core of the threats to be released without revealing any secrets about what exactly Ofgem was investigating, if necessary.
41.
There is no sense in which the threats were “obtained” from anyone else so as to engage section 44 FOIA.
42.
In reply to Ofgem’s response to the Tribunal’s directions of 23 June 2025, the Appellant reiterated that it is likely that some information can be released with redactions. By way of example, The Times had published that Ofgem had used statutory powers to make threats of criminal sanctions and fines if it did not hand over confidential journalistic material, the Times resisted and Ofgem backed down.
43.
The Appellant finds it hard to see how any new claims of sections 41 and 43(2) FOIA apply at all, particularly given the broad outline already in the public domain. However, the Appellant considers that if the information really does have the “quality of confidence” then it creates a strong public interest in making exactly what was said available. The Appellant accepts that the names of anyone at The Times not already in the public domain are likely exempt under section 40(2). Whether the names of Ofgem staff are exempt would depend upon their seniority.
The Law
FOIA
44.
FOIA provides that any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing if that information is held (section 1(1) (a)) and if that is the case to be provided with that information (section 1(1) (b)). These entitlements are subject to a number of exemptions which can be absolute or subject to the public interest balance in section 2(2)(b) FOIA namely that in:-
“... all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information”
45.
The exemption in section 31(1)(g) FOIA, which is subject to the public interest balance, provides that:-
"(1)
Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice- (g) the exercise by any public authority of its functions for any of the purposes specified in subsection (2),"
46.
Section 31(2)(c) FOIA provides:-
"(2)
The purposes referred to in subsection (1)(g) to (i) are- (c) the purpose of ascertaining whether circumstances which would justify regulatory action in pursuance of any enactment exist or may arise"
47.
Section 40 FOIA concerns personal information. Subsection 40(2) provides:
“(2)
Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if— (a) it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1), and (b) the first, second or third condition below is satisfied.
(3A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act — (a) would contravene any of the data protection principles …
(3B) The second condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene Article 21 of the UK GDPR (general processing: right to object to processing).
(4A) The third condition is that— (a) on a request under Article 15(1) of the GDPR (general processing: right of access by the data subject) for access to personal data, the information would be withheld in reliance on provision made by or under section 15, 16 or 26 of, or Schedule 2, 3 or 4 to, the Data Protection Act 2018 …
48.
Section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”) defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual”. The “processing” of such information includes “disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available” ( section 3(4) (d) DPA), and so includes disclosure under FOIA.
49.
The data protection principles are those set out in Article 5(1) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (“UK GDPR”), and section 34(1) DPA. The first data protection principle under Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR is that personal data shall be: “processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject”. To be lawful, the processing must meet one of the conditions for lawful processing listed in Article 6(1) UK GDPR. These include where “the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes” (Article 6(1)(a)).
50.
It also includes where “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.” (Article 6(1)(f)). The UK GDPR goes on to state that this condition shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks, but section 40(8) FOIA omits this provision, meaning that Article 6(1)(f) can be used as a lawful basis for the disclosure of personal data under FOIA.
51.
The balancing of interests test under Article 6(1)(f) involves consideration of three questions (as set out by Lady Hale DP in South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55 ):
(i)
Is the data controller or third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed pursuing a legitimate interest or interests?
(ii)
Is the processing involved necessary for the purposes of those interests?
(iii)
Is the processing unwarranted in this case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject?
52.
The wording of question (iii) is taken from the Data Protection Act 1998 , which is now replaced by the DPA and UK GDPR. This should now reflect the words used in the UK GDPR – whether such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data.
53.
Section 41 FOIA concerns information provided in confidence. Under subsection (1) information is exempt from disclosure if it was obtained by the public authority from any other person and the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise than under FOIA) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any other person.
54.
Under section 43(2) FOIA, information is exempt if its disclosure under FOIA would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it).
55.
Section 44(1)(a) provides that information is exempt information if its disclosure is prohibited by or under any enactment. As it is an absolute exemption the public interest balance does not apply. The relevant statute in these appeals is the Utilities Act 2000 (“ UA 2000 ”).
Utilities Act 2000
56.
The relevant provisions within the UA 2000 are:
105.— General restrictions on disclosure of information.
(1)
Information which–
(a)
has been obtained under or by virtue of the provisions of this Act , Part I of the 1986 Act Part 1 of the 1989 Act ….; and
(b)
relates to the affairs of any individual or to any particular business,
shall not be disclosed during the lifetime of the individual or so long as the business continues to be carried on, except as provided below.
(2)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a disclosure made with the consent of the individual or the person for the time being carrying on the business.
