Eski Avukattaki Müvekkil Dosyasının Teslimi

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THE HIGH COURT

                                                                            [2025] IEHC 748  

Record No: 2023/ 6292 P

 

BETWEEN

CATHERINE RYAN  

PLAINTIFF

AND

 

TWILIO IRELAND LIMITED

DEFENDANTS

Ex tempore judgment of Ms. Justice Emily Egan delivered on the 8^th day of December 2025

Introduction

1.            The plaintiff brings these proceedings against the defendant, (whom I will refer to as the plaintiff's employer) for breach of contract, penalisation contrary to the Protected Disclosures Acts 2014-2022 and associated wrongs. The plaintiff had instructed Lalloo & Company Solicitors (whom I will refer to as the former solicitors) to act on her behalf in these proceedings but has since terminated their retainer. In the present motion, the plaintiff seeks an order directing her former solicitors to deliver the complete client file to her new solicitors whom she proposes to instruct or to the plaintiff herself.

2.            The plaintiff's original fee agreement with her former solicitors was on a "no foal, no fee" basis. The present proceedings were initiated by plenary summons issued on 22^nd December 2023. It is not entirely clear what stage these proceedings have reached. What is clear, however, is that, for reasons which it is not necessary to detail here, the relationship of trust and confidence between the plaintiff and her former solicitors has broken down, culminating in the plaintiff's decision to discharge her former solicitors on 12^th August 2025. On receiving notice of this discharge, the plaintiff's former solicitors wrote to the plaintiff on 21^st August 2025, agreeing to apply to the High Court to come off record but informing the plaintiff that it would not be possible to do so until the end of the Civil Court's vacation in October or November 2025. The former solicitors also explained that because the plaintiff had terminated their retainer, the "no foal, no fee" agreement was also terminated. The former solicitors were therefore entitled to be paid for work done to the date of termination, before releasing the client's file. It was therefore indicated that the former solicitors had sent the plaintiff's file to legal cost accountants to draw up a bill of costs. It is not clear what progress has been made by the legal cost accountants in drawing up the bill. To date, there is no evidence that the bill of costs has been furnished to the plaintiff.

3.            The former solicitors resist the plaintiff's application for delivery of her file and rely upon their common law lien in respect of their outstanding fees. The plaintiff alleges that her former solicitor's common law lien is not enforceable because no valid section 150 legal costs notice pursuant to the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 was ever issued to her and because the service provided to her was unsatisfactory. The foregoing issues are the subject of a complaint that the plaintiff has made against her former solicitors to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority ("The LSRA"). The LSRA is treating the plaintiff's complaint as alleging that the legal services provided were of an inadequate standard and/or as alleging that the acts or omissions of the former solicitors constitute misconduct.

4.            Both the present proceedings against the plaintiff's employer and the investigation by the LSRA of her complaint against her former solicitors are ongoing. It would clearly not be appropriate for me to detail or comment further upon the proceedings themselves, the cause of the breakdown of the relationship of solicitor and client or on the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaints to the LSRA against her former solicitor.

5.            The plaintiff alleges that the continued non-release of her file is obstructing her representation in active High Court proceedings. The plaintiff's affidavit exhibits a letter dated 28^th October 2025 from her employer requesting that she attend a medical examination for the purposes of ascertaining whether she is medically fit to re-engage in the redundancy consultation process or, in the alternative, what reasonable accommodations the employer could put in place to facilitate such re-engagement. The plaintiff informed the court verbally that she has very recently received confirmation that her employer intends to progress with the redundancy process on 12^th December 2025. Whilst the plaintiff should have averred to this fact on affidavit, I am loath to delay matters for the purpose of securing a further affidavit. The plaintiff is the sole breadwinner in her family and the sole provider for two teenagers. There is clearly significant urgency in the plaintiff retaining an alternative firm of solicitors to advise her in relation to these matters.

6.             The plaintiff's affidavits suggested that she had consulted with a new firm of solicitors ("the proposed new solicitors"), who had agreed on a provisional basis at least to represent her. However, the proposed new solicitors have also quite properly informed her they could not fully advise her without an opportunity to review her file.