(3)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a disclosure if– (a) it is made for the purpose of facilitating the performance of any functions of the Secretary of State, the [ Authority ]… under the 1986 Act , the 1989 Act … or this Act .
Schedule 1 - Supplementary powers
11(1) The Authority has power to do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the performance of its functions.
Role of the Tribunal
57.
The role of the Tribunal is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice is in accordance with the law, or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based (section 58(2)). This means that we may review all the evidence provided to us (even if that evidence was not before the Commissioner) and make our own decision on the merits.
58.
As set out in NHS England -v- Information Commissioner and Dean [2019] UKUT 145 (ACC) "The First-tier Tribunal ‘exercises a full merits appellate jurisdiction and so stands in the shoes of the IC and decides which (if any) exemptions apply..."
59.
In Peter Wilson -v- The Information Commissioner [2022] UKFTT 0149 it was held that:- “30...the Tribunal’s statutory role is to consider whether there is an error of law or inappropriate exercise of discretion in the Decision Notice. The Tribunal may not allow an appeal simply because it disagrees with the Information Commissioner’s Decision. It is also not the Tribunal’s role to conduct a procedural review of the Information Commissioner’s decision-making process or to correct the drafting of the Decision Notice.”
The Issues
60.
The main issues for the Tribunal to determine in this appeal are:
•
Was disclosure of the information prohibited under the Utilities Act 2000 ( section 105(1) (a) and (b)) for section 44 FOIA to be engaged?
•
Is the disputed information confidential within the meaning of section 41(1) FOIA?
•
For any information which is confidential, would disclosure be in the public interest such that it would not amount to an actionable breach of confidence?
If not,
•
Would disclosure of the information prejudice, or be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person, including Ofgem?
•
Would disclosure be likely to prejudice the exercise by Ofgem of its functions for the purpose of ascertaining whether circumstances exist or may arise which would justify regulatory action in pursuance of any enactment?
•
If so, does the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information?
•
If any information is not exempt under sections 44, 41, 43(2) or 31 FOIA, does section 40(2) FOIA apply?
Findings of Fact
61.
Ofgem has statutory duties under various legislation including the Gas Act 1986 Act, the Electricity Act 1989 and UA 2000 .
62.
On 31 January 2023, The Times provided evidence to Ofgem relating to British Gas’ use of pre-payment meters in the homes of its vulnerable customers.
63.
On 1 February 2023, The Times published allegations into British Gas’ conduct of imposing forced prepayment meter installations on vulnerable customers. Ofgem opened an investigation into British Gas on 2 February 2023. It formally published the terms of reference of its investigation into British Gas Trading Ltd’s compliance with its licence conditions on 21 February 2023.
64.
The information derived from The Times was the key piece of information that led Ofgem to make a provisional order on 2 February 2023 against British Gas on the basis that it appeared to Ofgem that British Gas was or was likely to contravene its Standard Licence Conditions. The provisional order was made under powers within the 1986 Act and 1989 Act. It is available on Ofgem’s website.
65.
The first request (the October Request) was made to Ofgem on 8 October 2023. Ofgem responded to the request on 3 November 2023.
66.
The second request (the November Request) was made to Ofgem on 17 November 2023. Ofgem responded to the request on 14 December 2023.
Consideration
67.
The approach that the Tribunal has taken is to start with the absolute exemptions. If we have found that an absolute exemption applies, we have not gone on to consider other exemptions claimed, it being unnecessary to do so. Of course, where absolute exemptions have been found not to apply, we have proceeded to consider the other exemptions. Where we have identified that an exemption applies to information within an email chain, we have treated all the information as covered by that exemption. We have not attempted to separate out parts of the information as any potentially disclosable information was minimal and would be meaningless without the context of the withheld information.
Section 44
68.
Section 44(1)(a) FOIA provides that information is exempt information if its disclosure is prohibited by any enactment. In this case, if disclosure of information is not prohibited by section 105(1) UA, then condition (a) above is not satisfied, and the information is not exempt information under section 44(1)(a).
69.
In deciding that Ofgem was entitled to rely upon section 44(1)(a), the Commissioner cited Ofcom v Gerry Morrissey and the Information Commissioner [2011] UKUT 116 AC to the effect that neither the Commissioner nor the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine whether the public authority acted reasonably.
70.
The Commissioner further quoted its guidance on prohibitions on disclosure under section 44 that:
“Where a public authority has discretion about applying a gateway to disclosure, the Commissioner will not question or examine the reasonableness of the authority’s decision. If the authority has decided that information should not be disclosed under a gateway, the Commissioner will only verify that the authority has made that decision, and not consider whether its decision was reasonable. So, if there is a statutory prohibition on disclosure and the authority has decided that it is not disapplied by a gateway, then the Commissioner will accept that section 44(1)(a) applies.”
71.
As set out in Morrissey :
“54.
The language of s 2(2)(a) confirms that it must be for the public authority initially to determine whether the information requested is exempt “by virtue of” s 44. This in turn means that it is for the public authority to consider whether, in the light of the specific nature of the request made, and of the particular nature of the information sought to be disclosed, the applicability of some other statutory enactment results in the prohibition encapsulated in s 44. It will then be for the Commissioner to verify whether or not the public authority has dealt with the matter in accordance with the requirements of Part I of FOIA.”
“58.
The Commissioner’s statutory remit, in accordance with ss 18 and 50 of FOIA, is to decide whether a public authority has failed to deal with a request in accordance with the requirements of Part I of FOIA . It follows that the Commissioner is then charged with the responsibility of verifying whether the exercise required by FOIA has been correctly conducted by the public authority in question. The exercise which the Commissioner conducted was, insofar as it examined the reasonableness of OFCOM's failure to conclude that disclosure should be made under s 393(2), not in our view an exercise required by FOIA in the circumstances of the present case. As s 44 confers an absolute exemption , the role of the Commissioner, and thereafter that of the tribunal if appropriate, is limited to a verification process. There is, of course, a question of statutory construction as to what it is that FOIA contemplates will be involved in the verification process. Once that is resolved i t is not the role of the Commissioner to stray beyond that remit.”
72.
It was initially for Ofgem to determine whether the information requested is exempt by virtue of section 44. The Tribunal’s powers are restricted by reference to those of the Commissioner, which are limited to a verification exercise. This was summarised at paragraph 63 of Morrissey as:
“ In short, the task of the Commissioner is to make a decision whether, in any specified respect, a request for information made by a complainant to a public authority has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part I of FOIA. That may well require a view to be taken on the construction of a potentially relevant statutory bar on disclosure in other legislation. I n the circumstances of the present case it did not extend to asking the questions which might be asked on the subject of reasonableness by a court of supervisory jurisdiction examining a challenge to OFCOM's failure to exercise powers available to it under the 2003 Act.”
73.
Following the above approach and whether Ofgem dealt with the request “in accordance with the Requirements of Part I”, the question for the Commissioner and for the Tribunal is whether disclosure is prohibited under section 105 UA 2000 .
74.
Ofgem maintains that the information was obtained either under Schedule 1(11)(1) of the UA 2000 by reference to its enforcement functions under the 1986 Act and the 1989 Act or directly under those Acts by reference to Ofgem’s enforcement functions. It is further maintained that the information relates to the affairs of a particular business, being The Times and British Gas. As such, it is argued that the information is subject to the general restriction on disclosure within section 105 UA 2000.
75.
The Tribunal’s attention is drawn by Ofgem to the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Office of Gas and Markets v Pytel [2019] ICR 715 . At paragraphs [77-78] section 105(1) is described as creating “a very widely worded prohibition” that provides “a carefully crafted scheme of exceptions from the prohibition”.
76.
Not all information obtained by Ofgem is prohibited from disclosure under the UA 2000 . Ofgem states that it considered if any of the disclosure gateways in section 105 apply but concluded that they do not. In any event, Ofgem’s position is that the gateways provide a power to disclose but not a duty. Even so, the Tribunal has started by looking at whether section 105 UA 2000 could apply to the information claimed as exempt. It should not be assumed that section 105 automatically applies to all the communications. Section 105 is framed in terms of information “obtained” with reference to its functions under the named Acts.
77.
The Tribunal is satisfied that newly identified document 17 for the November Request falls within the statutory prohibition of section 105 of UA 2000 for section 44 FOIA to be engaged. In terms of the October Request, section 44 applies to documents 26 to 29 (inclusive), 33, 37 to 41 (inclusive) and 42.8 to 42.11 (inclusive), falling within Ofgem’s enforcement functions that are prohibited from disclosure by UA 2000. Although section 44 was not listed against document 42.8 in the table of withheld documents, this was clearly in error as section 44 was claimed on the document itself.
78.
It strikes the Tribunal that Ofgem has taken a broadbrush approach. It cannot have fully considered whether the information within each of the remaining documents was exempt under section 2(2)(a) FOIA by virtue of section 44(1) (a)). Whilst UA 2000 is drafted widely, it does not encapsulate any/all communications that Ofgem may have. The Tribunal concludes that Ofgem has not dealt with the Requests in respect of the remaining documents in accordance with Part 1 FOIA. Other than those documents listed above, section 44 is not engaged.