7.            On 30^th September 2025, the plaintiff emailed her former solicitors a "formal data subject access request" under Article 15 of the General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation 2016/ 679 (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. The plaintiff requested "access to all personal data concerning me that your firm holds or has held, in any format." The plaintiff advised that under the relevant legislation the former solicitors had 30 days to respond to the request. The former solicitors replied via email on 3^rd October 2025 and stated that "due to the volume and complexity of your request, it is necessary to extend the response time" and that the plaintiff could expect to receive a response and a copy of her personal records not later than 30^th December 2025. It does not appear that any such response had been sent to the plaintiff by the time of the hearing of the present application before me.

 

Legal principles

8.            The following are the applicable legal principles, most of which were summarised by McBride J. in the Northern Irish case of Donaghy v. JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd [2019] NICh 1:

A.    The solicitor's file is the property of the client.

B.    The solicitor has a lien over any property of the client that comes into his possession until he is paid. In Ismail v. Richards Butler (A Firm) [1996] 2 All ER 506, Moore-Bick J. observed:

"It has long since been recognised that, subject to any agreement to the contrary, a solicitor is entitled to exercise a general lien in respect of his costs on any property belonging to his client, which property comes into his possession in his capacity as solicitor"

C.    Any "no foal, no fee" arrangement is determined if the client decides to discharge the solicitor.

Thus, in Cadden v. Vesey and Kent Carty Solicitors [2016] IESC 75, McKechnie J. stated:

"In addition, it should be pointed out that in its publication, A Guide to Good Professional Conduct for Solicitors, (3rd Ed., October 2013), para. 7.6, the Law Society states:- "Unless a solicitor is agreeable to do so, there is no reason why the first solicitor should continue to fund a case after the client has left that solicitor. If costs are due, a bill of costs should be furnished without delay. Costs may be agreed, arbitrated or taxed. 'No foal, no fee' arrangements are determined if the client moves to another solicitor. It can be implied in these contingency fee arrangements that they are conditional on the first solicitor continuing to have prosecution of the case. The first solicitor will be entitled to his fees for the work done."

I respectfully agree with this passage."

This is confirmed in the most recent edition of the Law Society's Solicitor's Guide to Professional Conduct (4th Ed., September 2022).This states that if instructions have been accepted on a contingency basis, it is implied in the arrangement that the solicitor will continue to have carriage of the case. If the solicitor's retainer is terminated the solicitor is entitled to be paid for the work done to the date of termination of his instructions.

D.   A solicitor therefore has a general right to withhold the client's file until he is paid.

In Ismail v. Richards Butler (A Firm), Moore Bick J. stated:

"The basic rule is that a solicitor has the general right to embarrass his client by withholding papers in order to force him to pay what is due and the court will not compel him to produce them at the instance of the client."

This principle was cited with approval by Laffoy J. in Treacy v. Roche [2009] IEHC 103.

E.    However, where it is the solicitor who terminates the retainer, the court will normally make an order obliging the original solicitor to hand over the file to the new solicitor against an undertaking by the new solicitor to preserve the lien of the original solicitor. This jurisdiction has been exercised by the High Court of Ireland in a number of decided cases, to include: Treacy v. Roche, Ahern v. Minister for Agriculture [2008] IEHC 286, and Mulheir v. Gannon [2006] IEHC 274.

F.    Whilst, in such circumstances, the right of the original solicitor to recover the papers at the conclusion of the litigation may be worthless, the solicitor retains a right of action against the former client in contract.

G.   In Treacy v. Roche [2009] IEHC 103, Laffoy J. referenced "the general right to embarrass his client by withholding papers in order to force him to pay what is due" and observed:

".... While I accept that, in reality, the entitlement to get the papers back at the end of the litigation may be worthless, as I emphasised in my judgment in the Ahern case, a direction to hand over papers on the basis of preserving a solicitor's lien does not in any way affect the liability of the client for the costs which have accrued to the former solicitor. Such costs are a matter of contract between the client and the solicitor, subject, of course, to material statute law, including... provisions in relation to taxation of costs on a solicitor and client basis... and the powers conferred on the Law Society by the provisions of ss. 8 and 9 of the Solicitors (amendment) Act" (which authorises a range of  sanctions in the case of inadequate service or excessive fees).

H.   By contrast, where the client terminates the retainer, this is a weighty factor against interfering with the exercise of the original solicitor's lien.