Section 41
79.
The Tribunal had no difficulty in concluding that the first limb of section 41(1)(a) FOIA is satisfied where withheld information was obtained by Ofgem from another person, namely from a journalist at The Times.
80.
However, section 41(1)(a) was not fulfilled in the numerous instances where Ofgem was not receiving information but providing it to The Times.
81.
Where information was received by Ofgem, the Tribunal must decide whether the second limb of section 41(1) is met. The question here is whether there was an actionable breach of confidence at the date of the response to the request. That is the relevant date. In our considerations we are not limited to matters known to Ofgem. It is permissible to have regard to later occurring matters if they cast light on the circumstances at the relevant date.
82.
For section 41(1)(b) to be satisfied:
(i)
The disclosure of the information must constitute a breach of confidence; (ii) A legal person must be able to bring an action for the breach of confidence to court; (iii) That court action must be likely to succeed.
83.
In respect of (i) above, the Tribunal has applied the three-fold test in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 , read in the light of the developing case law on privacy:
•
Does the information have the necessary quality of confidence?
•
Was it imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence?
•
Is there an unauthorised use to the detriment of the party communicating it?
84.
Information possesses the ‘necessary quality of confidence’ if it is more than trivial, is not otherwise accessible and is worthy of protection in the sense that someone has a genuine interest in the contents remaining confidential. The Tribunal is satisfied that documents 6A, 7, 8, 19 and document 35 meet this threshold. They concern journalistic investigation and information provided in confidence whilst operating under cover.
85.
In considering the second bullet point, the Tribunal notes that where information was provided by journalists to Ofgem, from or with reference to a source, there would have been a clear expectation of confidentiality for this element to be met.
86.
On the third bullet point, it would be detrimental to the interests of The Times if it affected the trust that could be placed in it by third parties or disclosed possible reporting or journalistic investigations. The Times has not consented to the release of any of communications.
87.
The common law of confidence has developed in the light of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to provide, in effect, that the misuse of ‘private’ information can also give rise to an actionable breach of confidence. If an individual objectively has a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information, it may amount to an actionable breach of confidence if the balancing exercise between Article 8 and Article 10 rights comes down in favour of Article 8.
88.
Section 41 is an absolute exemption, but a public interest defence is available to a breach of confidence claim. Accordingly, there is an inbuilt balancing of the public interest in determining whether or not there is an actionable breach.
89.
As for element (ii) set out above, clearly The Times is a legal person entitled to enforce Ofgem’s duty of confidence in relation to information in the withheld documents identified.
90.
The final part of the test for engaging section 41 is whether the action for breach of confidence is likely to succeed. From the information before us, there is no apparent defence or lawful excuse to a breach of confidence. The Times had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the information within the documents identified by the Tribunal as within the scope of section 41. On balance, the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh the protection of confidences in this case.
91.
We conclude that documents 6A, 7, 8, 19 and 35 are exempt from disclosure under section 41 FOIA.
92.
We do not consider that there is the necessary quality of confidence with regard to the other documents (not already identified as exempt). It can suffice that the preservation of confidentiality is of substantial concern to the person in question, which is not regarded as a high threshold to satisfy. However, w here journalists engage with a public authority that is subject to FOIA, there can be no expectation that such exchanges will automatically be exempt by reason of journalistic activities. There is no cloak of confidentiality that can be universally applied to all such exchanges whatever the content. From the content, we are not satisfied that there would be justified cause for concern in preserving confidentiality for the remaining documents.
Section 31
93.
We have considered section 31 in relation to the information within the closed bundle not already found to be exempt under either section 44 or section 41.
94.
Ofgem relies on the purpose set out at section 31(2)(c) FOIA, being “(c) the purpose of ascertaining whether circumstances which would justify regulatory action in pursuance of any enactment exist or may arise…”.
95.
Whether circumstances exist to justify regulatory action, derive from provisions of the 1986 and 1989 Acts. Both Acts empower Ofgem in carrying out its functions in relation to licenses and certification. In this instance, there was an ongoing investigation into whether British Gas was complying with its licence obligations.
96.
We are satisfied that 31(2)(c) FOIA is engaged in relation to document 34 when considering the document as a whole.
97.
Section 31 is a qualified exemption, meaning that where it is engaged, we must still determine the public interest in the information being released. There is a distinction to be drawn between matters in which the public may be interested and matters which are properly in the public interest i.e. it is for the public good that particular information be known. Press articles are not, or not exclusively, determinative of that latter question.
98.
There is a public interest in the transparency and accountability of public authorities generally, particularly in the public having confidence that public authorities are discharging their obligations. Nevertheless, given that Ofgem’s investigation was said to be ongoing at the time of its Response to the Requests, we find that the public interest balance lies in withholding the information.
99.
Accordingly, Ofgem was entitled to rely on section 31 in terms of document 34. We find no other information (not already found to be exempt) captured by the criteria of this exemption.
Section 43(2)
100.
The exemption under section 43(2) of FOIA uses the terms ‘would’ and ‘would be likely to’ prejudice the commercial interests of any person. This means that the prejudice in question is more probable than not or that there is a real and significant risk of it happening.
101.
The following statement from a First-tier Tribunal case was subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Department for Work and Pensions v Information Commissioner & Frank Zola [2016] EWCA Civ 758 , as being the correct approach:
“On the basis of these decisions there are two possible limbs on which a prejudice based exemption might be engaged. Firstly, the occurrence of prejudice to the specified interest is more probable than not, and secondly there is a real and significant risk of prejudice, even if it cannot be said that the occurrence of prejudice is more probable than not.”[27] – see also Carolyne Willow v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 1876 at paragraph 27.
102.
Therefore, for such exemption to apply, there must be some causative link between the potential disclosure of the relevant information and the prejudice to the commercial interests of a person. The prejudice must also be real, actual or of substance and it must relate to the interests protected by the exemption.
103.
The commercial interests raised are those of The Times. The information to which section 43(2) could apply has already been identified as exempt for other reasons. The exemption is also argued in relation to most of the other communications. We are simply not satisfied that disclosure of the information within the documents not already found to be exempt would be likely to affect The Times’ commercial interests.
104.
A key point is the time the exemption is to be assessed. There may be sensitivities at the time of exchange that have disappeared by the time of the Response. That is the relevant date. In this instance, there is not a real or significant risk of prejudice where information concerning a journalistic investigation has already been published at the date of Response. The remaining documents cannot be said, for instance, to reveal the newspaper’s approach to potential coverage so as to cause prejudice.
105.
Of the documents within the closed bundle not already found to be exempt, the Tribunal finds no others to be exempt by virtue of section 43(2) FOIA.
Section 40(2)
106.
The information withheld under section 40(2) comprises names, job titles and contact details (telephone numbers and email addresses). Plainly, the contact details are personal information exempted from disclosure under section 40(2).
107.
Names and job titles are ‘personal data’, but only exempt information if one of the conditions in section 40(3A), (3B) or (4A) is met. Here, the exchanges are between members of the Media Team and a national newspaper. There are legitimate interests in disclosure of the information including the identity of those involved, other than individuals in junior roles. We are not satisfied that some names belong to those holding ‘junior’ positions from their job titles and involvement in the exchanges.
108.
There is general public interest in transparency where a regulator engages with the press. We accept that the processing is reasonably necessary for these interests. There is not an alternative means by which the Appellant can obtain this type of information about the requested matter. We find that such interests are not overridden by the interests and rights of the data subjects. The Times has provided its own reasons for not wishing disclosure of any part of the communications. Where the information concerns material subsequently published under the name of the reporter, that personal data was already placed in the public domain by the time of the Responses.
109.
Moreover, those in senior positions at Ofgem involved in issuing press releases, responding to press enquiries and communicating with journalists more generally in a role within a public authority, cannot expect anonymity.
110.
Those individuals who are not in senior roles are identified in the CLOSED Annex, where there is also additional closed reasoning. Their details are exempt under section 40(2) and should be redacted as should third party details who were merely copied into communications. To this limited extent only Ofgem was entitled to rely upon section 40(2) FOIA. None of the three conditions are otherwise satisfied.
Conclusions
111.
We find that some of the documents within the closed bundle are covered by the claimed exemptions as follows:
111.1
section 44 was engaged for documents 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42.8, 42.9, 42.10 and 42.11.
111.2
section 41 was engaged for documents 6A, 7, 8, 19 and 35.
111.3
section 31 was engaged for document 34.
112.
The remaining documents within the closed bundle listed below are exempt only insofar as they include personal information which has been found to engage section 40(2) as identified in the CLOSED Annex. They should be disclosed with appropriate redactions.
•
Documents 1-6 (not 6A)
•
Documents 9-16
•
Document 18
•
Document 20
•
Documents 21-25
•
Documents 30-32
•
Document 36
•
Documents 42.1 – 42.7
•
Documents 42.12 - 42.13
113.
In summary, we have found that some of the requested information is not covered by the claimed exemptions and so should be disclosed under FOIA. The appeal is therefore upheld in part, and we issue the Substituted Decision Notices set out at the start of this Decision.
Signed: Judge Saward Date: 20 October 2025