I.     However, even where the client terminates the retainer, the court retains full supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors as officers of the court. In Donaghy v. JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd, McBride J. held that, even where the client terminates the retainer, the court may therefore interfere with the enforcement of the solicitor's common law lien on equitable principles:

"Similarly, notwithstanding the existence of some jurisprudence which indicates that the court will automatically refuse a client's application for files to be delivered up in the absence of costs being paid or secured in circumstances where the client has terminated the retainer...  I consider that there is no reason in principle why, in appropriate circumstances, a court could not interfere in the enforcement of a common law lien on equitable principles, even when it is the client who terminates the retainer. This is because the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction can make such order as to delivery up as it thinks fit having regard to the overall interests of justice; - see Slatter v Ronaldsons [2001] All ER (D) 251 in which Patton J stated...:

"...I am prepared to accept, on the authorities, that there is no reason, in principle, why, in appropriate circumstances, the court should not be able to interfere in the enforcement of the common law lien, on equitable principles."

J.     On the other hand, in Ellis v. John Hodge Solicitors [2022] EWHC 2284, the High Court of England and Wales (Commercial Division) also stated that because certain earlier cases had not been cited to the court in Donaghy v. JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd, it may be that the broad statement in Donaghy of the court's power to interfere in the lien where a client terminates a solicitor's retainer other than for misconduct is incorrect. It may be necessary therefore to distinguish between cases in which the client terminates the retainer for alleged misconduct from those where misconduct is not alleged.

K.    Overall, therefore, Irish courts have approved the general principle that a solicitor claiming a lien over a file "should have every security not inconsistent with the progress of the cause." In Heslop v. Metcalfe (1837) 3 My & G. 183, Lord Cottenham L.C. held

"I then take the law as laid by Lord Eldon, and, adopting that law, must hold that [the solicitor] is not permitted to impose upon the plaintiff the necessity of carrying on his cause in an expensive, inconvenient and disadvantageous manner. I think the principle should be, that the solicitor claiming the lien, should have every security not inconsistent with the progress of the cause."

This passage has been relied upon in a number of Irish cases, including Ahern v. Minister for Agriculture and Cadden v. Vesey.

L.    The courts of England and Wales have held that various relevant factors may be considered by the court in exercising its equitable jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the common law lien. In Donaghy v. JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd, McBride J. summarised the law as follows:

"[11] In assessing the nature of the order which best serves the interest of justice, Leggatt J in A v B [1984] 1 All ER 265 observed at page 274- 275 that the court should weigh the following two matters:

"(a) That a litigant should not be deprived of material relevant to the conduct of his case and so driven from the judgment seat, if that would be the result of permitting the lien to be sustained, and

(b) That litigation should be conducted with due regard to the interests of the court's own officers, who should not be left without payment for what is justly due to them."

[12] In the exercise of its discretion therefore the court must have regard to all the factual circumstances of the case. Whilst recognising each case is fact specific, the following is a non-exhaustive list of factors which the court may consider relevant to the exercise of its discretion:

• When, why and who ended the solicitor/client relationship?

 • The nature of the case.

• The stage litigation has reached.

• The conduct of the solicitor and client respectively.

• The balance of hardship which might result from the order the court is asked to make.

• The fact the value of the solicitor's lien is likely to be considerably diminished if the papers required for pending litigation are handed over..."

 

Guidance from the Law Society

9.            In Cadden v. Vesey, McKechnie J. specifically referenced the Law Society's publication "A Guide to Good Professional Conduct for Solicitors" (3rd ed., October 2013) para. 7.6 in relation to the transfer of files between solicitors. This guidance has now been updated and the most recent edition Solicitor's Guide to Professional Conduct (4th ed., September 2022) provides as follows:

"When a file is transferred to another firm, the first solicitor may opt to accept an undertaking in respect of the payment of costs as an alternative security to the solicitor's common law lien. However, there is no obligation upon the first solicitor to accept such an undertaking. It is advisable for a solicitor who is the second solicitor instructed by a client, and who is giving an undertaking to pay a first solicitor's costs, to qualify the undertaking to say, firstly, that it is conditional on the second solicitor not being discharged by the client and, secondly, to say it is conditional on sufficient monies coming into the solicitor's control to pay the costs. Other qualifications as necessary may be made.

In cases where an undertaking in respect of the payment of costs is being accepted by the first solicitor, all outlays paid should be discharged immediately to the first solicitor."

10.        A Law Society Practice Note dated August 2020, Transferring Files Between Solicitors states that the original solicitors may agree that a proportion of the fees would be paid immediately, the balance to be secured by a suitable undertaking. Indeed, I note that an even more stringent approach was ultimately taken in Donaghy v. JJ Haughey Solicitors Ltd. Rather, the court having noted the undesirability of unnecessarily impeding the litigation and "driving the plaintiff from the judgment seat"  nonetheless ordered the delivery of the papers on the basis of an undertaking by the plaintiff to give security for the full costs due to the original solicitor.

11.        This Practice Note emphasises that, in the event of a file transfer, the original solicitor must ensure that if costs are due, a bill of costs should be furnished without delay. The original solicitor has a professional duty to furnish the client or his solicitor with the bill of costs as soon as reasonably possible. He may wish to have the costs drawn by a costs drawer. If he does so, he should refer his file to the costs drawer immediately and ensure that the matter receives prompt attention. If there is delay in furnishing the bill of costs, the smooth transition of the matter between the two solicitors is unlikely to be accomplished. The Practice Note observes that the judiciary, while upholding a solicitor's lien, have been very critical where there has been delay by the first solicitor in furnishing his bill of costs.

12.        The same Practice Note also offers advice to solicitors in the event of a GDPR request by a former client in the context of a file transfer. In summary, the Practice Note advises that the exercise of a lien will not override the rights which a client has under the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the "GDPR") along with the Data Protection Act 2018. Under Article 15 of the GDPR, an individual has a right to a copy of their personal data which is held by any firm (acting as a controller) as long as such data is held either (i) electronically, such as on a computer system (ii) on a manual file, as long as the file forms part of a "filing system", i.e. where the file is structured according to specific criteria which makes the information relating to the individual readily accessible, e.g., a file with an individual's name on the front of the file. Compliance with an access request does not automatically mean that a solicitor is required to copy an entire file and hand it over to the requester. Instead, what is required is to provide a copy of personal data which relates to the requester. Therefore, a solicitor may provide a copy of personal data but may exclude anything on the file which relates to third parties (save where same relates to both the requester and another individual) or any documents or records which do not constitute personal data at all (e.g. information relating to companies rather than the individual themselves). 

13.        This means that a solicitor exercising a common law lien on a client's file is still required to fulfil a data access request. Importantly the Practice Note reminds solicitors that data access requests should be completed within one month. In very limited circumstances, this time period may be extended by up to two further months.

 

Summary of legal principles and Law Society Guidance

14.        In summary, the law distinguishes between circumstances in which a retainer is terminated by the solicitor and those in which it is terminated by the client.

15.        Where the retainer is terminated by the solicitor - even for reasonable cause - the court is more protective of the client and indeed of the litigation. In such circumstances, the usual approach will be to order the original solicitor to hand over the file subject to the preservation of his or her lien, albeit that this lien would be of little real value once the original litigation has terminated.

16.        Where, however, it is the client that discharges the solicitor's retainer, the court will be less inclined to interfere with the lien. In such circumstances, the original solicitor may elect to accept an undertaking from the new solicitor in respect of the costs as an alternative security to their lien. If the original solicitor is in principle prepared to accept an undertaking, then its precise terms will be a matter for the client's instruction and thereafter for negotiation and agreement. There is, however, no obligation on the original solicitor to accept an undertaking offered as alternative security to his or her common law lien. Further, whilst it would generally be advisable or prudent for the new solicitor to offer a conditional undertaking, such a conditional undertaking is unlikely to represent sufficient security for the original solicitor, particularly where liability is in issue in the underlying proceedings.

17.        I am satisfied, however that, particularly where the client terminates the retainer for alleged misconduct, the court retains the discretion to interfere with the enforcement of the solicitor's common law lien on equitable principles. I am further satisfied that, in considering whether, and in what manner, to interfere with the exercise of the lien, the court should make the order which best serves the interests of justice. This means that the court must weigh in particular (i) the risk that the client would be deprived of material relevant to the conduct of the case if the lien is sustained; against (ii) the principle that litigation should be conducted with due regard to the interests of officers of the court, who should not be left without payment for what is properly due to them. In determining the appropriate order, the court should have regard to all of the circumstances of the case such as those enunciated by McBride J. in Donaghy (see para 8L above).

18.        As a matter of good practice, on termination of the retainer a bill of costs should be furnished without delay. Further, even if a solicitor is exercising a common law lien on a client's file, they are still required, as a matter of good practice, to respond adequately to a GDPR data access request within one month, or exceptionally three months of the said request.

 

Application of the above to the present case

19.        In this case, it is the client who has discharged the former solicitor's retainer. This terminates the contingency fee agreement and the plaintiff's former solicitor, who is in principle, entitled to be paid for work done to date before releasing the file, has invoked his common law lien. Liability has not been admitted by the plaintiff's employer in the underlying proceedings, and one could not therefore assume that an award of money will necessarily be paid to the plaintiff at the conclusion of this litigation to discharge these fees.

20.        In such a case, whilst the court is, in principle, less inclined to interfere with the lien, it nonetheless retains the discretion to do so on equitable principles. It is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the application of equitable principles requires the court to interfere with the enforcement of her former solicitor's common law lien.

21.        In the present case, it is difficult to apply several of the non-exhaustive list of factors identified by McBride J. in Donaghy as relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion [see para 8L above], such as why and who ended the solicitor/client relationship or the "conduct" of the solicitor and client respectively. The plaintiff has set out her version of why the solicitor client relationship has ended and has impugned the conduct of her former solicitor. Because these matters form the basis of the plaintiff's complaint to the LSRA, it is entirely reasonable that her former solicitor has not replied to or engaged with these aspects of the plaintiff's affidavit. Likewise, it would clearly not be appropriate for me to detail or comment on these matters. Still less, in the absence of a reply from the plaintiff's former solicitor, can I make any findings of fact in relation thereto.

22.        However, it is possible to assess the impact of certain of the other factors identified by McBride J. Thus, as regards the nature of the case, my understanding is that it is an employment dispute arising out of an alleged protective disclosure. Neither the plaintiff nor her former solicitors have provided evidence as to the stage that the litigation has reached. As a matter of practical reality, there is evidently an imminent possibility that the underlying employment relationship will be terminated on foot of the forthcoming redundancy process. In assessing the nature of the order which best serves the interests of justice, I am satisfied that there is a significant risk that, if the file is not released even for a limited further period of time, this may irreversibly deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of her proceedings. It would deprive her of legal representation should she wish to either challenge the redundancy process, participate in same, or negotiate a termination package in that context. Further, even if the plaintiff is not in a position to secure alternative legal representation, I am satisfied that the non-release of her file would also seriously impede her ability to advocate for herself in any of these respects. The scenario thus presenting has the potential to impact upon the plaintiff's constitutional right to earn a livelihood and her right of access to the courts to challenge the forthcoming redundancy process. The  imminence of these potentially grave impacts distinguishes the present case from one in which the underlying litigation is merely interrupted but not wholly nullified by the full enforcement of a solicitor's common law lien. Furthermore, regardless entirely of the cause of the breakdown of the relationship of trust and confidence as between the plaintiff and her former solicitor, the plaintiff should have been furnished with a bill of costs without delay. In view of the expiry of almost four months since the termination of the retainer, I am not satisfied that this has been attended to with sufficient urgency. Likewise, in light of the urgency of the plaintiff's present circumstances, I am concerned that over two months have passed without any meaningful response to the plaintiff's GDPR data access request. Although the former solicitor has informed the plaintiff that her GDPR request is complex, he has not explained how, in all the circumstances, this gives rise to exceptionality justifying a three month delay. In my view, all of the above factors mean that the balance of hardship which might result from an order of the court interfering with the lien of the former solicitors lies in favour of the plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the value of the lien is likely to be considerably diminished if the file is released.

23.        In considering the form of order that would be appropriate, I did not understand the former solicitors to object, in principle, to an unconditional undertaking by the proposed new solicitor to the discharge of their fees as an alternative security to their lien.

24.        However, any solicitors coming on record for the plaintiff are likely to favour an undertaking which is conditional on their not being discharged by the client and, on sufficient monies coming into their control to pay the costs. It is quite possible that, without the facility for a conditional undertaking such as this, the proposed new solicitors will, on reasonable grounds, decline to represent the plaintiff. This might render the continuation of the litigation practically impossible, which would be to the detriment of the plaintiff. I observe that this would also, in all likelihood, be to the detriment of the former solicitors whose prospects of successfully recovering the costs outstanding would be reduced. It is therefore in the joint interests of both the plaintiff and her former solicitors that a solution is identified which enables the current litigation to proceed and, crucially, enables the plaintiff to deal in an informed manner with the imminent redundancy process.

25.        In response to a query from the court, the former solicitors indicated that they would be prepared to release the plaintiff's file to her new solicitors on an undertaking to discharge their fees in the event of the successful conclusion of these proceedings by settlement and/or agreed termination and or/by award of the court subject to an order for costs. Apportionment of the respective fees of the former solicitors and the proposed new solicitor would be determined at the conclusion of the proceedings and in default adjudicated upon by a costs accountant with both firms discharging the cost accountant's fees in accordance with the decision on apportionment. Reasonable outstanding outlays were to be discharged prior to release of the file.

26.        As is apparent from my review of the legal principles above, there was no legal obligation on the former solicitors to accept an undertaking - still less a conditional undertaking such as this - and it is to their credit that, in the best interests of their former client, they agreed to do so. The plaintiff also indicated that she would be prepared to issue an instruction to her proposed new solicitor to issue such an undertaking.

27.        Unfortunately, in the time available, neither the plaintiff nor her former solicitors have been able to confirm that this undertaking is acceptable to the proposed solicitors. At present, therefore it is not clear whether the plaintiff will in fact be legally represented or whether she will have to represent herself in the proceedings and crucially, in the imminent redundancy process. It is to be regretted that the time is so short that the plaintiff, her former solicitor, and her new solicitor have been unable to reach agreement on these matters before this court issues its ruling. My sense is that, were it not for the extreme urgency now presenting, a mutually acceptable undertaking could have been agreed between the plaintiff's former solicitor and her new solicitors. Certainly, as I say the plaintiff's former solicitors have evinced a flexible and constructive approach. For the avoidance of doubt, I should also say that it is clear that the proposed new solicitor fully appreciates their professional obligations on the transfer of files between solicitors and has acted entirely properly in this regard.

28.        It is therefore necessary for any order of this court to provide in the alternative for two scenarios; one in which new solicitors come on record for the plaintiff and one in which she is compelled to act as a litigant in person, either indefinitely or until the steps necessary to effect transfer of the file to a new solicitor can be affected.

29.        Looking at the first scenario: if the plaintiff requires that her former solicitors release her file to a new solicitor nominated by her (who may or may not be the same form as the proposed new solicitor), I am satisfied in the exercise of my discretion that it is appropriate to order as follows:

a)    The former solicitors to deliver the file to the new solicitors without prejudice to the former solicitor's lien against the plaintiff. The new solicitors retained by the plaintiff to furnish the former solicitors with an undertaking to hold the said file and documents subject to the former solicitor's lien and to return them to the former solicitor on the conclusion of the proceedings.

b)    The new solicitors retained by the plaintiff to furnish the former solicitors with an undertaking to discharge their fees on the conclusion of the litigation by settlement and/or agreed termination and or/by award of the court subject to an order for costs and subject to the said fees being agreed, assessed or adjudicated subject to apportionment (as to which see para c below), and subject to any ruling of the LSRA on foot of the plaintiff's complaint.

c)    The apportionment of the respective fees of the former solicitors and the new solicitor retained will be determined at the conclusion of the proceedings and in default adjudicated upon by an agreed costs accountant with both firms discharging the cost accountant's fees in accordance with the decision on apportionment.

d)    As recommended by the Law Society the undertaking of the new solicitor is to be conditional on such new solicitor not being discharged by the plaintiff and on sufficient monies coming into their control to pay the costs.

e)    Accordingly, I direct the plaintiff to provide irrevocable instructions to any new solicitor whom she proposes to retain to provide an undertaking to her former solicitors in the above terms. It will be a matter for any new solicitor to decide whether they are prepared to represent the plaintiff on foot of such an undertaking.

f)     I am further satisfied that; on such a scenario it is appropriate that the plaintiff put the new solicitor in funds in a provisional amount of €1,500 plus VAT prior to the release of the file to discharge properly drawn outlays. This sum is to be paid out by the new solicitor to discharge outlays only when same are agreed, assessed, or adjudicated upon, and any deficit in outlay is to be discharged by the plaintiff at the conclusion of the litigation. Likewise, any surplus is to be repaid to the plaintiff at the conclusion of the litigation. For the avoidance of doubt, I have nominated this figure for convenience only and have not assessed outlay in this amount.

30.        In light of the urgency of the situation, the plaintiff, her former solicitors and any new solicitor must use their best endeavours to secure the transfer of the file no later than close of business on 11^th December 2025. Notwithstanding these best endeavours, it is reasonable to anticipate difficulty in concluding these matters prior to that date.

31.        It is therefore quite possible that the second scenario will arise in which the plaintiff will have to proceed in the first instance as a litigant in person, at least until new solicitors are retained. As the plaintiff requires urgent access to her file to respond to the imminent redundancy process, I propose to manage this second potential scenario in the following manner.

32.        I order that, if the plaintiff requires that her former solicitors release her file directly to her, she must take the following steps:

a)    Write to her former solicitors by close of business on 9^th December 2025 requesting the release of her file, subject to their lien.

b)    In the said letter the plaintiff should provide written authority to her former solicitors to write to the solicitors representing her employer in the litigation requesting and authorising them that at the conclusion of the litigation by settlement and/or agreed termination and or/by award of the court subject to an order for costs, they should pay directly to her former solicitors such fees as are agreed, assessed or adjudicated subject to apportionment (as to which see para c below), and subject to any ruling of the LSRA on foot of the plaintiff's complaint.

c)    In the said letter the plaintiff should acknowledge that the apportionment of the respective fees of her former solicitors and any new solicitor will be determined at the conclusion of the proceedings and, in default, adjudicated upon by an agreed costs accountant with both firms discharging the cost accountants' fees in accordance with the decision on apportionment.

d)    In the said letter, the plaintiff should provide written authority to her former solicitors to inform the solicitors representing her employer in the litigation that the said fees of the former solicitors when agreed, assessed, adjudicated upon, and apportioned are to be paid directly to the plaintiff's former solicitors, irrespective of whether the plaintiff continues the litigation as a litigant in person or engages alternative solicitors.

e)    However, the letter ought to also note, for the avoidance of doubt that, in the event that the plaintiff retains new solicitors, the authority or instruction that the fees of the former solicitors are to be paid directly to them by the employer's solicitor may, with the written consent of the plaintiff, her former solicitors and her new solicitor be revoked.

f)     Immediately upon receiving this letter the plaintiff's former solicitors shall forthwith, and in any event no later than close of business on 10^th December 2025 write as aforesaid to the solicitors representing her employer in the litigation, copying same to the plaintiff. The said letter should inform the solicitors representing her employer in the litigation that the said letter is sent in compliance with the order of this court. The former solicitors shall duly confirm that the solicitors representing her employer in the litigation have received the said letter.

g)    I further order that, prior to the release of the file, the plaintiff pay to her former solicitor, a provisional amount of €1,500 plus VAT to discharge properly the drawn outlays of the former solicitor. This sum is to be held by the former solicitors until the conclusion of the litigation at which stage it can be deployed to discharge outlays when same are agreed, assessed, or adjudicated upon. Any additional sum found to be due for outlay is to be discharged by the plaintiff at the conclusion of the litigation. Likewise, any surplus in the said sum once outlays have been discharged is to be repaid to the plaintiff at the conclusion of the litigation. For the avoidance of doubt, I have nominated this figure for convenience only and have not assessed outlay in this amount.

h)   The plaintiff's former solicitors to release her file to her within 48 hours of receipt of the said sum of €1,500 plus VAT for outlays.

i)     The plaintiff to undertake that, at the conclusion of the litigation, she will, if requested, return her file to her former solicitor.

33.        Finally, it is quite possible that a combination of the above two scenarios will come to pass, and that the plaintiff will need to temporarily represent herself until alternative representation is secured. In such circumstances, in accordance with para 32 e) above, the plaintiff, her former solicitors and her new solicitor can agree to revoke the prior instruction/authorisation that the plaintiff's employer's solicitor pay the former solicitor's costs directly and replace it with an undertaking in the form set out at para 29 above or some other form of mutually agreed undertaking.  

34.        I will hear the parties as to the form of a final order and any consequential matters. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, this case will be re-listed before me upon the expiry of 7 days from the date of delivery, on Tuesday 16^th December at 11am.